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This thesis consists of seven chapters which highlight
the importance of logistics to sustain conventional
warfare; identifies shortcomings within NATO's Central
Region of Europe, where the UK has committed forces;
and suggests methods of overcoming some of the resource
deficiencies by enhanced management.
The first chapter defines logistics and highlights the
importance of Central Europe to the NATO Alliance.
The second chapter examines the albeit changing pers¬
pective and nature of conflict in the European Theatre.
The third chapter identifies the different military
logistics management systems used by the Central Europe
NATO Allies and the Soviet forces; and draws interest¬
ing conclusions concerning the UK's logistics methods.
The fourth chapter examines the sensitive subject of
sustainability and logistic stock levels which includes
an examination of the burden sharing debate. The fifth
chapter defines and examines the concept of interoper¬
ability of military means and resources within NATO,
an area of weakness. The sixth chapter outlines NATO
command responsibilities for logistics in the Central
Region, which is also a weak area. The seventh and
final chapter summarizes the key areas discussed in
the preceding chapters and identifies means of improv¬
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
...what cannot be supported logistically
cannot be accomplished tactically.1
Erickson
The subject of logistics within academic defence studies
tends to take second place to the more exciting aspects
of strategy, tactics, military equipment and force
2
strengths. It has been noted by the historian, Martin
Van Creveld, that "hundreds of books on strategy and
tactics have been written for every one on logistics",
however the true professional military analyst well
appreciates that one of the keys to successful opera¬
tions is sound logistic support to the fighting troops,
especially when the emphasis is placed upon Generalship
in its broadest sense. The military historian, J F C
Fuller, noted in his treatise on Alexander the Great
that 'supply' provided the basis for the successful
4
strategy and tactics of the Macedonian Army, and some¬
what later during the Second World War, the then General
Sir Archibald Wavell (later Field Marshal and Viscount)
drew attention to 'logistics' a word then not in common
use, with this view:
The more I have seen of war, the more
I realize how it all depends on admin¬
istration and transportation (what our
1
American allies call logistics). It
takes little skill or imagination to
see where you would like your forces
to be and when; it takes much know¬
ledge and hard work to know where you
can place your forces and whether you
can maintain them there.5
From the opposing party another oustanding wartime
field commander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, made,
similar apreciation about supply:
The first essential condition for an
Army to be able to stand the strain
of battle is an adequate supply of
weapons, petrol and ammunition...
The bravest men can do nothing with¬
out guns, the guns nothing without
plenty of ammunition: and neither
guns nor ammunition are of much use
in mobile warfare unless there are
vehicles with sufficient petrol to
haul them around.6
Field Marshal Rommel mentions the term mobile war¬
fare which many military professionals tend to
regard, together with 'fire and manoeuvre', as a
comparatively recent development; but the Macedonian
Army of Alexander the Great is reported to have been
7
the most mobile force in existence at the time. It
achieved the ability to make swift marches by train¬
ing soldiers to carry their arms,armour and rations
and making do with a light baggage train. An excel¬
lent study on the logistics of this Army by Donald
Engels provides a valuable insight into the preparation
and planning of military supply in the 4 th Century BC.
2
The comment that "Alexander better understood the
capabilities and limitations of his logistic system
g
than perhaps any other commander, before or since"
is understandable given the daily supply requirements
of a mobile force numbering some 65,000 personnel
with 6,100 cavalry horses, and the success with which
9
Alexander moved them into battle. The main demands
of grain, forage and water was however not complicated
at that time by the needs for ammunition for "even as
late as 1870, ammunition had formed only a neglible
10
fraction of all logistic requirements".
The major change came with the First World War
which saw staggering expenditures of ammunition.
From 1914 to 1918 Britain shipped to France over 170
11
million shells and the 1916 British offensive on the
12
Somme alone used some 1.5 million shells. Figure 1.0
provides a contemporary view of volume production at
a National Shell-filling Factory of the day. The
most surprising statistic of the war from a logistics
view is that ammunition did not represent the greatest
dead weight or volume of supply. The provision of
hay and oats outstripped the demands for munitions
and the tonnages moved to France during the four years
were :
Hay and Oats: 5,439,000 tons
Ammunition: 5,253,000 tons




The latter figure is surprising in an era which saw
the first deployment of heavy tanks (Somme 1916),
and the introduction of internal combustion engine
lorries. However, the figures tell the tale that
thousands upon thousands of horses were used for
logistic support in the war and Figure 1.1 serves as
an appropriate reminder of this fact.
The Second World War placed far greater emphasis
upon the requirements for fuel which, when linked with
ammunition and essential spares, relegated the demands
for subsistence - the updated equivalent of the
14
Macedonian Army's grain, forage and water, from
their 100% to a mere eight to twelve percent of all
15
supplies. This fundamental change is tied to the
process of logistics primarily needed to support men
which was applicable to the armies of Alexander,
Napoleon, and to a less extent, those of the Second
World War, towards the still developing concept of
logistics essentially required to support weapon
16
systems. One learned historian has gauged the pro¬
portion for today's supply between ammunition, fuel
and the miscellaneous balance needed to support
troops to be 30, 40 and 30% respectively with the
latter 30% including less than 10% for the subsis-
17
tence of the soldier. It is suggested that even
this freely acknowledged rule of thumb guide is wrong




increasing support demands of equipments far out¬
strips the logistic needs of personnel. Proportions
around 40% ammunition, 55% fuel and 5%,the remainder
would be nearer the truth for planned conventional
18
mobile operations at today's high intensity levels.
In this introduction we have moved fairly swiftly
from the 4th to the 20th Century because while the
academic rigour of defence studies is most frequently
concerned with historical analysis, this thesis is
directed towards NATO logistics of today. The NATO
history is only 40 years old, but provides enough
lessons to examine current logistic strengths and
weaknesses. Although most essential background data
are recent for a real historian, conclusions for the
future can be made by recognizing the valuable
military lessons learned from structured historical
19
study. It is significant that the few books on
20
logistics for the hundreds on strategy and tactics
are all historically based with very little attempt
to draw lessons for the future. By focusing on the
military logistics of NATO's Central Region today,
without neglecting the historical experience, this
21
paper attempts to provide a more vivid abstract view.
* * *
Forty years ago the United Kingdom joined eleven
7
i
other nations in the capital of the United States to
22
form a defensive alliance. The treaty, known as the
North Atlantic Treaty was formally signed on 4 April
1949 in Washington and was ratified by member nations
within just five months, see a copy of the document
at Appendix A. In time the original twelve signatories
to the agreement were joined by four other countries,
the last being Spain in 1981. Total membership of the
Alliance is now sixteen. The core of the Treaty is
Article 5 in which member nations "agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
23
America should be considered an attack on them all".
It also commits them to take necessary steps to help
each other in the event of armed attack. One former
Director of the British Atlantic Commission has expressed
the view that "Article 5 must one day take its place
among the great proclamations of history, along side
24
the Magna Carta and the US Declaration of Independence"
and this represents the highest praise for the draft¬
ing of a Treaty which has formed:
...an association of free states joined
together to preserve their security
through mutual guarantees and collective
self-defence as recognized by the United
Nations Charter.25
Emphasis should be placed upon 'free states' as the
NATO Alliance is not a supranational organization,
but is inter-governmental where nations retain their
8
own sovereignty. While maintaining individual inde¬
pendence, countries are allied together in an official
group which provides a forum for consultation and
27
coordination of security policies. The formulation
of common goals and strategies has resulted in various
national commitments to the agreed NATO structure.
For the UK the major and most direct contribution
involves the allocation of land/air forces to Central
Europe on the basis that "The forward defence of the
Federal Republic of Germany is in effect the forward
2 8 \
defence of Britian itself". This comprises the \
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) which has a peactime
strength of 55,000, but would be expanded to a total
force of about 150,000 on mobilization, and 12,000
29
Royal Air Force personnel.
NATO aims to deter Soviet aggression through a
strategy of forward defence and flexible response.
The concept of forward defence "dates formally from
a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York
70
in 1950"; this logically ties in with the North
Atlantic Treaty to defend all territory of the
71
Alliance. The strategy of flexible response, often
known by its NATO Military Committee document desig¬
nation of MC 14/3, was adopted in 1967.^ The strategy
of flexible response means that the Alliance should
aim to have sufficient forces to respond to any level
of aggression and possess a full spectrum of forces
9
so that it can counter any act of aggression with an
appropriate response. In consequence, NATO forces
are made up of three interlocking elements known as
the NATO Triad.^ They are:
- conventional forces strong enough to
resist and repel a conventional attack
on a limited scale, and to sustain a
conventional defence in the forward areas
against large scale conventional aggression;
- intermediate and short-range nuclear
forces to enhance the deterrent and, if
necessary, the defensive effort of NATO's
conventional forces against a conventional
attack; to deter and defend against an
attack with nuclear forces of the same
kind; and to provide a linkage to the
strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance
with the aim of convincing an aggressor
that any form of attack on NATO could
result in very serious damage to his
interests, and of emphasizing the- dangers
implicit in continuing a conflict;
- United States and United Kingdom strategic
nuclear forces which provide the ultimate
deterrent.3^
The most important leg of NATO's Triad of deterrence
is the ability to wage a conventional war. The
longer the Alliance can sustain a conventional
defence, more time is made available for political
manoeuvring, but more importantly it delays the pos-
35
sible need to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
This is fundamental not only to keep the nuclear
threshold high, but to try to ensure there is no
excuse for either side to escalate its choice of
weaponry. A strong conventional defence is essential
10
to meet the true aims of a flexible response stra-
tegy and thus temper the undue reliance currently
placed by NATO upon the 'unpredictable' aspect of
an Alliance response. It is emphasized that the
current strategy is not based upon a fixed ladder
of escalation; but retains the policy to vary its
37
response.
Although there is a large numerical imbalance between
O O
the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO,
it does not follow that an effective defence cannot
be successful against a numerically stronger attacker.
Indeed, Clausewitz noted that "the defensive form of
39
warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive".
Well known terrain and established logistic support
systems coupled with mobility and flexibility favour
a well trained and determined defender. This can
often off-set the strength advantages of an aggressor
40
- up to a certain level. NATO has strong and well
trained forces in Central Europe which should be
capable of compensating for its numerical deficiencies
with effective fighting power. However, fighting
power is a combination of many variables of which
training, equipment, team spirit, tactics and logistics
are, but some of the elements. It has been noted by
one historian that "strategy like politics, is said
41
to be the art of the possible". However, what is
possible is determined not merely by numbers of troops,
11
tactical awareness, level of training, quality of arms,
determination and morale, but by the facts of what is
made available in terms of ammunition, fuel, spares
42
and transport. In other words, logistic support.
The UK Government has described NATO's continuing
4 3
commitment to Central Europe as "The European Pillar"
where it has been noted that the major threat to the
Alliance comes from Warsaw Pact forces concentrated
44
along the Inner German Border. However, all pillars
need firm foundations and the keystone of conventional
4b
defence is the sustainability of forces. It follows
that if NATO logistic systems cannot keep pace with
demands, or conventional war stocks become exhausted,
the remaining option must entail the use of nuclear
weapons, irrespective of its further implications.
This perspective is quite basic, but all the indica¬
tions are that the NATO Alliance has become gravely
deficient in its ability to sustain a conventional
4 6
defence. Initially guarded warnings by political
and military leaders are now increasing in tempo and
forthrightness, for example, the prestigious US commis¬
sion on integrated long-term strategy reported that:
The US and its allies have frequently
stated that their forces in Europe are
not equipped to sustain themselves in
combat beyond a certain number of days,
and that they would then have to turn
to nuclear weapons.47
12
A similar view is taken by the North Atlantic Assembly
special committee whose report NATO in the 1990s links
the need to improve conventional defence to raise the
nuclear threshold and highlights supply and ammunition
shortfalls which currently limits "the ability of
48
Allied Forces to sustain combat". The warnings have
slowly gathered momentum from the veiled hints of
several years ago, for example, when the then Commander
in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe commented that
"the combat value of our forces depends, to a great
4 9
extent, on the availability of supplies", to a full
acknowledgement of logistic deficiencies by today's
50
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. A warning expressed
by UK's former Chief of Defence Staff in the House of
Lords summarizes the position:
You can only increase the effective¬
ness of our conventional forces -
if that is really the Government's
intention - ...particularly through
the provision of greater stocks of
ammunition in comparison with the
sometimes dangerously low levels
that exists at present.51
Apart from 'dangerously low level' the other key
words of the statement are 'if that is really the
Government's intention'. This query is not applic¬
able to UK alone as, in a cost limiting environment,
all political leaders have a difficult task in apply¬
ing national priorities to balance the needs of an
13
effective conventional NATO deterrence. The purchase
of expensive up-to-date weapon systems and the main¬
tenance of efficient combat units offers more apparent
fighting power than enhancing logistic units or hold¬
ing adequate war stocks.. The former is more apparent
to those within the Armed Services, the latter may be
more carefully concealed. All the Allies find the
provision of credible conventional deterrent forces
52
a severe financial burden. The trend is to minimize
costs but, at the same time, endeavour to enhance dis¬
cernible deterrence. A key area open to adjustment
is to improve 'teeth to tail' ratios by maintaining
53
or enhancing the more visible combat forces; but
reduce service support systems in terms of personnel,
equipment and war stocks. The following comment by
the Professor of War Studies at King's College London
is relevant:
...any policy of deterrence, whether
nuclear of conventional, puts a lot of
emphasis on appearances and the appear¬
ance of technological dynamism might be
valuable whatever the reality.54
The reality is that within the Alliance today there
is insufficient logistic support providing inadequate
conventional sustainability and this situation is
rightly causing concern within NATO Headquarters."^
Apart from the financial considerations briefly men¬
tioned, the major reason for the problem stems from
14
the original Western European agreement that "Logistics
is a purely national responsibility in peace and in
56war". This principle was endorsed by the North
57
Atlantic Council in 1952; however the simple state¬
ment has created one of the weakest links in NATO today
and affects the very foundations of the European Pillar.
It has resulted in varying types of weapons and ammuni¬
tion, and differing national views on logistics has
caused varying stock levels and has influenced the
willingness of nations to place vital logistics under
NATO control.
This study is undertaken in the conviction that the
keystone of sustainability in respect of conventional
defence with nuclear's threat to balance in multi¬
national operations has never really set firm. In
addition 'sustainability' is likely to suffer further
erosion due to four factors; first, the public percep¬
tion of an easing of the Soviet threat following the
5 8
December 1987 INF Treaty; second, the continuing growth
of disarmament movements in most European Allies' states;
third, the impression given by many learned people,
often bolstered by senior military personnel in self
defence, that NATO's conventional forces are strong
59
enough to 'see-off an aggressor'; and fourth, a desire
of most people to see their governments' finite funds
spent on peacetime projects providing more visible
benefits. However, to repeat the opening sentence of
15
this study, "...what cannot be supported logistically
6 0
cannot be accomplished tactically"; and in this context
it is necessary to consider what is meant by the word
'logistics'.
* * *
'Logistics', both as a word and as a concept forms
the whole basis of this study, focusing on NATO's
Central Region. An explanation of its meaning is
necessary. Some two decades ago, the word logistics
was not often used in relation to British Military
activity. Supplies, transport, movements and medical
support were all better known in the Armed Forces.
Civil industry however, soon transposed these elements,
excluding medical support, into physical distribution
management which has developed further to logistics
management sometimes prefixed with the word total.
This embraces the efficient acquisition, warehousing,
inventory control and onward distribution of goods.
It plays a significant part in the profitability of
corporate enterprise and has consequently gained stature
and recognition at board level of many public limited
companies today. The Council of Logistics Management
of the United States defines logistics management as:
The process of planning, implementing
and controlling the efficient, cost-
effective flow and storage of raw
16
materials, in-process inventory,
finished goods, and related infor¬
mation from point-of-origin to
point-of-consumption for the pur¬
pose of conforming to customer
requirements.61
This may seem quite new, however it is not all that
different from the old military adage of 'getting
the right materials (or troops), in the right quan¬
tities, to the right place, in the right condition
at the right time'. Furthermore, it was a military
man, Antoine Henri Jomini, the Swiss Baron who became
a general in the Imperial Army of the Russian Czar
who, in 1838, made the distinction between strategy,
tactics and logistics. He linked logistics to
"the practical art of moving armies" and including
"arranging and supervising the march of trains of
62
baggage, munitions, provisions and ambulances".
In this respect the modern term physical distribution
would not be too wide.
Shifting in time and space from the 19th to the
20th Century, and from the old world to the new; the
American historian,Duncan S Ballantine, contributed
to the subject knowledge with his book US Naval Logis-
63
tics in the Second World War. The official US Navy
definition of logistics in 19^7 was:
The supply of material and personnel,
including the procurement, storage,
17
distribution and transportation of
material, and the procurement, housing,
training, distribution and transport¬
ation of personnel, together with the
rendering of services to Naval operating
forces.64
Ballantine identified from this broad and comprehen¬
sive statement the distinction of two main parts:
...the first being the logistics of
production and the second the logistics
of consumption. The former is that phase
of logistic effort,which is carried on
under civilian auspices as a predominantly
economic function,and within a set of
conditions imposed by the nature of the
nation's economy. The latter is the
phase of logistics more intimately invol¬
ved in military operations, in which the
determining conditions are those of the
military situation.65
Because the military are more concerned with con¬
sumer logistics, the role of production logistics is
often given less prominence in post-operation analysis;
but acquisition is equally as important as delivery.
Today there are several definitions of logistics,
civil and military, each tending to place a different
emphasis on the relationship of strategy, tactics,
production and consumption. However, within NATO
logistics is defined as:
The science of planning and carrying out
the movement and maintenance of forces.
In its most comprehensive sense, those
aspects of military operations which
deal with:
18
-design and development, acquisi¬
tion, storage, movement, distri¬
bution, maintenance, evacuation
and disposition of material (*);
-movement, evacuation and hospi¬
talisation of personnel;
-acquisition or construction,
maintenance, operation and dis¬
position of facilities;
-acquisition or furnishing of
services.66
* material; equipment in its
wider sense including vehicles,
weapons, ammunition, fuel etc...
Leaving aside medical and personnel considerations,
the two aspects of production and consumer logistics
are incorporated within the above broad,and all
embracing NATO agreed definition. In outline, the
two elements are identified as:
Production Logistics: That part of
logistics concerning research, design,
development, manufacture and acceptance
of material.67
Consumer Logistics: That part of
logistics concerning reception of the
initial product, storage, transport,
maintenance (including repair and
serviceability), operation and dis¬
posal of material.60
It is the latter aspect of the logistic process, with
which this study is primarily concerned,and narrows
further consumer logistics to those vital supplies
needed by equipped troops to fight and survive in
19
the field. These supplies comprise:
-bulk supplies (ammunition, petroleum,
oil and lubricants (POL) and rations).
Individually issued expendable items
(spare parts and direct exchange items).
Non-expendable items (weapons and equip¬
ments ) . 69
Combat units are dependent upon all types of
supplies listed above, but the method of obtaining
them in battle, varies between the category of
items and the method adopted by the nation involved.
It could result in a combat unit sending its organic
transport rearwards to collect supplies (pull system);
or a logistic support unit carrying the stocks forward
70
to deliver them (push system). The varying national
systems used in NATO are a direct result of the
agreement concerning "logistics is a national respons-
71
ibility in peace and in war". While the provision
of battlefield logistic support encompasses the move¬
ment and delivery of three types of supplies (bulk,
expendable and non-expendable), it will be appreciated
that the most important, in terms of daily consumption,
quantity and necessity, are the bulk supplies, in other
words rations, fuel and ammunition. Because of the
very importance of these supplies, the British name
them Combat Supplies, although the NATO designation
72
is Class I, III and V respectively. It is the stock¬
holding, movement and delivery systems of these essential
20
items which form an important part of this paper.
* * *
A study of this nature involves the use of NATO
military concepts, terms and a number of abbreviations.
As an aide, a simple glossary of appropriate abbrev¬
iations is included separately at the end of the
final chapter.
The scene for this thesis is set in the Central
Region of Europe, essentially for three main reasons.
Firstly, the Central Region is where Britain's major
support to NATO is committed, on the declared principle
that the defence of this geographic area represents
71
a part of the defence of the UK itself. In addition,
over 40% of the country's total defence budget is
devoted to the ground and air forces maintained to
74
support Europe. Secondly, the multi-national mix of
75
Allied forces, deployed in a comparatively narrow
zone, provides a complex and challenging study area
concerning national logistic stocklevels, support
systems, and NATO command and control responsibilities.
Thirdly, the Central Region is arguably the most
important part of NATO's defensive posture, being
an area of immense wealth and industrial potential.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, some 30% of the
population and 25% of its industrial capacity is
21
located within just 60 miles (100 km) of the Inner
7 6
German Border (IGB); a tantalizing prospect for a
would-be aggressor.
NATO's Central Region is not restricted to the
Federal Republic of Germany, but includes other
countries, see Figure 1.2. In the words of a former
Commander in Chief Central Europe:
It contains the industrial heartland
of Western Europe; it includes the
Benelux countries and all of the
Federal Republic of Germany, south
of the River Elbe, and in this area
live over 80 million people. It
extends from the North Sea to the
foothills of the Austrian and Swiss
Alps.77
While the geographic area of study is set in a
NATO command region, it is important to outline its
place within the overall Alliance civil and military
structure. Because NATO is an international, as
opposed to supranational organization, decisions are
7 ft
made by consensus and this in turn demands a number
of committees to formulate policy.
At NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the highest
decision-making body and forum for consultation within
79
the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council. At
Ministerial Meetings of the Council, nations are




these meetings are held twice yearly. The Council
also meets occasionally at the level of Heads of
State and Government. In permanent session,
Ambassadors (Permanent Representatives) meet in
council, usually at least once a week. The separate
Defence Planning Committee (DPC) comprises representa¬
tives of countries particpating in NATO's integrated
military structure and meets, like the North Atlantic
Council, both in permanent at Ambassadorial level
and twice yearly at Ministerial level. At Ministerial
meetings, member nations are represented by Defence
81
Ministers. These two committees essentially form
part of NATO's civil structure which is complimented












The Military Committee comprises the Chiefs of
Staff of each member nation of the Alliance, except
8 2
for France who is represented by a Military Mission
and Iceland having no military forces may be
O o
represented by a civilian. The Military'
Committee is the "senior military authority in the
84
Alliance" and meets twice yearly at the Chief of
Staff level, but functions on a weekly basis with
nations represented by a permanent Military Representa¬
tive (MILREP).^ The role of the Military Committee is
to advise the North Atlantic Council ^and the Defence
Planning Committee on military matters and provide
direction to the three major NATO commanders (MNC's);
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT),
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander
in Chief Channel (CINCHAN), shown in graphic form in
Figure 1.3-
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is
a US four star general, whose Allied Command Europe
(ACE) covers an area from the North Cape to the
Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the Eastern
O r~j
border of Turkey, but excluding the UK and Portugal.
He exercises control through four major subordinate
commands (MSC's), see Figure 1.4, of which Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), as its name implies,
covers the Central Region of Europe. The Commander





known as CINCENT, is currently a German four star general
and he in turn exercises control through three principle
subordinate commands (PSC's) comprising two Army
Corps named Northern and Central (NORTHAG and CENTAG)
and the Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) which
comprises two separate Allied Tactical Air Forces
(ATAF's); the second based in the North and the fourth
O O
further South.
The forward areas of AFCENT are, for defence,
divided roughly into half and each allocated to an
Army Group, together with a supporting Tactical Air
Force, see Figure 1.5. The Northern Army Group
(NORTHAG) is responsible for the Northern area, run¬
ning approximately from Hamburg to Kassel, and from
the Inner German Border (IGB) to the borders of the
89
Netherlands and Belgium. This area encompasses the
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), which is the peace¬
time name for all British troops stationed in Germany,
including the 1st British Corps. NORTHAG is headed
by a British four star general who, in war, commands
four separate national Corps; Belgium, British,
90
German and Dutch. It is also likely that the III US
91
Corps would in war be placed under command of NORTHAG.
Although the Corps is based in Texas in peactime,
with the exception of a forward brigade deployed near
Bremen, shown on Figure 1.5, the majority of its











are stored in the NORTHAG area.
The Central Army Group (CENTAG) commanded by a
US four star general is allocated the Southern part
of AFCENT's forward area, running approximately from
Kassel Southwards to the borders with Austria and
Switzerland, and from the IGB and the Czechoslovakian
border to the borders of France, Luxembourg and Belgium.
CENTAG commands four Corps; two German and two US,
plus a Canadian mechanised Brigade Group. Although
France left the integrated military organization in
1966, three French armoured divisions remain stationed
in German/within the CENTAG area. Although these
forces are not assigned to NATO, France continues to
93
be a member of the Alliance.
The four Corps within each Army Group are in turn
each responsible for their own segment of allocated
territory. The 1st British Corps' mission is to
defend a sector facing the IGB, "some 65 km wide to
9 4
the East of Hannover". The depth of this defensive
Allied territory is divided into zones, linked to
responsibility levels and these are discussed in detail
in Chapter 3 as a requisite to understanding current
field logistics management procedures.
* * *
29
The most noteworthy aspect of the Central Region
is the international mix of land and air forces. Six
95
nations, excluding France and Luxembourg, belonging
to the integrated military structure have a unity of
purpose and a declared aim "to prepare together in
peace, to fight together in war, to defend its part
of NATO territory^ The Central Region therefore
provides an interesting picture of multi-national
defence problems, which not only impacts upon command
and control,but also upon logistics. While the agreed
Alliance doctrine is that each nation is responsible
for the logistic support of its own NATO assigned
97
troops, this very arrangement has lead to what one
learned observer has described as "the Achilles heel
98
of NATO". The following agreed quote by the then
Chief of Logistics Plans and Policy at SHAPE is telling:
After some three years plus that I have
spent working in the SHAPE and NATO
logistics environment, I conclude that
the weakest link in the Alliance capa¬
bility to present a coherent defence
has to be the fragmentation of its
logistic structure.99
There are four critical areas of NATO logistics
which suggest themselves as contributing to the frag¬
mentation described above, and all stem from the
"national responsibility" ^for logistics. They are:
- Battlefield logistic management systems.
30
- Logistic stock levels.
- Interoperability.
- NATO Command responsibilities of national
logistic stocks.
The factors all have a direct impact upon the sus-
tainability of NATO trocps in battle and are addressed
in this thesis. An examination of NATO logistics
involves strategy, structure, economics and coopera¬
tion within the Alliance. In management terms, NATO
logistics of today has its strengths, weaknesses,
101
opportunities and threats. This study aims to
examine perceived flaws and threats, to identify its
strengths and to highlight opportunities for building
upon them.
* * *
In view of the scope of the subject, it is necessary
to outline parameters. The main title of the study
"NATO Military Logistics Policy (Central Region)"
is correct. It means that the subject concentrates
upon logistic policy for land forces and that the geo¬
graphical bounds are limited to Central Europe where
the United Kingdom, together with the United States,
. . . . 102
provides major support.
Two further parameters, or limitations not addressed
31
in the thesis, concern the special relationship of
France to the Alliance being part of NATO, but not
in the integrated military structure, and the influ¬
ence of European versus American industry. Both areas
are worthy of separate studies; however, as they do
not affect the conclusions of this thesis, they have
been excluded now to save clouding the basic problem.
The problem is that unless the logistic sustain-
ability of NATO's combat troops in Central Europe is
improved, the use of nuclear weapons could be invoked
at an earlier stage than the public wish; the military
are planning for; and for which the governments are
responsible for.
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APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER 1
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington D.C., 4 April 1949*
The Parties to this Treaty reafTirm their faith in the purposes and princi¬
ples of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace
with all peoples and all Governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, indi¬
vidual liberty and the rule of law.
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic
area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the
preservation of peace and security.
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:
ARTICLE 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to
settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice
arc not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.
ARTICLE 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful
and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions,
by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which
these Institutions arc founded, and by promoting conditions of stability
and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international
economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any
or all of them.
ARTICLE 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Par¬
ties. separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help
and mutual aid. will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them,
the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the
Parties is threatened.
* The Treaty came into force on 24 August, 1949, after the deposition of
the ratifications of all signatory states.
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ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree thai an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recog-'
nised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in con¬
cert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE 6"
For the purpose of Article 5. an armed attack on one or more of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack
— on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on
the Algerian Departments of France f, on the territory of Turkey or on
the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
— on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over
these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of
any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered
into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of
the Tropic of Cancer.
ARTICLE 7
The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as afTecting. in any
way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are
members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in con¬
flict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into
any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
* As amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on
the accession of Greece and Turkey.
t On 16 January, 1963. the French Representative made a statement to
the North Atlantic Council on the efTects of the independence of Algeria
on certain aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council noted that
insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned the




The Panics hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be
represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this
Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly
at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
necessary, in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee
which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and
5.
ARTICLE 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European
State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any
State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instru¬
ment of accession with the Government of the United States of America.
The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the
Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE I 1
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions earned out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments
of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government
of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories
of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which
have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories,
including the ratifications of Belgium. Canada. France. Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been depo¬
sited and shall come into etTec: with respect to other States on the date of
the deposit of their ratifications.
.ARTICLE 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter,
the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the pur¬
pose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting
peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of
universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to
be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the
Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Gov¬
ernments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunica-
tion.
ARTICLE 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic,
shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States
of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government
to the Governments of the other signatories.
H 9
CHAPTER 2 - CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE
We must stand together for negotiated,
coordinated, stabilizing reductions
against a risk to throw off defense
burdens, against a return to the narrow
protection of self-interest that could
be so dangerous at a time when European
politics are in a state of flux rivaled
in my adult life only by the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War.
President George Bush"'"
This extract from the speech by the US President to
the NATO Heads of State and Government on the after¬
noon of the 4th December 1989 at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels highlights the changes which are taking
place today in Europe. These changes include a new
leadership in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
peaceful breaches in the Berlin Wall some 28 years
2
after it was erected, open public speculation about
the possibilities of a unified Germany, a new people's
government in Romania, and seemingly even greater
impressions of openness by the Soviet Unions President.
All these measures have eased the Western publics per¬
ception of a threatening Warsaw Pact. This shift of
view occurring at a time when in many countries eco¬
nomic considerations are paramount, may indeed start
a move to reduce their defence burdens rightly iden¬
tified by the acknowledged leader of the NATO Alliance.
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The problem is that, in spite of the strictures, it
could well be that America will continue to lead from
the front and hasten to reduce her own defence expen-
•2
diture "on the basis of a reduced threat in Europe".
The present times are therefore inspiring for
those with an interest in politics , economics or
defence - the three are interwoven. However, the
purpose of this Chapter is to consider the nature of
the threat in NATO's Central Region and endeavour to
gaugejif the shifting scene has significantly changed
the threat, or merely altered the perspective.
Firstly, a brief resume of some of the important
events which brought the US President to Europe to
advise his Allies to 'stand together for negotiated,
coordinated, stabilizing reductions'.
The most appropriate starting point for a simple
modern chronology of important defence related events
must be the appointment, in March 1985 of Mikhail
4
Gorbachev to head the Soviet Union. He has proved
to be flexible and has been described as having a
highly persuasive political and diplomatic approach
which poses "unique challenges to Western leadership".
In September 1986 the Stockholm Conference on Disarm¬
ament in Europe (CDE) agreed on the notification,
observation and inspection of military manoeuvres.^
This was followed just over a year later by the
signing of the INF Treaty in Washington, D.C., by
7
President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev. This important
treaty eliminated two categories of land based inter¬
mediate-range (1,000 to 5,000 kms) and shorter-range
(500 to 1,000 kms) nuclear missiles; but most signifi¬
cantly it provided for the first time, a procedure
g
for on-site inspections. The next notable event
was the announcement in December 1988 by Mr Gorbachev
at the United Nations that his country had decided
to make unilateral cuts in the Soviet Forces by 1991
amounting to 500,000 personnel, 10,000 tanks, 8,500
artillery pieces and 800 combat aircraft.'' This quite
unprecedented move was followed by similar announce¬
ments to reduce Armed Forces by the German Democratic
Republic and Czechoslovakia. Budget reductions had
10
also been proposed by Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.
Within two months in February 1989 the last Soviet
troops withdrew from Afghanistan and, only one month
later in March 1989, negotiations on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE)and confidence - and security-
1 1
building measures (CSBM)opened in Vienna. At the
NATO Heads of State and Government Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council the following May, the Allied
leaders adopted an arms control and disarmament policy
known as 'The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept'.
This significant document which effectively lays down
Allied policy in this important arms control area is
at Appendix A to this Chapter.
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At the time of writing (December 1989), the eyes
of the NATO nations, with the US out-staring the
12
others, are firmly fixed upon the forthcoming Con¬
ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) discussions. The
hope is that asymmetrical reductions may provide:
one, enhanced security for the Alliance and; two,
the ability for nations to trim their own forces and
thus make economic savings. The original objectives
and proposals of the 16 member countries of NATO
published at the outset of the CFE negotiations are
reproduced at Appendix B to this Chapter; however,
it is emphasized that it should really be treated as
a guide for principles, as today's pace of change is
quite startling for a 40 year old Alliance. This
extract from the latest final communique of NATO's
Defence Planning Committee which met in Ministerial
session in Brussels on 28th and 29th November 1989
shows where the emphasis lies:
We welcome the initiation of unilateral
conventional force reductions by the
Soviet Union and some of its Allies,
but we cannot ignore the fact that, even
after completion of these reductions,
the Warsaw Pact will retain well-equipped
forces which substantially out-number
those of the West, underlining the need
to reach an early CFE agreement. We
therefore look forward to the prospect
of a successful outcome next year to
the CFE negotiations in Vienna which
would substantially improve the balance
of forces in Europe. A CFE agreement




The possible changes in force strength in Central
Europe has not diminished the NATO Alliance commit¬
ment to its strategy of flexible response and forward
defence. In May 1989 Heads of State and Government
of NATO stated: "For the foreseeable future, there
is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the
14
prevention of war". This view is echoed in the UK's
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1989 which points
out that even after the unilateral cuts made by the
Soviet Union (the 10,000 tanks and 8,500 guns plus
additions from Warsaw Pact Allies), the remaining
tanks and artillery "in an area from the Atlantic
to the Urals will out-number those of NATO by 2.4:1".
The main focus tends to fall upon the tank forces when
comparing force strengths; but there is an equally
serious imbalance in artillery. A former commander
of the Central Army Group, General Glenn Otis teamed
together with the former commander of the US Field
Artillery Center, Brigadier General Paul Pearson to
express sincere misgivings about "NATO's chronic
16
inferiority in weight of artillery deployed in Europe".
Without wishing to spoil their collective thunder of
obvious indignation, this short extract highlights
the true realities of combat in the European Theatre:
A NATO division defending on the axis of
a Warsaw Pact main attack can expect to
be targeted by a 45-minute salvo or pre¬
paratory fires consisting of more than
2,000 tons of ordnance. An attack of
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this intensity and duration is beyond
the experience of even the longest
serving military person.17
In their article the Generals continued to compare
the artillery capabilities of the Soviet Forces with
the US and note that the Russians lead in range, rate
of fire and quantity of guns. This up-to-date crit-
/
ique of national NATO assigned forces who themselves
have more resources than any of their immediate Cen¬
tral Region Allies highlights the strength of the
Warsaw Pact threat.
The word threat used in the form outlined above
implies an ability to "use force as an instrument of
18
policy". But 'threat' is a combination of capabili¬
ties and intentions which are, of necessity, judgement
based. While the Western Allies and their peoples
may gauge that the Soviet Union's intentions are benign,
the scope of their capabilities are highlighted in the
following comment made by two authors, of whom one is
NATO's current Assistant Secretary General for Politi¬
cal Affairs:
Western perceptions of the Soviet threat
are reinforced by the immense and steady
build-up of Soviet military capabilities
far beyond those that are needed for self-
defence or military parity - especially
in the European theatre.19
It is the weapons systems which could be used to mount
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sizeable offensive operations which creates the
greatest threat to stability in Europe. These com¬
prise primarily tanks and artillery and it is the
sheer quantity of equipments held by the Warsaw Pact,
which intimidates the NATO Allies. It was estimated
in early 1989 by NATO that the "Soviet Union itself
possesses more tanks and artillery than all the other
20
members of the Warsaw Pact and the Alliance combined".
It is this quite objective assessment of capabilities
which cannot be glossed-over by arguments of good
intentions.
To counter the Russians overwhelming military might,
NATO relies upon its strategy of deterrence founded
upon flexible response as outlined in Chapter 1.
The Western approach to deterrence is analysed in a
comprehensive study which was undertaken for the United
21
Nations in 1986. It emphasized that the word and con¬
cept was politically defensive and that its intention
was to discourage aggression. It suggested that:
"The French equivalent, dissuasion, expresses the con-
22
cept and the spirit of deterrence more accurately".
Military men tend to prefer more succinct terms and
the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General
Bernard Rogers attributed a most concise definition
to a Briton. He quoted Michael Heseltine as saying
that "the success of our strategy of flexible response
rested: 'upon the Russians being in no doubt about the
56
2 3Allies' ability and will to defend themselves'".
* * *
The 'ability' for NATO forces to conduct an effec¬
tive defence depends upon an adequate capability for
24
each leg of NATO's triad of forces. It is important
that the three legs of the strategy of deterrence
remain balanced to provide military capabilities to
25
counter aggression at every level as required. This
rationale offers the ability to change strategic
responses (to another leg of the triad) through a
conscious military-political decision, and not due
to a deficiency in one particular element of the triad.
As identified briefly in Chapter 1, the weakest leg
in NATO's strategy of deterrence today is centred
upon conventional forces.
The area of conventional weakness is not a new
phenomomenon; it was noted some 32 years ago by
Henry Kissinger - well before the current NATO stra¬
tegy had been adopted that:
Almost a decade after its creation,
NATO is still without a force suf¬
ficient to prevent its members from
being over-run by the Soviet Army.26
Twenty years later in 1977, US Senator Sam Nunn,
together with Senator Dewey Bartlett produced a
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report to the US Senate Committee on Armed Services
following two trips to NATO forces in Europe. Their
quite comprehensive study outlined the flexible response
strategy, identified longstanding deficiencies in con¬
ventional fire power and urged that ammunition stocks
be increased using the emotional words: "The lives of
27
American fighting men must take precedence". By
1985 a North Atlantic Assembly Committee also identi¬
fied a weak conventional leg of NATO's triad of deter¬
rence and their report included 'sustainability' as
2 8
one of ten areas of "critical persistent deficiencies".
The same year at the instigation of the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, General Bernard Rogers, a Conven¬
tional Defence Improvement (CDI) Initiative was laun¬
ched by NATO Ministers at their May 1985 Defence Plan¬
ning Committee meeting. It had the objective of iden¬
tifying key deficiency areas in need of special atten-
29
tion with a view to targeting the allocation of resources.
It achieved some success, particularly in the procure¬
ment field; however, in a hard hitting article in 1988
the German Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(there are two deputies, one German and one British),
General Eberhard Eimler stressed the importance of
NATO providing adequate forces for "each of the three
legs of the triad", and emphasized the need to streng-
30
then conventional forces.
The above catalogue of weaknesses in NATO's conven-
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tional forces in meeting the requirements of Allied
deterrence strategy is significant within the context
of this study. For, without exception, the criticisms
allude, in one form or another, to sustainability or
logistics as contributing to the present poor state
of affairs. The respected former US Ambassador to
NATO, the Hon David Abshire has used the analogy of
the NATO triad as a three-legged stool with these
words:
I had always said in my speeches across
Europe that the deterrent was like a
three-legged stool, with the conventional
leg much shorter than the others so that
the stool was badly out of balance. In
light of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, the conventional leg
of the deterrent stool, now more than ever,
must be made longer and sturdier. The
conventional imbalance is the heart of the
problem. NATO has never properly strength¬
ened the third, conventional leg of the
deterrent.31
Thus NATO strategy is described; however, there must
surely be a temptation to cut down the other two
32
legs as an alternative method to balancing the stool.
Turning to the Soviet Union and the Western per¬
ception of their capabilities; a hawkish view from
the US Department of Defense in their annual 1989
publication Soviet Military Power notes :
- Even if the Soviets completely elimin-
59
ated the forces discussed in Gorbachev's
7 December 1988 United Nations' speech,
Warsaw Pact forces would still out¬
number NATO in tanks, artillery and
divisions by a ratio of over 2 to 1.
- Despite talk of reduced military budgets,
Moscow still spends an estimated 15 to
17 percent of its GNP on defense, while
the United States spends less than 6
percent
- Although Gorbachev proposes to reduce
the Soviet defense budget by 14.2%,
since 1985 Soviet Defense expenditures
have increased by an average of 3 per¬
cent per year in real terms. In com¬
parison, since 1985, United States
defense spending has declined in real
terms by 11 . 2%.33
The comment 'even if the Soviets' in the first quote
above could well reflect suspicion of the Russians
actions. According to the defence analyst, Phillip
Karber, the 1979 unilateral withdrawal of 6 Guards
Tank Division from East Germany to Belorussia, which was
widely publicised, saw assets "duplicitiously redis-
34
tributed in Central Europe"; see Figure 2.0. The
comment has also been made that what is unilaterally
withdrawn (without mutually agreed checks) can be
35
unilaterally replaced. The comment regarding mili¬
tary budgets is also relevant at a time when all the
indications are that the Russian production of arma¬
ments remains high. According to Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, General John Galvin, in 1989 some
3,000 to 3,400 T-72s and T-80s will be produced.^
The final part concerning overall defence budgets per¬




their agreed 'Resource Guidance' aims, rather than
criticize the Soviet Union.
Returning to the theme that 'threat' is a combina¬
tion of capabilities and intentions; it is fair com¬
ment to highlight the Soviet Unions considerable
forces which surpass those of every other nation in
the world. The subject of intentions is an open ques¬
tion; but certainly it would appear that the leader-
o Q
ship is working towards a "master plan". Indeed
President Gorbachev "in his book 'Perestroika', shows
himself to be more a bearer of a message, for which
he is not wholly responsible than the creator of a
39
new regime". Somehow one expects deviousness and
significant forward planning from the nation which
produces the World's best Chess players. But the
momentous changes occurring in Europe almost daily
(in December 1989) would have been impossible to
accurately forecast. The emphasis placed by President
Bush upon this 'state of flux' serves to remind that
changes, however welcome, could create destabilizing
40
tensions. It is against this changing pattern of
events that arms control negotiations and, in particu¬
lar a future successful CFE agreement, could be seen
to promote greater security between the two Alliances.
It is hoped that the framework outlined by NATO
Heads of State and Government in their 'Comprehensive
Concept' (at Appendix A) will indeed lead to the "stable
62
balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower
levels".^
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A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The overriding objective of the Alliance is to preserve peace in freedom, to prevent
war. and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The Allies' policy to this
end was set forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. It remains valid. According to the Report,
the North Atlantic Alliance's "first function is to maintain adequate military strength and
political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory
of member countries if aggression should occur". On that basis, the Alliance can carry out
"its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in
which the underlying political issues can be solved". As the Report observed, military
security and a policy aimed at reducing tensions are "not contradictory, but complementary".
Consistent with these principles. Allied Heads of State and Government have agreed that
arms control is an integral pan of the Alliance's security policy.
2. The possibilities for fruitful East-West dialogue have significantly improved in
recent years. More favourable conditions now exist for progress towards the achievement
of the Alliance's objectives. The Allies are resolved to grasp this opponunity. They will
continue to address both the symptoms and the causes of political tension in a manner that
respects the legitimate security interests of all states concerned.
3. The achievement of the lasting peaceful order which the Allies seek will require that
the unnatural division of Europe, and particularly of Germany, be overcome, and that, as
stated in the Helsinki Final Act. the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and the
right of peoples to self-determination be respected, and that the rights of all individuals, in¬
cluding their right of political choice, be protected. The members of the Alliance accordingly
attach central importance to further progress in the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) process, which serves as a framework for the promotion of peaceful
evolution in Europe.
4. The CSCE process provides a means to encourage stable and constructive East-West
relations by increasing contacts between people, by seeking to ensure that basic rights and
freedoms are respected in law and practice, by furthering political exchanges and mutually
beneficial cooperation across a broad range of endeavours, and by enhancing security and
openness in the military sphere. The Allies will continue to demand full implementation of
all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. the Madrid Concluding Docu¬
ment. the Stockholm Document, and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting. The
last document marks a major advance in the CSCE process and should stimulate further
beneficial changes in Europe.
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5. The basic goal of the Alliance's arms control policy is to enhance security and
stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the require¬
ments of the strategy of deterrence. The Allies are committed to achieving continuing
progress towards all their arms control objectives. The further development of the Compre¬
hensive Concept is designed to assist this by ensuring an integrated approach covering both
defence policy and arms control policy: these are complementary and interactive. This work
also requires full consideration of the interrelationship between arms control objectives and
defence requirements and how various arms control measures, separately and in conjunction
with each other, can strengthen Alliance security. The guiding principles and basic
objectives which have so far governed the arms control policy of the Alliance remain valid.
Progress in achieving these objectives is. of course, affected by a number of factors. These
include the overall state of East-West relations, the military requirements of the Allies, the
progress of existing and future arms control negotiations, and developments in the CSCE
process. The further development and implementation of a comprehensive concept of arms
control and disarmament will take place against this background.
II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL
6. The Alliance continues to seek a just and stable peace in Europe in which all states
can enjov undiminished security at the minimum necessary levels of forces and armaments
and all individuals can exercise their basic rights and freedoms. Arms control alone cannot
resolve longstanding political differences between East and West nor guarantee a stable
peace. Nonetheless, achievement of the Alliance's goal will require substantial advances in
arms control, as well as more fundamental changes in political relations. Success in arms
control, in addition to enhancing military secuntv. can encourage improvements in the East-
West political dialogue and thereby contribute to the achievement of broader Alliance
objectives.
7. To increase security and stability in Europe, the Alliance has consistently pursued
every opportunity for effective arms control. The Allies are committed to this policy,
independent of any changes that may occur in the climate of East-West relations. Success
in arms control, however, continues to depend not on our own efforts alone, but also on
Eastern and particularly Soviet readiness to work constructively towards mutually beneficial
results.
8. The immediate past has witnessed unprecedented progress in the field of arms
control. In 1986 the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreement
created an innovative system of confidence and security-building measures, designed to
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promote military transparency and predictability. To date, these have been satisfactorily im¬
plemented. The 19H7 INF Treaty marked another major step forward because it eliminated
a whole class of weapons, it established the principle of asymmetrical reductions, and
provided for a stringent verification regime. Other achievements include the establishment
in the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear risk reduction centres, the US/Soviet
agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile launches, and the conduct of the Joint
Verification Experiment in connection with continued US/Soviet negotiations on nuclear
testing.
9. In addition to agreements already reached, there has been substantial progress in the
START negotiations which are intended to reduce radically strategic nuclear arsenals and
eliminate destabilising offensive capabilities. The Pans Conference on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons has reaffirmed the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and given
powerful political impetus to the negotiations in Geneva for a global, comprehensive and
effectively verifiable ban on cnemical weapons. New distinct negotiations within the
framework of the CSCE process have now begun in Vienna: one on conventional armed
forces in Europe between the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) and one on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among all 35
signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.
10. There has also been substantial progress on other matters important to the West.
Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. There has been movement toward the resolution of
some, although not all. of the remaining regional conflicts in which the Soviet Union is
involved. The observance of human rights in the Soviet Union and in some of the other WTO
countries has significantly improved, even if serious deficiencies remain. The recent Vienna
CSCE Follow-up meeting succeeded in setting new. higher standards of conduct for
participating states and should stimulate further progress in the CSCE process. A new
intensity of dialogue, particularly at high level, between East and West opens new opportu¬
nities and testifies to the Allies' commitment to resolve the fundamental problems that
remain.
11. The Alliance does not claim exclusive responsibility for this favourable evolution in
East-West relations. In recent years, the East has become more responsive and flexible.
Nonetheless, the Alliance's contribution has clearly been fundamental. Most of the
achievements to date, which have been described above, were inspired by initiatives by the
Alliance or its members. The Allies' political solidarity, commitment to defence, patience
and creativity in negotiations overcame initial obstacles and brought its efforts to fruition.
It was the Alliance that drew up the basic blueprints for East-West progress and has since
pushed them forward towards realisation. In particular, the concepts of stability, reasonable
sufficiency, asymmetrical reductions, concentration on the most offensive equipment,
rigorous verification, transparency, a single zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the
balanced and comprehensive nature of the CSCE process, are Western-inspired.
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12. Prospects are now brighter than ever before for lasting, qualitative improvements in
the East-West relationship. There continue to be clear signs of change in the internal and ex¬
ternal policies of the Soviet Union and of some of its Allies. The Soviet leadership has stated
that ideological competition should play no part in inter-state relations. Soviet acknowledge¬
ment of serious shortcomings in its past approaches to international as well as domestic
issues creates opportunities for progress on fundamental political problems.
13. At the same time, serious concerns remain. The ambitious Soviet reform pro¬
gramme. which the Allies welcome, will take many years to complete. Its success cannot
be taken for granted given the magnitude of the problems it faces and the resistance
generated. In Eastern Europe, progress in constructive reform is still uneven and the extent
of these reforms remains to be determined. Basic human rights still need to be firmly
anchored in law and practice, though in some Warsaw Pact countries improvements are
underway. Although the WTO has recently announced and begun unilateral reductions in
some of its forces, the Soviet Union continues to deploy military forces and to maintain apace
of military production in excess of legitimate defensive requirements. Moreover, the geo-
strategic realities favour the geographically contiguous Soviet-dominated WTO as against
the geographically separated democracies of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has long been
an objective of the Soviet Union to weaken the links between the European and North
American members of the Alliance.
14. We face an immediate future that is promising but still uncertain. The Allies and the
East face both a challenge and an opportunity to capitalise on present conditions in order to
increase mwual security. The progress recently made in East-Wesf relations has given new
impetus to the arms control process and has enhanced the possibilities of achieving the
Alliance's arms control objectives, which complement the other elements of the Alliance's
security policy.
III. PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE SECURITY
15. Alliance security policy aims to preserve peace in freedom by both political means
and the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for
effective defence. The fact that the Alliance has for forty years safeguarded peace in Europe
bears witness to the success of this policy.
16. Improved political relations and the progressive development of cooperative struc¬
tures between Eastern and Western countries are important components of Alliance policy.
They can enhance mutual confidence, reduce the risk of misunderstanding, ensure that there
are in place reliable arrangements for crisis management so that tensions can be defused,
render the situation in Europe more open and predictable, and encourage the development
of wider cooperation in all fields.
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17. In underlining the importance of these facts for the formulation of Alliance policy,
the Allies reaffirm that, as stated in the Harmel Report, the search for constructive dialogue
and cooperation with the countries of the East, including arms control and disarmament, is
based on political solidarity and adequate military strength.
18. Solidarity among the Alliance countries is a fundamental principle of their security
policy, it reflects the indivisible nature of their security. It is expressed by the willingness
of each country to share fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of the common effort
aswell as its benefits. In particular, the presence in Europe of the United States' conventional
and nuclear forces and of Canadian forces demonstrates that North American and European
security interests are inseparably bound together.
19. From its inception the Alliance of Western democracies has been defensive in
purpose. This will remain so. None of our weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.
The Alliance does not seek military superiority nor will it ever do so. Its aim has always been
to prevent war and any form of coercion and intimidation.
20. Consistent with the Alliance's defensive character, its strategy is one of deterrence.
Its objective is to convince a potential aggressor before he acts that he is confronted with a
risk that outweighs any gain - however great - he might hope to secure from his aggression.
The purpose of this strategy defines the means needed for its implementation.
21. In order to fulfil its strategy, the Alliance must be capable of responding appropri¬
ately to any aggression and of meeting its commitment to the defence of the frontiers of its
members' territory. For the foreseeable future, deterrence requires an appropriate mix of
adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to
date where necessary; for it is only by their evident and perceived capability for effective use
that such forces and weapons deter.
22. Conventional forces make an essential contribution to deterrence. The elimination
of asymmetries between the conventional forces of East and West in Europe would be a
major breakthrough, bringing significant benefits for stability and security. Conventional
defence alone cannot, however, ensure deterrence. Only the nuclear element can confront
an aggressor with an unacceptable risk and thus plays an indispensable role in our current
strategy of war prevention.
23. The fundamental purpose of nuclear forces - both strategic and sub-strategic - is
political; to preserve the peace and to prevent any kind of war. Such forces contribute to
deterrence by demonstrating that the Allies have the military capability and the political will
to use them, if necessary , in response to aggression. Should aggression occur, the aim would
be to restore deterrence by inducing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, to terminate his
attack and to withdraw and thereby to restore the territorial integrity of the Alliance.
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24. Conventional and nuclear forces, therefore, perform different hut complementary
and mutually reinforcing roles. Any perceived inadequacy in either of these two elements,
or the impression that conventional forces could be separated from nuclear, or sub-strategic
from strategic nuclear forces, might lead a potential adversary to conclude that the risks of
launching aggression might be calculable and acceptable. No single element can. therefore,
be regarded as a substitute compensating for deficiencies in any other.
25. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative strategy for the prevention of war.
The implementation of this strategy will continue to ensure that the security interests of all
Alliance members are fully safeguarded. The principles underlying the strategy of deter¬
rence are of enduring validity. Their practical expression in terms of the size, structure and
deployment of forces is bound to change. As in the past, these elements will continue to
evolve in response to changing international circumstances, technological progress and de¬
velopments in the scale of the threat - in particular, in the posture and capabilities of the forces
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
26. Within this overall framework, strategic nuclear forces provide the ultimate guaran¬
tee of deterrence for the Allies. They must be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on
an aggressor state even after it has earned out a first strike. Their number, range, survivability
and penetration capability need to ensure that a potential aggressor cannot count on limiting
the conflict or regarding his own territory as a sanctuary. The strategic nuclear forces of the
United States provide the cornerstone of deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. The
independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France fulfil a deterrent r-ole of their
own and contribute to the overall deterrence strategy of the Alliance by complicating the
planning and risk assessment of a potential aggressor.
27. Nuclear forces below the strategic level provide an essential political and military
linkage between conventional and strategic forces and. together with the presence of
Canadian and United States forces in Europe, between the European and North American
members of the Alliance. The Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are not designed to
compensate for conventional imbalances. The levels of such forces in the integrated military
structure nevertheless must take into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with
which the Alliance is faced. Their role is to ensure that there are no circumstances in which
a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military
action. Nuclear forces below the strategic level thus make an essential contribution to
deterrence.
28. The wide deployment of such forces among countries participating in the integrated
military structure of the Alliance, as well as the arrangements for consultation in the nuclear
area among the Allies concerned, demonstrates solidarity and willingness to share nuclear
roles and responsibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce deterrence.
29. Conventional forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating the Allies' will to
defend themselves and by minimising the risk that a potential aggressor could anticipate a
quick and easy victory or limited territorial gain achieved solely by conventional means.
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30. They must thus be able to respond appropriately and to confront the aggressor
immediately and as far forward as possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to
end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse to the use of nuclear weapons by
the Allies. The forces of the Allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable them to
fulfil this role at all times. Moreover, since the Alliance depends on reinforcements from the
North American continent, it must be able to keep open sea and air lines of communication
between North America and Europe.
31. All member countries of the Alliance strongly favour a comprehensive, effectively
verifiable, global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons. Chemical weapons represent a particular case, since the Alliance's overall strategy
of war prevention, as noted earlier, depends on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conven¬
tional weapons. Pending the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, the Alliance
recognises the need to implement passive defence measures. A retaliatory capability on a
limited scale is retained in view of the Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical weapons
capability.
32. The Allies are committed to maintaining only the minimum level of forces necessary
for iheir strategy of deterrence, taking into account the threat. There is. however, a level of
forces, both nuclear and conventional, below which the credibility of deterrence cannot be
maintained. In particular, the Allies have always recognised that the removal of all nuclear
weapons from Europe would critically undermine deterrence strategy and impair the security
of ihe Alliance.
33. The Alliance's defence policy and its policy of arms control and disarmament are
complementary and have the same goal: to maintain security at the lowest possible level of
forces. There is no contradiction between defence policy and arms control policy. It is on
the basis of this fundamental consistency of principles and objectives that the comprehensive
concept of arms control and disarmament should be further developed and the appropriate
conclusions drawn in each of the areas of arms control.
IV. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT:
PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES
34. Our vision for Europe is that of an undivided continent where military forces only
exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, as has always been the case for the Allies,
not for the purpose of initiating aggression or for political or military intimidation. Arms
control can contribute to the realisation of that vision as an integral pan of the Alliance's
security policy and of our overall approach to East-West relations.
35. The goal of Alliance arms control policy is to enhance security and stability. To this
end. the Allies' arms control initiatives seek a balance at a lower level of forces and arma¬
ments through negotiated agreements and. as appropriate, unilateral actions, recognising that
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arms control agreements are only possible where the negotiating partners share an interest
in achieving a mutually satisfactory result. The Allies' arms control policy seeks to remove
destabilising asymmetries in forces or equipment. It also pursues measures designed to build
mutual confidence and to reduce the risk of conflict by promoting greater transparency and
predictability in military matters.
36. In enhancing secuntv and stability, arms control can also bring important additional
benefits for the Alliance. Given the dynamic aspects of the arms control process, the
principles and results embodied in one agreement may facilitate other arms control steps. In
this way arms control can also make possible further reductions in the level of Alliance forces
and armaments, consistent with the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. Furthermore, as
noted in Chapter II. arms control can make a significant contribution to the development of
more constructive East-West relations and of a framework for further cooperation within a
more stable and predictable international environment. Progress in amis control can also
enhance public confidence in and promote support for our overall security policy.
Guiding Principles for Arms Control
37. The members of the Alliance will be guided by the following principles:
- Security: Arms control should enhance the security of all Allies. Both during the
implementation period and following implementation, the Allies' strategy of
deterrence and their ability to defend themselves, must remain credible and effective.
Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of
the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance
security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security. Arms control measures
should respect the legitimate security interests of all states and should not facilitate
the transfer or intensification of threats to third party states or regions.
- Stability: Arms control measures should yield militarily significant results that
enhance stability. To promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or
eliminate those capabilities which are most threatening to the Alliance. Stability can
also be enhanced by steps that promote greater transparency and predictability in
military matters. Military stability requires the elimination of options for surprise
attack and for large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires that no state has
forces of a size and configuration which, when compared with those of others, could
enable it to calculate that it might gain a decisive advantage by being the first to resort
to arms. Stability also requires measures which discourage destabilising attempts to
re-establish military advantage through the transfer of resources to other types of
armament. Agreements must lead to final results that are both balanced and ensure
equality of rights with respect to security.
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- Verifiability: Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for
arms control agreements. If arms control is to be effective and to build confidence,
the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must, therefore, be of central
concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should be measured against the
record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures
should exclude opportunities for circumvention.
Alliance Arms Control Objectives
38. In accordance with the above principles, the Allies are pursuing an ambitious arms
control agenda for the coming years in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields.
Nuclear Forces
39. The INF Agreement represents a milestone in the Allies' efforts to achieve a more
secure peace at lower levels of arms. By 1991. it will lead to the total elimination of all United
States and Soviet intermediate range land-based missiles, thereby removing the threat which
such Soviet systems presented to the Alliance. Implementation of the agreement, however,
will affect only a small proportion of the Soviet nuclear armoury, and the Alliance continues
to face a substantial array of modem and effective Soviet systems of all ranges. The full
realisation of the Alliance agenda thus requires that further steps be taken.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
40. Soviet strategic systems continue to pose a major ihreat to the whole of the Alliance.
Deep cuts in such systems are in the direct interests of the entire Western Alliance, and there¬
fore their achievement constitutes a priority for the Alliance in the nuclear field.
41. The Allies thus fully support the United States objectives of achieving, within the
context of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, fifty percent reductions in United States and
Soviet strategic nuclear arms. United States proposals seek to enhance stability by placing
specific restrictions on the most destabilising elements of the threat - fast flying ballistic
missiles, throw-weight and. in particular. Soviet heavy ICBMs. The proposals are based on
the need to maintain the deterrent credibility of the remaining United States strategic forces
which would continue to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for the Alliance as a
whole; and therefore on the necessity to keep such forces effective. Furthermore, the United
States is holding talks with the Soviet Union on defence and space matters in order to ensure
that strategic stability is enhanced.
A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces
42. The Allies are committed to maintaining only the minimum number of nuclear
weapons necessary to support their strategy of deterrence. In line with this commitment, the
members of the integrated military structure have already made major unilateral cuts in their
sub-strategic nuclear armoury. The number of land-based warheads in Western Europe has
been reduced by over one-third since 1979 to its lowest level in over 20 years. Updating
where necessary of their sub-strategic systems would result in further reductions.
43. The Allies continue to face the direct threat posed to Europe by the large numbers
of shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory and which have been
substantially upgraded in recent years. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be
of overall value to Alliance security. One of the wavs to achieve this aim would be by tangible
and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of
shorter range leading to equal ceilings at lower levels.
44. But the sub-strategic nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance
are not principally a counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO. As is
explained in Chapter III. sub-strategic nuclear forces fulfil an essential role in overall
Alliance deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a potential
aggressor might discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military action.
45. The Alliance reaffirms its position that tor the forseeable future there is no alternative
to the Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war. which is a strategy of deterrence based
upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which
will continue to be kept up to dale where necessary. Where nuclear forces are concerned,
land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circum¬
stances and as far as can be foreseen will be needed in Europe.
46. In view of the huge superiority of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short-range nuclear
missiles, the Alliance calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its short-range
missile systems to the current levels within the integrated military structure.
47. The Alliance reaffirms that at the negotiations on conventional stability it pursues the
objectives of:
- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower
levels:
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security: and
- the elimination as a matter of high priority of the capability for launching surprise
attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.
48. In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and
reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance states that one of its highest priorities in nego-
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tiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions which
would achieve the objectives above. In this spirit, the Allies will make every effort, as
evidenced by the outcome of the May 1989 Summit, to bring these conventional negotiations
to an early and satisfactory conclusion. The United States has expressed the hope that this
could be achieved within six to twelve months. Once implementation of such an agreement
is underway, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter
into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear
missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels. With special reference to the
Western proposals on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by the proposals by the United States
at the May 1989 Summit, the Allies concerned proceed on the understanding that negotiated
reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried
out until the results of these negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw
Pact SNF systems should be earned out before that date.
49. As regards the sub-strategic nuclear forces of the members of the integrated military
structure, their level and characteristics must be such that they can perform their deterrent
role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat
- both conventional and nuclear - w ith which the Alliance is faced. The question concerning
the introduction and deployment of a follow-on system for the Lance will be dealt with in
1992 in the light of overall security developments. While a decision for national authorities,
the Allies concerned recognise the value of the continued funding by the United States of
research and development of a follow-on for the existing Lance short-range missile, in order
to preserve their options in this respect.
Conventional Forces
50. As set out in the March 1988 Summit statement and in the Alliance's November 1988
data initiative, the Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level far in excess of its
needs for self-defence, directly challenges our security as well as our aspirations for a
peaceful order in Europe. Such excessive force levels create the risk of political intimidation
or threatened aggression. As long as they exist, they present an obstacle to better political
relations between all states of Europe. The challenge to security is. moreover, not only a mat¬
ter of the numerical superiority of WTO forces. WTO tanks, artillery and armoured troop
carriers are concentrated in large formations and deployed in such a way as to give the WTO
a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. Despite the recent welcome
publication by the WTO of its assessment of the military balance in Europe, there is still con¬
siderable secrecy and uncertainty about its actual capabilities and intentions.
51. In addressing these concerns, the Allies' primary objectives are to establish a secure
and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels, while at the same time
creating greater openness about military organisation and activities in Europe.
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52. In the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks between the 23 members of the
two alliances, the Western Allies are proposing:
- reductions to an overall "limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe,
concentrating on the most threatening systems, i.e. those capable of seizing and
holding territory:
- a limit on the proportion of these total holdings belonging to any one country in
Europe (since the security and stability of Europe require that no state exceed its
legitimate needs for self-defence):
- a limit on stationed forces t thus restricting the forward deployment and concentration
of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe): and.
- appropriate numerical sub-limits on forces which will apply simultaneously throughout
the Atlantic to the Urals area.
These measures, taken together, will necessitate deep cuts in the WTO conventional
forces which most threaten the Alliance. The resulting reductions will have to take place in
such a way as to prevent circumvention, e.g. bv ensuring that the armaments reduced are
destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Verification measures will be required to ensure that all
states have confidence that entitlements are not exceeded.
53. These measures alone, however, will not guarantee stability. The regime of
reductions will have to be backed up by additional measures which should include measures
of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, storage, movement
and levels of readiness and availability of conventional forces.
54. In the CSBM negotiations, the Allies aim to maintain the momentum created by the
successful implementation of the Stockholm Document by proposing a comprehensive
package of measures to improve:
-transparency about military organisation.
-transparency and predictability of military activities.
- contacts and communication.
and have also proposed an exchange of views on military doctrine in a seminar setting.
55. The implementation of the Allies' proposals in the CFE negotiations and of their
proposals for further confidence- and security-building measures would achieve a quantum
improvement in European security. This would have important and positive consequences
for Alliance policy both in the field of defence and arms control. The outcome of the CFE
80
A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
negotiations would provide a framework for determining the future Alliance force structure
required to perform its fundamental task of preserving peace in freedom. In addition, the
Allies would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security if the
immediate CFE objectives are achieved - for example, further reductions or limitations of
conventional armaments and equipment, or the restructuring of armed forces to enhance
defensive capabilities and further reduce offensive capabilities.
56. The Allies welcome the declared readiness of the Soviet Union and other WTO
members to reduce their forces and adjust them towards a defensive posture and await im¬
plementation of these measures. This would be a step in the direction of redressing the
imbalance in force levels existing in Europe and towards reducing the WTO capability for
surprise attack. The announced reductions demonstrate the recognition by the Soviet Union
and other WTO members of the conventional imbalance, long highlighted by the Allies as
a key problem of European security.
Chemical Weapons
57. The Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile poses a massive threat. The Allies
are committed to conclude, at the earliest date, a worldwide, comprehensive and effectively
verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.
58. All Alliance states subscribe to the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol for
the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods
of Warf are. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reaffirmed the
importance of the commitments made under the Geneva Protocol and expressed the
unanimous will of the international community to eliminate chemical weapons completely
at an early date and thereby to prevent any recourse to their use.
59. The Allies wish to prohibit not only the use of these abhorrent weapons, but also their
development, production, stockpiling and transfer, and to achieve the destruction of existing
chemical weapons and production facilities in such a way as to ensure the undiminished
security of all participants at each stage in the process. Those objectives are being pursued
in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Pending agreement on a global ban. the Allies
will enforce stringent controls on the export of commodities related to chemical weapons
production. They will also attempt to stimulate more openness among states about chemical
weapons capabilities in order to promote greater confidence in the effectiveness of a global
ban.
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V. CONCLUSIONS :
Arms Control and Defence Interrelationships
60. The Alliance is committed to Dursuing a comprehensive aoproach to security,
embracing both arms control and disarmament, and defence, it is important, therefore, to
ensure that interrelationships between arms control issues and defence requirements and
amongst the vanous arms control areas are fully considered. Proposals in anv one area of
arms control must take account of the implications for Alliance interests in general and for
other negotiations. This is a continuing process.
61. It is essential that defence and arms control objectives remain in harmony in order
to ensure their complementarv contribution to the goal of maintaining security at the lowest
balanced level of forces consistent with the requirements of the Alliance strategy of war
prevention, acknowledging that changes in the threat, new technologies, and new political
opportunities affect options in both fields. Decisions on arms control matters must fully
reflect the requirements of the Allies' strategy of deterrence. Equally, progress in arms con¬
trol is relevant to military plans, which will have to be developed in the full knowledge of
the objectives pursued in arms control negotiations and to reflect, as necessary, the results
achieved therein.
62. In each area of arms control, the Alliance seeks to enhance stability and security. The
current negotiations concerning strategic nuclear systems, conventional forces and chemical
weapons are. however, independent of one another: the outcome of any one of these
negotiations is not contingent on progress in others. However, they can influence one
another: criteria established and agreements achieved in one area of arms control may be
relevant in other areas and hence facilitate overail progress. These could affect both arms
control possibilities and the forces needed to fulfil Alliance strategy, as well as help to
contribute generally to a more predictable military environment.
63. The Allies seek to manage the interaction among different arms control elements by
ensuring that the development, pursuit and realisation of their arms control objectives in in¬
dividual areas are fully consistent both with each other and with the Alliance's guiding
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principles for effective arms control. For example, the way in which START limits and sub-
limns are applied in detail could affect the future flexibility of the sub-strategic nuclear forces
of members of the integrated military structure. A CFE agreement would by itself make a
major contribution to stability. This would be significantly further enhanced by the
achievement of a global chemical weapons ban. The development of confidence- and
security-building measures could influence the stabilising measures being considered in
connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations and vice versa. The
removal of the imbalance in conventional forces would provide scope for further reductions
in the sub-strategic nuclear forces of members of the integrated military structure, though it
would not obviate the need for such forces. Similarly, this might make possible further arms
control steps in the conventional field.
64. This report establishes the overall conceptual framework within which the Allies will
be seeking progress in each area of arms control. In so doing, their fundamental aim will be
enhanced security at lower levels of forces and armaments. Taken as a whole, the Allies'
arms control agenda constitutes a coherent and comprehensive approach to the enhancement
of security and stability. It is ambitious, but we are confident that - with a constructive
response from the WTO states - it can be fully achieved in the coming years. In pursuing this
goal, the Alliance recognises that it cannot afford to build its security upon arms control
results expected in the future. The Allies will be prepared, however, to draw appropriate con¬
sequences for their own military posture as they make concrete progress through arms
control towards a significant reduction in the scale and quality of the military threat they face.
Accomplishment of the Allies' arms control agenda would not only bring great benefits in
itself, but could also lead to the expansion of cooperation with the East in other areas. The
arms control process itself is. moreover, dynamic: as and when the Alliance reaches
agreement in each of the areas set out above, so further prospects for arms control may be
opened up and further progress made possible.
65. As noted earlier, the Allies' vision for Europe is that of an undivided continent where
military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence: a continent which no
longer lives in the shadow of overwhelming military forces and from which the threat of war
has been removed: a continent where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states are
respected and the rights of all individuals, including their right of political choice, are
protected. This goal can only be reached by stages: it will require patient and creative
endeavour. The Allies are resolved to continue working towards its attainment. The
achievement of the Alliance's arms control objectives would be a major contribution towards
the realisation of its vision.
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APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER 2
CFE NEGOTIATIONS
Oblecttves
1. The objectives of these negotiations are :
— the establishment of a secure and stable balance of
conventional forces at lower levels:
— the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and
security;
— the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the
capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating
large-scale offensive action
2. Through the proposals set out below, the Delegations of
Belgium. Canada. Denmark. France, the Federal Republic of
Cermanv. Greece. Iceland, italv. Luxembourg, the Netherlands.
Norway. Portugal. Spain. Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States seek to establish a situation in which surprise
attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible
options We pursue this aim on the basis of eoual respect for
the security interests of all. Our proposals make up a coherent
wnoie and are intended to be applied simultaneously and in
their totality in the area of application, as defined in the
mandate
Rationale
3 The rationale for our proposals is as follows
— the present concentration of forces in the area from the
Atlantic to the Urals is the highest ever known in peace-time
and represents the greatest destructive potential ever
assembled Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant
to surorise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery
and armoured trooo carriers, must therefore De radically
reduced it is the substantial disnaritv in the numbers of these
svstems. ail capable of rapid mobility and high firepower,
which most threatens stability in Europe These svstems are
also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime
aim of anv aggressor.
— no one country should be oermitted to dominate Europe
bv force of arms no participants should therefore possess
more than a fixed proportion of the total holdings of all
participants in each category of armaments, commensurate
with its needs for self defence.
— addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will
not Dv itself affect the stationing of armaments outside
national borders additional limits will also be needed on
forces stationed on other countries territory.
— we need to focus on both the levels of armaments and
state of readiness of 'orces m those areas wnere trie
concentration of such forces is greatest, as wen as to prevent
redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area
of application to anotner it wit therefore be necessary to
aooiv a series of interlocking sublimits covering forces
throughout the area, together with further limits on
armaments in active units
Proposals
4 we propose the following specific measures within the
area of aooncation
Rule 1 • Overall Limit
The overall total of weapons in each of the three categories
identified below will at no time exceed
mam battle tanks 40.000
artillery pieces 33.000
armoured trooo carriers 56.000
Rule 2 : Sufficiency
No one country may retain more than 30 per cent of the
overall limits in these three categories, i.e
mam battle tanks 12.000
artillery pieces 10.000
armoured trooo carriers 16.800
Rule 3 : Stationed Forces
Among countries belonging tc a treaty of Alliance neither side
will station armaments outside national territory in active
units exceeding the following levels :
main battle tanks 3.200
artillery pieces 1.700
armoured trooo carriers 6.000
Rule 4 : SuD-llmltS
in the areas indicated be'ow. each group of countries
belonging to the same treaty of Alliance shall not exceed the
following levels
(11 In the area consisting of Belgium. Denmark. France, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Greece. Iceland. Italy.
Luxembourg, the Netherlands. Norway. Portugal. Spain.
Turkey, the United Kingdom Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic. Hungary. Poland. Romania and
the Territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising
the Baltic. Byelorussian. Carpathian. Moscow, Volga. Urals.
Leningrad Odessa. Kiev. Trans-Caucasus. North Caucasus
military districts
Source - NATO Information
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mam battle tanks 20.000
artillery 16 500
armoured trooo carne'S 28.000 (of wnich
no more than 12.000 aifvs)
(2) in the area consisting of Belgium. Denmark France, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Italy. Luxembourg, the
Netherlands. Portugal. Scain. the United Kingdom.
Czechoslovakia the German Democratic Republic. Hungary.
Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals
comprising the Baltic. Byelorussian. Carpathian. Moscow.
Volga. Urais military districts in active units
• mam battle tanks 11.300
artillery 9000
• armoured trooo carriers 20.000
(5) in the area consisting of Belgium. Denmark. France, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Italy. Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Reoublic. Hungary Polano and the
territory of the Soviet Union comprising the Baltic. Bveio
russian Carpathian military districts in active units
• main battle tanks 10.300
■ artillery 7 600
• armoured trooo carriers 18.000
(4) in the area consisting of Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic and Poland in active units
• main battle tanks 8.000
artillery 4.500
armoured trooo carriers 11.000
(5) Rule 4 is to be seen as an integrated wnoie which will only
be applied simultaneously and across the entire area from the
Atlantic to the Urals, it will be for the members of each
Alliance to decide how they exercise their entitlement under
all of these measures
Rule 5 : information Exchange
Each vear holdings of main battle tanks, armoured trooo
carriers and artillery pieces will be notified, disaggregated
down to battalion level This measure will also apply to
personnel in both combat and combat support units Any
change of notified unit structures above battalion ieve'. or
anv measure resulting in an increase of personnel strength in
such units, will be subject to notification, on a basis to be
determined in the course of the negotiations.
Measures for stability,
verification and non-clrcumventlon
5 As an integral part of the agreement, there would be a
need for
— stabilising measures to buttress the resulting reductions
in force levels in the Atlantic to the Urals area. These should
include measures of transparency, notification and constraint
appned to the deployment, movement, storaae and levels of
readiness of conventional armed forces which include
conventional armaments and eauioment.
— verification arrangements to include the exchange of
detailed data about forces and deployments with the right to
conduct on-site inspection, as wen as otner measures
designed to provide assurance of comonance with the agreed
provisions.
— non circumvention provisions inter alia, to ensure that the
manpower 3nd eouioment withdrawn from anv one area do
not have adverse security implications for anv participating
state.
— provision for temporarily exceeding the limits set down in
Rule 4 for ore-notified exercises
The longer term
6 in the longer term and in the iignt of the implementation
of the above measures, we would be willing to contemplate
further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe
such as
— further reductions or limitations of conventional
armaments and eauioment:
— the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive
capabilities and further to reduce offensive capabilities
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CHAPTER 3 - MILITARY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Central Europe has been described as an area having
the world's greatest concentration of military poten-
1
tial and, within NATO's responsibility area of
Allied Command Central Europe over 80 million people
2
live there. The region covers the whole of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries
and is highly industrialized with the benefit of many
valuable sea ports and other centres of communication.
The border between the Federal Republic of Germany
and its two Warsaw Pact neighbours to the East measures
approximately 700 kilometres.
The main military shortcoming of NATO's Central
Region is its lack of depth. In the North, the
distance from the Inner German Border (IGB) to the
port of Hamburg is only 50 kilometres; to Bremen
130 kilometres and to the major ports of Rotterdam
and Antwerp, approximately 600 kilometres. In the
South, at one point, the IGB is only 150 kilometres
from the Rhine. It is this factor, coupled with
the knowledge that approximately 25% of West Germany's
industry and about 30% of its population are located
2
within 100 kilometres of the IGB, which underpins
4
the 'forward defence' rationale of NATO's strategy.
For command and control of operations, the area
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closest to the Inner German Border is allocated
two army groups: Northern (NORTHAG) and Central
(CENTAG) each commanded by a four star general.
The army groups also have an associated Allied
Tactical Air Force (ATAF), the Second to the North
and the Fourth to the South who share the same
5
army group boundaries. See Figure 3-0.
Figure 3.0
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Each NATO army group commands four national corps
and each of the four corps (three star generals'
command), is made up of divisions (two star generals'
command), which vary in number from two to four.
Each division comprises three brigades and each
brigade commands a number of armoured, infantry
and allocated artillery units which may be mixed
together to form battle groups or combat teams.
All the brigades, except those of the UK, have their
own organic logistic support troops.
Within the last three years, NORTHAG revised
its NATO concept of operations within the broad
framework of forward defence and flexible response,
from a 'positional defence' to a more flexible
system to keep pace with the dynamics of modern
highly mechanised warfare. NORTHAG's concept
embodies:
Since NATO's adoption of the strategy of
forward defence and flexible response in
1967, NORTHAG has planned to fight its
defensive battle as far to the East as
possible, and has adopted a defensive
plan to defeat the enemy by wearing
down the impetus of an attack. But
continuing improvements in Soviet fire¬
power and developments in operational
concepts have led us to reconsider these
tactics. Soviet military doctrine places
great emphasis on the concentration of
forces to achieve surprise and local
superiority, and the Soviet Operational
Manoeuvre Groups are intended to exploit
initial breakthroughs and penetrate
rapidly into NATO's rear areas. Faced
with these developments, NORTHAG's static
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defence began to look increasingly
brittle. A revised concept for the
defence of the area was therefore
prepared, and has now been approved
by NATO and by the national authorities
of the countries concerned. The revised
concept places greater emphasis on the
selection of defence of vital areas;
on cooperation between ground and air
forces; on tactical flexibility and
mobility; and in the employment of
reserves .
Indeed, a key element of this plan is a
considerable strengthening of the armoured
reserve forces available to NORTHAG. It
is important to recognize that the concept
does not mark any change in NATO's essen¬
tially defensive posture; nor does it imply
any abandonment of the principle of forward
defence, which remains a fundamental tenet
of NATO strategy. But it does recognise
that force improvements permit the adoption
of a more mobile tactical concept. Static
defence can lead only to a war of attrition,
while the new concept would allow the defen¬
ders to seize the initiative from the aggres¬
sor, giving the Alliance a much better chance
of defeating the enemy, rather than merely
delaying him.6
The concept means that combat arms in the Central
Region, including the 1st British Corps, are having
to adapt themselves to a mobile battle, mechanized
to a greater extent than hitherto. This, in turn,
will place far greater demands upon battlefield
logistics systems than ever before because "mechan-
11 7
ized force stands or falls by the mobility it attains".
In NATO's Central Region of today, a mix of nations
each supply their own countries troops on the 'logistics
g
is a national responsibility' basis using re-supply
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loops extending from the rear forward. This system
has been aptly described as "the umbilical cord of
administrative movement"which tends to be based
upon historical experience and methods developed in
the First World War with seemingly little modification.
It has been recorded that:
Strategy and Tactics, in their art and
practice, change slowly; but Supply, in
its systems, much more so. For a system
is invented, evolved, or adapted, and
remains for so long the academically
correct thing that it is never questioned,
its efficiency is never doubted. It lasts
for several generations; it grows old.
Still, the soldier accepts it. Its imma¬
nence is too fixed; it is sacrosanct.10
It is surprising to note that the above comment-was
written some fifty-one years ago. Yet today, in spite
of the concept of a more mobile tactical strategy,
the logistic supply systems of many NATO nations in
the central region is still based upon the 'umbilical
cord' principle.
The depth of NATO's defensive territory is divided
into zones linked to responsibility levels mentioned
in Chapter 1, and these are important within the con¬




- Communications Zone (COMMZ), which is the
area from the North Sea to the border of
Germany, including both Belgium and the
Netherlands.
12
- Combat Zone (CZ), the Army Groups' responsi¬
bility, covering the area within Germany
from the borders of the Netherlands, Belgium
and France; Eastwards to the IGB and border
with Czechoslovakia.
The Combat Zone is further divided approximately
into halves to make up the:
1 3
- Rear Combat Zone (RCZ), the Western side
of Germany to the borders of the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg and France.
14
- Forward Combat Zone (FCZ), the Eastern side
of Germany to the IGB and the Czechoslovakian
border.
The Forward Combat Zone is also known as the Corps
Area as each national Corps will deploy its divisions
and be responsible for its defence within boundaries.
The Rear Combat Zone is used to provide rear support
facilities for some Corps; but troops of the German
Territorial Command are responsible for its security.
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(Source: NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9,
(First Draft, September 1989).
Logistic support for Allied forces is, in general,
allocated by national authorities to responsibility
levels at Commands in the COMMZ, RCZ or FCZ as appro¬
priate. However, systems vary according to nationality;
a significant factor when efficiency, mobility, flex¬
ibility and cooperation are essential for joint
1 s
allied operations. Although the term logistics
has been defined in Chapter 1 and further narrowed
down to production logistics and consumer logistics;
the most important to the field soldier are those
logistics which enable troops to survive, to move and
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to fight. These can be identified as:
- Combat supplies i.e. ammunition, fuel and
rations.
- Battlefield repair and recovery of both equip¬
ment and personnel.
The following words by the former General Officer
Commanding the US Army Logistics Center, Fort Lee,
Virginia are relevant:
Support for the combat forces begins at
the edge of the combat battlefield where
direct support to combat elements is pro¬
vided. This is by far the most impor¬
tant place in the logistic system - all
elements support it.16
* * *
In view of the importance of logistics to the
fighting troops, an observer could be forgiven for
thinking that procedures at the vital battlefield
interface in Allied Command Europe would be almost
17
identical. Eight Army Corps, provided by five nations,
deployed side by side in a comparatively small area
with little depth, under one command against a common
threat, would perhaps substantiate this view. However,
the agreement that the "provision of logistic resources
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to meet NATO operational plans is a national
18
responsibility" has permitted countries to develop
their own systems.
The lack of uniformity in battlefield logistics
is only one result stemming from the logistics is
19
a national responsibility rule. More serious,
within a systems context, is the leeway provided
for nations to design and tailor their own logistics
to support their national NATO assigned troops.
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, when military
budgets are reduced, an obvious solution is for
governments to cut the "tail" in preference to the
20
more highly visible "teeth". This action not only
21
maintains the "shop window" aspect of deterrence,
but also reassures the taxpayers and voters. As
a result of financial squeezing, some nationjs systems
have been eroded or redesigned to a level that their
efficiency under combat conditions would be question¬
able. However, as the systems are never truly
22
independently tested, some national logistics short¬
comings remain under the cover of the three blankets:
not disturbing the country's voters; not upsetting
NATO Allies; and not projecting any sign other than
a credible deterrent posture. In this respect NATO
23commanders' primary aim is to deter war.
Economic constraints are not the only factors
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which lead to differing logistics systems. Historical
experience, geography and varying perceptions of
the threat all lend themselves to different responses.
The Navy saying from the days of sail - "different
ships, different longsplices" is quite appropriate
for the six nations deployed to defend NATO's Central
24
Region. Where a sailing ship may have been efficient
with its splices running through its own blocks; it
would not have been possible to expect another vessel's
spliced rope to run through its sheaves, as size and
25
angle of pull are involved. It all becomes a question
of interoperability:
The ability of systems, units or forces
to provide services to and accept services
from other systems, units or forces and to
use the services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together.26
It will be appreciated that the importance of inter¬
operability is heightened when resources become scarce.
But this is the situation in the Central Region today;
27 2 8
both limited resources and limited interoperability
and this is addressed separately in Chapters 4 and 5-
It has been noted that economics, geography, his¬
torical experience and threat perception assists in
shaping a nation's military logistics system. The
United States, with its worldwide orientation, an
apparent sufficiency of resources (the economic factor)
94
and a tightly controlled decision-making process has
a different view to the West Germans, who only have a
Central Europe mission. The German Forces live, work
and will fight in their own country so, naturally,
they give a high priority to civil/military coopera-
29
tion; and this latter factor assists the economic
considerations.
In contrast, the British, who have neither the
funds of the US nor the geographic aspects of the
Germans, are influenced by economic constraints linked
to historical experience. This latter aspect has
resulted in a structure-driven system and a peace¬
time soldiering culture. The Netherlands and Belgium
have similar closeness to the threat, but are less
influenced by the same historical experiences in
developing their logistic systems. Both countries
also suffer from limited funding and, in stark compari¬
son to their NATO allies, at least officially agree
and declare their deficiency areas.
The following quote by the Professor of History at
Texas A & M University is significant:
New analogies, terms and a greater sensi¬
tivity of the range of (logistic) func¬
tions can serve to offset simplistic teeth-
tail images. If the spearhead be set on an
unsound shaft, and not firmly welded, then
shall it be forged for naught?30
It is even more poignant to record that the emblem/
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badge of the 1st British Corps incorporates a spear-
31head set on a very short shaft.
* * *
It has been recorded that British logistic systems
have been influenced by economic constraints linked
to historical experience. Prior to 197^, logistic
support units were organised to providethe following
32
to each brigade in the field:
- Transport Squadron (Royal Corps of Transport)
- Ordnance Company (Royal Army Ordnance Corps)
- Field Workshop Unit (Royal Electrical and
Mechanical Engineers)
- Field Ambulance Unit (Royal Army Medical Corps)
These units were affiliated to the brigade and remained
under the command of their respective heads of service
at division. Brigades were responsible for the detailed
management of their own logistics, but within the
33
overall plan laid down by divisional headquarters.
In 1974, a Defence Review was undertaken with the
object of saving money and manpower; one result was
a restructuring plan for the Army. It removed the
brigade level of command and cut operational logistic
support, centering command and control of logistics
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at division. It was suggested that this was the most
appropriate place to ensure balance, flexibility and
the efficient use of scarce resources. However, 1981
saw the reintroduction of the brigade level of command;
but this did not trigger a return of the hitherto
affiliated brigade units. Savings had been made and
new concepts adopted which, for logistics, articulated
two main principles:
- Logistic resources are commanded and
controlled at the highest practical
level.34
- The commander (of a formation) commands
logistic units through the heads of
service. This task is usually under¬
taken on his behalf by the Deputy Chief
of Staff.
Although the Northern Army Group's revised concept
of operations places the emphasis "to fight a mobile
35
defensive battle' which will demand tactical flex¬
ibility and mobility. 1st British Corps brigades
the "basic 'fighting' formation", do not have affil¬
iated logistic support units. Instead, they receive
a slice of the divisions logistic units assets as
37
and when required. This normally involves the allo¬
cation of:
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- Immediate Replenishment Groups - a small
number of Royal Corps of Transport (RCT)
load carrying vehicles tasked to provide
Combat Supplies to battle groups. (Push
System). Normally allocated one group per
battle group.
- Forward Ordnance Team - a small Royal Army
Ordnance Corps (RAOC) team tasked to trans¬
mit stores demands, resolve problems asso¬
ciated with the resupply of ordnance stores,
and act as a transit point for stores when
necessary. (Pull System).
- Forward Repair Team - a numberof Royal Elec¬
trical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) trades¬
men capable of major assembly changes to impor¬
tant vehicles.
- Dressing Station - a Royal Army Medical Corps
(RAMC) unit capable of giving First Aid and
preparing casualties for evacuation with their
own ambulances.
The units to which these elements belong remain under
divisional command through their own logistic service
heads. The main logistic units at division are:
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- A transport regiment made up of three trans-
o Q
port squadrons.
- An ordnance battalion comprising three ordnance
companies.
- Two armoured workshop units; one large and one
small, which can collectively form three medium
repair groups and three forward repair groups.
- Two field ambulance units, one with tracked
ambulances and one with wheeled ambulances.
They can collectively form three dressing
stations.
The ability to split the four logistic aspects into
three separate groups is noteworthy, given that each
British division now commands three brigades.
The British system of battlefield logistics support
is unique as the provision of the vital Combat Supplies
39
is shared between two logistic corps. RAOC units
procure, hold and account for the supplies whenever
they are static in warehouses, transit sheds or field
dumps; and remain accountable to their cap-badge head.
The RCT moves the Combat Supplies forward from RAOC
facility to RAOC dumps until the stores are finally
delivered to the fighting units. These RCT elements
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are responsible in turn to their own logistic corps
head. To limit the transport cycle length, RCT
units are tasked to cover certain boundaries and
become designated; see Figure 3-2:
- 4th line transport (known as support
command troops) who move Combat Supplies
within the COMMZ and forward to RCZ
dumps, normally to a Corps Supply Area
CSA) .
- 3^d line transport (knownas corps troops)
who move the Combat Supplies within the
RCZ and forward from the CSA's to the
Divisional Supply Areas in the FCZ.
- 2nd line transport (know as divisional
troops) who move the Combat Supplies
within the FCZ and via their own Immed¬
iate Replenishment Groups (IRG's) to
the fighting troops.
1st line transport is not RCT manned, but comprises
vehicles which belong to armoured regiments or
infantry battalions in the brigade areas; and these
vehicles are classed A1 or A2 echelon; see Figure 3-2.
This description of today's dynamic process could
have been extracted from a 1938 publication on British
100
SUPPLY SYSTEM OP A BRITISH ARMY CORPS
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supply with little amendment. It is recorded
that before the introduction of Motor Transport,
a battalion's A1 and A2 echelons would be approx-
41
imately 30 horse drawn wagons; but the greater
significance is that the ponderous umbilical system
42
has not changed.
One area of inter-mixing transport tasking con¬
cerns the movement of artillery ammunition in the
FCZ. Because of the vast quantities likely to
be used, 3^d line transport can be tasked to back¬
up the 2nd line transport units in delivering ammuni¬
tion direct to gun lines via an Ammunition Control
Point (ACP). When this occurs, the 3rd line trans¬
port unit is detached to and placed under command
of the division.
Combat supplies comprises ammunition, fuel and
rations. The format outlined in the preceding
paragraphs does not necessarily include the movement
of fuel as greater reliance is now placed upon
bulk transportation. In this respect, the NATO
4 3
Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), provides
both storage and transport facilities well forward.
Large RCT 22,500 litre low-mobility road tankers
fill from CEPS depots or from field tank farms
and transfer the fuel to 12,000 litre tankers which
in turn top-up fuel pods mounted on 4 or 6 wheel
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drive trucks. The fuel vehicles are part of the
transport regiments and allocated by size/mobility
according to their line role. There is no inhibition
in refilling any fuel-carrying vehicle at the nearest
44
CEPS depot; however, the system provides flexibility
in trucking fuel forward in the event of a forward
CEPS depot becoming inoperable. CEPS depots are
manned by NATO staff; field tank farms are run
by RAOC personnel.
Two other vital aspects of combat logistics concern
the recovery and repair of both equipments and person¬
nel on the battlefield.
The recovery and repair of battlefield
equipment is vital to the armies of NATO
today as it has been since the inception
of mechanised, combined-arms warfare.^5
In view of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in tanks
and guns, a way of maximising the effectiveness of
NATO's main battle tank fleet is an effective system
4 6
of battlefield recovery and repair. This could
become a critical factor where the odds are so high.
The REME tends to comprise practical engineers who
take a pragmatic approach to the principle "logistics
are commanded and controlled at the highest practical
47level". Their two divisional field workshop units
are designed to structure into three medium and three
forward repair groups. As soon as the battle situation
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develops, the REME commander should have little
qualms in deploying one medium and one forward
repair group to support each of the three brigades
of the division. They are not, however, detached
to the brigades in peacetime.
The role of the RAMC also involves practical
skills and, while the corps stress that casualty
estimates are not their responsibility, the following
quote is interesting:
It would seem reasonable to expect a
battle group in contact to receive
15% casualties in a 6 hour period in
NW Europe. If this is the case, the
Regimental Aid Post would have diffi¬
culty in coping on their own.^8
The RAMC also feels that in any 100 casualties, 40
are likely to be killed or missing. Of the remaining
60, 10 can be returned to duty after treatment and
the remainder will require evacuation, with 24
/- 4 9
stretcher and 26 walking or sitting cases. These
figures have been included to focus the mind on the
importance of combat logistics; however, within the
divisions, the two RAMC field ambulance units can
deploy three separate dressing stations, one for each
brigade, when directed. In peacetime, RAMC units
are not affiliated to a particular brigade.
This section has been designed to describe, as
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concisely as possbile, the combat logistics system
employed within the divisions of the 1st British Corps
before examining the systems of other ground forces.
It seems appropriate at this stage, to quote the
meaningful last sentence in The Army Field Manual -
The Armoured Division in Battle: "The logistic plan
50
most likely to succeed will be the simplest".
* * *
The allocation of two US Army Corps to the Central
Region and a reinforcement Corps whose troops are in
51
America, but equipment stored in Germany represents
a significant American commitment to the NATO Alliance
It should, however, be viewed against the background
of an Armed Service with wide geographic interests
and design principles which include global orientation
The ability to position and support forces almost any¬
where in the world, coupled with the stationing of
major Army combat formations in Korea, Panama, Alaska
and Hawaii, as well as the Continental US and Europe
represents comprehensive logistics understanding. It
also explains why a significant proportion of the 'few
55
books written on logistics' have been by Americans.
The US Army logistic system at divisional level is
coordinated by the divisional support command. Until
1986, this was a brigade-sized logistic formation with
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supply and transportation, medical and maintenance
battalions which could implement the logistic plan
for the brigades of the division. It was a system,
similar to the British, founded on the belief that
centralised control gives flexibility and adaptability.
In practice, it was found impossible to operate direct
to brigades without some intermediate logistic cell.
As a result, the post of Forward Area Support Coor-
dination Officer was created; the individual was
backed up with a Forward Area Support Team comprising
elements of the divisional logistic units. These posts
were not fully established but merely personnel deployed
as a team well forward to improve the logistic service
to the brigades.
The shortcomings of the above system generated con¬
siderable discussions within the United States and a
hard-hitting analysis noted that the "arrangement of
providing combat service support to brigades in a
division is not going to work satisfactorily in com-
bat".55
The article recommended that forward support
battalions consisting of companies of the supply,
medical and maintenance services and a commander and
staff be created. One battalion to be allocated to
each brigade for immediate support, and a main
support battalion including a transportation company
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at divisional level giving a wider range of facilities
on a routine basis, such as special stores or compli¬
cated spares. Surprisingly, these proposals were
tried and tested and, in 1986, the US Army adopted
the principle of establishing a main support battalion
at division with forward support battalions provided
for brigades.5^ These units are now operating and the
supply units provided within US Army Corps in Europe
are shown in the matrix below:











- Supply and Service Company
- Light Maintenance Company
- Heavy Maintenance Company
- Missile Support Company
- Medical Company















1. Units in tne brigade area of operations request Class I, II, III, TV and VII supplies from the Supply
Company of the Forward Support Battalion. Class VIII supplies are requested from the medical unit assigned
to the battalion and Class II supplies from the maintenance unit of the battalion. Units In the brigade
area draw selected high usage ammunition (such as 15omm) from the ammunition transfer point (ATP) tnat
operates near the supply company. All other ammunition Is picked up at the annunitlon supply point (ASP)
in the Corps. If requested supplies are not on hand at the brigade supply points, the requests are
forwarded to the division materiel management center (I**iC). The personnel at the DMMC cneek their records
to see If the supplies are located withir. the division. If tney are, the DMMC directs Issue to the user.
If the supplies are not on hand within the division, personnel request them from the Corps WC.
2. Units in tne division rear request Class I, II, III, IV, and VII supplies from the supply and service
company of tne Mair. Suprr-t battalion (MSB). Class VIII supplies are requested from the medical company of
the MSB. Class II supplies are obtained from the MSB Light Maintenance Company, except missile items,
which are supplied by the KSE Missile Company. Units In the division rear draw selected ammunition from
the ATP. All other ammunition must be plcKed up from the Corps ASP. If ^quested supplies are not or. hand
at tn- divisional supply point, -equests are sent to the D**1C or Medical unit for transmittal to the Corps
?-£iC or KZDSOM (Medical Supply, Optical and Maintenance) unit.
Ir. peacetime tne Corps ff,! serves primarily in ar. aoair.istrativ- role, processing requisitions for further
transmission to the Continental United States 'COSnJS, supply base. A limited numoe- of high priority
requ*sitions and requisitions fo~ items repaired at Corps or tneater level are satisfied by the Corns. Ir.
wartime, the Corps General Support Supply Base CCSSB? is the p-tmsry source for Class I. II. Ill, TV, V,
VII and non-ai- delivered (ALOC) Class IX. ALOC Class IX -equlrements (except for issue priority
oesignators (I?D) 1) will continue tc be met from CONUS.
3. Units in tne Corps rear draw their supplies from Direct Support (DS) supply points throughout the Corps
area. The Supply and Service Company (DS), of the Supply and Service Battalion, provides Class I. II, III,
IV, and VII supplies to the requesting units. Clas3 V is provided by the Corps ASP, Class VIII by medical
units operating ir. the Corps. Class IX supplies are provided by the maintenance units of the various main¬
tenance battalions. In addition to the DS supply points supporting the Corps units, there are general
supply (GS) units which provide GS supplies and backup to the DS units.
iJ. Logistics Command and Control. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) provides maintenance, supply,
transportation, health service support, and field services to the corps. Within a corps rone, non-
dlvlsional units receive DS and GS supply and maintenance from the COSCOM. Additionally, the COSCOM
provi3-s GS and backup DS support to the divisional units. The COSCOM accomplishes its mission through
support groups and subordinate DS/GS units. Materiel and maintenance management is accomplished through
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the COSCOM materiel management tenter (MMC); Corps transportat Ion assets are managed by the COS COM
movements control center (WC). Both management centers are subordinate to COSCOM HQ. The COSCOM WC,
like the IWC, continuously monitors the operational readiness of weapons systems and takes action to keep
thee operational.
The division support command (DISCOM) provides direct support supply, maintenance, transports!Ion, medical
support, and services to the division. The division support command deals directly with the support groups
of the COSCOM on oombat service support matters. The DISCOM also maintains a close relationship with the
functional control centers (MMC) and (MCC) of the corps. Support to the brigades is generally tailored to
the size, mission, and equipment of the brigade. The DISCOM commander, In providing support to the
division, uses the Division Materiel Mangement Center (DMCC) as his primary coordinating and control
element. It reviews maintenance priorities to Include repal- parts, and Is geared to returning Inoperative
weapons systems to combat. Tne DWC also coordinates and controls supply operations to move supplies
forward and shift support resources to meet the operational needs.















































The utilization of the supply units is shown in sche¬
matic form at Figure 3-3, and the points of particular
relevance concerning the new system are: first, the
combination of supply and transport within one unit
at divisional level; second, ceitral logistic coordina¬
tion at brigade, division and corps level; third, and
most importantly, a structure designed specifically
57
to meet the task.
* * *
The Heer - The Federal German Army provides the
largest share of NATO land forces in Central Europe
comprising 340,000 personnel in peacetime, which would
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be increased in war to a total of 1,055,000 men.
The Army is for administration established into three
main elements; the Army Field Forces (Feldheer), the
Territorial Army (Territorialheer) and the General
Army Office (Heeresamt). The latter essentially
provides support to the Army Staff and includes a
substantial training organization; but the Fi^sld Forces
represents those troops "earmarked for assignement to
NATO commanders".^ This force totalling 12 dT^/isions^0
is organized into three Army Corps with the 1st German
Corps deployed to NORTHAG; and the 2nd and 3rd German
Corps to CENTAG. The Territorial Army comprising some
64,000 personnel remains under national command and
is tasked to secure German territory in the Rear
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Combat zone and support the Field Forces.
The Federal German Army has well developed logistic
plans for the Central Region, including the provision
61
of a large number of host nation support measures
for other members of the Alliance. These measures
are agreed bi-laterally in peacetime and represent a
significant logistic allocation. For example, assis¬
tance to US reinforcements includes 18 transportation
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battalions and 14 security companies. The Federal
Army's support to its 1,055,000 troops, together with
meeting the demands of host nation support agreements,
requires highly developed logistic plans and procedures.
This latter aspect was simplified by the formation in
1959, of the Technical Service (Technische Truppe) by
amalgamating two services covering supply, transport
and repair; in effect forming a single logistic corps.
However, the Medical Services (Sanitastruppe) remain
a separate corps.
In the field the supply units provided within GE
Army Corps are outlined overleaf:
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FORMATION TYPE OF SUPPLY UNITS
BRIGADE - Supply Company
x i
DIVISION SUPPLY BATTALION:
- Supply Company (for div troops)
- Supply Company Material
- Supply Company Bulk Supplies












- Special Weapons Supply
Battalion
The Brigade Supply Company provides and transports
ammunition (except artillery and engineers), fuel,
rations, clothing and personal support items, repair
parts and a field post office. The two Divisional
Supply Companies Bulk Supplies provides ammunition
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SUPPLY SYSTEM QP A GERMAN ARMY CORPS
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Figure 3.4
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support to the brigades as well as divisional units.
The formation General Staff are responsible for the
planning of the logistics support system, but the
deputy commander has a supervisory role in the rear
areas. The supply system of a German Army Corps is
as shown in schematic form at Figure 3-4 and this
system applies to all three of its Army Corps.
Before examining the supply methods of the Dutch
and Belgian Corps, emphasis must be placed on the German
63
Army's additional commitment to the Rear Combat Zone.
Here, troops of the German Territorial Command which
in peacetime numbers 64,000 men, but would be
6 4
increased in war to nearly half a million, are
responsible for security and significant logistic tasks
in support of own troops and for the benefit of Alliance
as a whole.
* * *
The 1st Netherlands Corpsplaces emphasis on mobility
and flexibility to provide the opportunities to react
to changing situations. In consequence, its logistic
systems have been designed to reflect this overall
6 S
strategy. It is established with dedicated logistic
units at brigade and corps level only; but the Corps
Logistic Command creates, with its own organic units,
an area support system in the divisional area. The
115
supply organization is outlined below:











- 3 Support Battalions (one for each
division)
- 3 Supply Battalions (one for each
division)
- Maintenance Battalion
The difference between the Corps Logistic Command
Support (Legerkorps Vezorgings) and Supply (Aanvullings
Plaats) Battalions concerns both structure and deploy¬
ment area. The Logistic Support Battalion comprises
three companies - supply, maintenance and medical,
and the battalion is designed to be deployed to the
divisional area. The Logistic Supply Battalion which
is also established on the scale of one for each divi¬
sion has three companies - supply, ammunition and
materiel; and is employed in the Corps area primarily
for area support, but as a back-up to the support
battalions deployed in the divisional area. A sche¬
matic of the supply system of the Netherlands Army
Corps is at Figure 3 • 5 •
* * *
116
SUPPLY SYSTEM OF A. NETHERLANDS ARMY CORPS
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Figure 3.5
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The logistic system of the 1st Belgian Corps is
similar to that of the 1st Netherlands Corps in
that the division has no organic logistic units; but
is supported by troops of the Corps Logistic Support
Command. The supply organization comprises:
FORMATION TYPE OF SUPPLY UNITS
BRIGADE
X







CORPS CORPS LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND
XXX
- 2 Logistic Battalions (scale, one
per division)
(Forward Logistic Complex)
- 2 Logistic Battalions (scale, one
per division)
(Logistic Support Complex)




The difference between the three types of logistic
battalions provided by the BE Corps Logistic Support
Command concerns their support role and planned
deployment areas. One type of battalion establishes
a Forward Logistic Complex in the rear area of each
division; the second type organizes a Logistic Support
Complex in the Corps area behind each division; the
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third type provides a Logistic Depot Complex in the
Corps rear area. The diagram at Figure 3-6 fully
outlines and simplifies the supply system of this
Corps .
At this forward edge, the Brigades of the 1st
Belgian Corps each have their own organic logistic
support units, comprising a combined supply and trans¬
portation company, a maintenance company and a medical
company. This allocation provides the flexibility
needed for dynamic mobile operations by "operational
level"^units of today.
* * *
This space intentionally left blank
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SUPPLY SYSTEM OF A BELGIAN ARMY CORPS
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Figure 3.6
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Staying in NATO's Central Region, but moving outside
/* i—j
the integrated military structure, the system adopted
by the French Army is of academic interest if only
because, aside from the recently established Franco/
68
German Brigade, French Corps do not have the brigade
level of command. In 1977 the French Army removed the
operational level of brigades, but established smaller
divisions and this grouping still stands. Within a
French Army Corps, the supply organization comprises:
FORMATION TYPE OF SUPPLY UNIT
REGIMENT - Command and Services Company
DIVISION
XX




- 2 Corps Transport Regiments
- 2 Ammunition Companies
- 2 Fuel Companies
- 2 Supply Companies
- 2 Forward Maintenance Supply
Companies
- Rear Maintenance Supply Company
- Medical Supply Company
The French differentiate within Logistiques three
main areas; the replenishment component which embraces
transport, ammunition, fuel and supply units; the
maintenance function; and the medical component.
These are undertaken and coordinated by the Corps
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SUPPLY SYSTEM OF A FRENCH ARMY CORPS
DIVISION AREA •
Legend: Va - b7 air
V? - b7 rail
VR b7 road
GRAY - ?crvard Replenisonent Group
GRAR - Rear ReplenAsanent Group
caav - Forward Suurl7 Cocoan7
CAAR - Rear Supply Cocoas7
GTS - TransloadiDe Lone
Lin - Tecana.cal Lone
ZVT - Transit Lone
LRA - Porvard SunnI7 LoDe
Logastics oX an Arx? Corps
- as designed and organised b7 toe Corps rear area CP,
- is uadertaxen b? toe Logistic Bragaaa.
Toe Logistic brigade severs
medical
Xialds of logistic and of toe
3. Oaix features
- m# Corps xs selX-euiTlcient Tor a coaoat da?s;
- support of Xorces is unoertaxer by toe Logistic Brigade wOiCO
obtains its supplies Xros Xlxed installations/depots (b? rail
or road);
- coxDtt units are Xreed to a large extent of logistic duties,
following to# principle tOat 1rear replemaoes forward".
TO# Logistic Brigade is composed of toe following J components:
. toe medical component and the maintenance component wtici are
independent!? replenisned;
- to* replenisoment component wtncO provides all otOer supplies
(ammunition, fuel, etc.);
- in addition, toere exist st lrx7 level replenishment capa¬
bilities to pronds b? air supplies for one combat da? lor a
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Source - NATO's MAS 1989
Figure 3.7
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Logistic Brigade which essentially operates a "push"
system.^ The current French Army Corps supply system
is outlined at Figure 3-7; but this organization,
together with that of the British, superficially lacks
the mobility of the systems adopted by other NATO
Corps in the Central Region.
* * *
Turning to another areaof French influence, at least
linguistically, the Canadians do not have corps or
division strength in Europe, but provide to NATO the
4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group which is based
in Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany. The brigade
is established with a Service Battalion which comprises
a supply and transport company and a maintenance company.
In addition, a medical support unit is maintained.
While this logistic establishment may seem to be
designed to fit the needs of a specific brigade in
Europe, Canadian organization would provide the follow¬
ing logistic supply units at corps level if deployed:
This space intentionally left blank
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- Forward Replenishment Battalion
- 2 General Supplies Battalion
- Combat Supplies Battalion
- Vehicle Supply Battalion
- Engineer Support Regiment
The organization at brigade and division level
shown above is self-explanatory; but at Corps the
Forward Replenishment Battalion and one of the
General Supplies Battalion would be deployed in the
Corps area, but well forward in what the Canadians
7 0
term Corps Forward Administrative Area.' The
remaining Corps logistic units would be positioned
further back, but still within the Rear Combat Zone.
This space intentionally left blank
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One of the keys to the Canadian logistic support
system is the joining of supplies and transport into
71
one responsibility area at the "operational level"
of brigade in line with its many NATO Allies. Although
there are some differences between the Allies' systems
hitherto described they generally all share two common
principles; an appreciation of the requirement for
logistic support units at brigade level to enhance
flexibility and mobility; and the understanding that
supply and transportation are essentially part of the
'total logistics' function.
* * *
Turning to the Soviet Armed Forces the following
comment by Colonel General Ivan Golushko, the current
72Chief of Staff of the Rear Services serves to remind
that whatever the nationality or political conviction,
the military aim of achieving efficient logistic
support to the troops on the battlefield remains the
same :
Continuous supplies of fuel, ammunition,
food, weapons and equipment repair, and
attending to the wounded is strenuous
labour, without which success in any 7o
aspect of modern war would be unthinkable.
The above quote could be taken to imply that the Soviet
Forces operate a similar logistic system to those of
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the NATO Allies; but a fundamental difference concerns
the emphasis placed upon 'continuous supplies'. While
NATO systems do rely upon continuous replenishment
at every level on the battlefield, an umbilical cord
running from the rear forwards, the Russians employ
a quite different methodology. This entails providing
the tactical formations (division level) with suffi¬
cient logistical resources to complete their missions
over a set time and attrition period without resupply.
The divisions fight by living off their logistic assets
until they are replaced in the line by a fresh division,
which is also provided a set scale of resources. The
relieved division is then replenished or reconstituted
by Army level resources, and it is at this level where
the Russian commitment to 'continuous supplies' takes
place. This methodology ensures that tactical forma¬
tions are not limited by logistic constraints in offen¬
sive operations and in this respect, the significance
of offensive operations is stressed.
The Soviet States' principles of warfare places
emphasis on the primacy of the offensive as a means
74
of waging war, and while the declared shift to a
75
doctrine of 'reasonable or defensive sufficiency'
may affect the structure, size and organization of
76
Soviet Forces, the ability to carry out offensive
operations through its tactical doctrine and train¬
ing if fully maintained. Even the defensive NATO
126
Alliance aims to have an ability to conduct offen-
77
sive counterstroke operations.
The Soviet logistic system therefore is given a
high priority and is designed to support vast mobile
forces on the battlefield. If given a high level
of combat readiness, the Soviet Forces marshalled
for 'all-out' conventional operations in the European
theatre could comprise:
Almost 14,000 armoured vehicles and
artillery pieces, augmented by a further
7,100 tanks and guns within 16 hours,
followed by a further reinforcement
within 24 hours, bringing a grand total
just short of 20,000 tanks and guns.78
The logistic support of such sizeable forces, in the
words of General Golusko, "characterized by resolute
and dynamic actions and by abrupt changes in the
79
situation', would place significant demand on the
supply system. The movement of manpower and supplies
to the front lines is the responsibility of what is
named the Rear Services.
8o
The Soviet Forces concept of the 'Tyl' or Rear is
an important one embracing all service support within
one organization:
Rear services are divided into central
(strategic) operational, and troop (tact-
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ical) units. A measure of the constantly
increasing importance of the Tyl Corps
is that its national chief was recently
given the rank of marshal. At the
national level and down through each
subordinate level of military command,
there are separate headquarters and
staffs for the Chiefs of the Rear,
as those responsible for supply are
known.81
In other words a dedicated logistic branch controls
all resources starting at national level under its
Marshal all the way forward to the battlefield where
an 'operational rear' is established. This opera¬
tional rear extends from the forward battle position
to between 100 and 150 km back. Supplies are con¬
trolled by the army 'Tyl' chiefs, who will normally
operate base and forward depots. These army level
8 2
depots are the usual break bulk points for rail-
shipped supplies and terminals for fuel pipelines.
The last three years has seen a major reorganiza¬
tion of the Soviet logistic support structure due
to four main reasons. First, the influence of
experience in Afghanistan. Second, the perceived
demands for greater battlefield mobility. Third,
the increasing emphasis placed upon conventional war¬
fare and finally, the now recognized demands to coor¬
dinate rear area security. The American analyst,
Graham H Turbiville, Jr., who specializes in Soviet
logistic concepts, has noted, from a comprehensive
128
and continuing research of Russian publications,
"a sweeping reorganization of the materiel support
system in all motorized rifle, tank and airborne
O n
divisions in the Soviet Armed Forces". It has been
reported that this reorganization will affect the
84
logistic support system for some 200 divisions,
which essentially combines the elements of supply,
transport and maintenance into 'material support'
units at various levels under a single commander.
This new structure replaces the earlier "fragmented
8S
transport/supply entities" ' when Russian divisions
were established with a number of disparate logistic
86
units, of which transport provided the major focus.
The new system of Soviet ground forces logistic
organization provides the following types of materiel
support (materiel' nogo obespecheniia) units:
FORMATION TYPE OF SUPPLY UNIT 1
REGIMENT - Materiel Support Company
DIVISION MATERIEL SUPPORT BATTALION:
- 2 Transport Companies
- Fuel Transport Company
- General Purpose Cargo Transport
Company
- Combined Depot (Supplies)
- Mobile Field Bakery
- Medical Section
- Maintenance Platoon
- Supply and Service Platoon
- Engineer Platoon
ARMY - Materiel Support Brigade
(Source: Graham H. Turbiville, Jr)
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This new organization of materiel support units has
been described as the most important change to occur
within "Soviet tactical-level logistics in recent
O rj
years". It is geared to support the demands of
modern and mobile fire and manoeuvre formations on
the battlefield; an aim it has in common with the
NATO Allies. It has also been recognized that the
new organization of providing integrated materiel
support units at regiment, division and corps level
could easily be adjusted to any future structure
8 8
changes within the Soviet Army.
Soviet Army formations have additional logistic
resources, which includes separate medical units at
a regiment, division and army level. They are all
part of the 'Tyl' designed to support the fighting
elements and remain self-contained. As already
mentioned, it is emphasised that the Russian supply
system at divisional level, unlike those of the NATO
Allies, does not rely upon permanently maintained
lines of supply when on the march. At Army level
89
where 'continuous supply' really does apply, it
is estimated that its forces could fight for 12 to
14 days if necessary, even without re-supply.^
According to a 1984 US Army manual "Soviet Military
91
Forces do receive effective logistic support",
and given the sheer volume of materiel required,




Before summarizing the essentials of this Chapter
it is necessary, if only to convince the non-British
reader of the academic critical level of this paper,
to make special comment on the British battlefield
logistic support position. It is clear there are two
systems operating within Allied Forces Central Europe
deployed as part of NATO's integrated command struc-
92
ture. The UK concept where logistics are centra¬
lized at division with elements allocated to brigades
as required, and those of the immediate Allies who
have established logistic units organic to their bri¬
gades. The latter has the advantage of giving these
fighting formations greater flexibility on the battle¬
field and makes the logistics commander responsible
to the formation commander for command and control
of logistic personnel, their training, the implemen¬
tation of the logistic plan (determined by the brigade
staff), and the siting and defence of the rear areas.
The British system places this significant respons¬
ibility on the shoulders of the brigade deputy Chief
of Staff which is quite a tall order for an officer who
will probably have received minimal logistics training.
There is little doubt that of the two systems, the prov¬
ision of integrated brigade logistic support units has




The British reluctance to adopt a battlefield
logistics system similar to its Central Region Allies
comprises a mix of variables which may be due to
pragmatism and a perception of what is realistically
achievable; but is additionally influenced by back¬
ground and a form of military philosophy. The prag¬
matic approach acknowledges that several adjustments
to the Army's 'teeth-to-tail ratio' have occurred
over time when logistic personnel levels were cut;
against today's background of ever declining defence
95
budgets which provides little scope to fund a change.
In any event, financial priority is usually given to
upgrading tanks, guns and other more visible elements
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of deterrence. The considerations of background or
philosophy is essentially linked to reluctance to
change which is particularly appropriate to the Armed
Forces. The term 'all professional Army' is seen as
an accolade; however, the employment of professionals,
especially in non-profit organizations, is not neces¬
sarily synonymous with task efficiency. It has been
stated that "Professionals often have motivations
that are inconsistent with good resource utilization,
and their success as perceived by their professional
97
colleagues reflects these motivations". People resist
change if it rearranges lines and levels of authority
and, as outlined by Professor Child of Aston University
132
Management Centre:
A change aimed at simplifying an
organization structure, may be
through reducing the number of
hierarchical levels, will probably
be seen by some as a threat to job
security and their prospects of
promotion further up the hierarchy.
A change aimed at enriching jobs of
subordinates may be viewed by a
manager as a threat to his authority...
The very process of change may be seen
as an unwelcome disturbance and inter¬
ference to a well established routine.9°
Yet if the Army adopted a strategy of providing inte¬
grated logistic support units for the battlefield
at brigade level, it follows that this step could
create the rationale for a structure change further
99back. Should this approach be taken to its logical
conclusion, it could well result in the formation
of a single logistic corps embracing the functions
of supply, transport and maintenance with the possible
inclusion of medical support. It is this spectre,
of demolishing current hierarchical groupings and
cutting cap badge interests, which should not be
underestimated in stiffening internal military resis¬
tance to change.
There is an awareness of UK sustainability diffi¬
culties on the battlefield resulting from three main
areas. Firstly, two studies completed in 1981 involved
an examination into the probable ammunition and equip-
133
ment expenditure, at maximum intensity, within BAOR
in the 1980-1990 time-frame taking into account esti¬
mated attrition losses. The results identified
"very large increases in artillery daily ammunition
expenditure rates. In the case of M109 for example,
101
the rates were trebled." Secondly, these increases
were noted at the time when the British field artillery
main calibre is in the process of change from 105 mm
to 155 mm. The latter shell is approximately two and
a half times heavier than the 105 mm. Thirdly, the
scheduled phased introduced beginning now (1989), of
102
the new multi-launch rocket system. All these ele¬
ments have created a serious shortfall in battlefield
transport lift which serves to underpin the cry "when
resources are scarce, logistics are commanded and
10 3
controlled at the highest practical level".
However, the realities of general war in Europe
would make the flexibility of centralized logistic
control difficult to achieve. Communications would
be vulnerable to intercept and jamming which the
Soviet Army has well developed expertise. In the
final analysis, all radio communications could be
104
blocked by Electro Magnetic Pulse. A total block-
out would seriously impact upon British combat logis¬
tic support, but would only marginally effect its
immediate Allies or a Soviet aggressor. BAOR exer¬
cises have, in the recent past, endeavoured to
134
simulate operations conducted on 'radio silence';
however, without the use of the civil telephone
(Bundespost), logistic support systems coordinated
105
at divisional level would have been seriously degraded.
UK logistic planners see the saviour of the battle¬
field shortfall in transport lift to be the intro¬
duction of the Demountable Rack Offloading and Pickup
System (DROPS). This equipment is considered the
only viable way of coping with the increased tonnages
on the battlefield "without unacceptable increases
1 0 6
in manpower and conventional vehicles". The system
consists of a prime mover (truck) and a "demountable"
rack or platform known as a flatrack. A flatrack is
designed to carry 10 standard pallets or military
unit load containers each weighing 1.5 tonnes; the
total lift 15 tonnes. A loaded flatrack can be drawn
onto a prime mover in less than 5 minutes as a one
man operation. Offloading is equally simple. The
systems advantages are: high prime mover utilisation
to achieve the increased lift, it is road/rail com¬
patible with the planned introduction of specialist
rail transfer equipment, and crossloading is almost
eliminated. The aim is to move a loaded flatrack
of ammunition (or mines) from the depot to the gun
lines without unloading the flatrack. Its key role
and justification for the expenditure is the move¬
ment of ammunition; however, DROPS is dependent upon
135
effective command and control and, in the words of
the manufacturer: "Efficient communications and ADP
assistance will be essential.if the system is to
107
achieve its full potential".
The adoption of integrated logistic support units
at brigade level by all in-theatre Allies, leaves one
to question if the division is really the practical
level to control battlefield logistics supply of the
fighting formations. Indeed, the concept of estab¬
lishing logistic support battalions or regiments is
not new to the British; but such units are only pro¬
vided for specific functions for what is termed 'Out
108
of Area Operations'. The Royal Marines 3 Commando
Brigade is supported by a logistic regiment which
comprises a headquarters, transport, ordnance, medical
and workshops squadron, together with a number of
109
specialists. In addition, 5 Airborne Brigade has
a logistic battalion which was formed in April 1985-
This establishment was due in part, to the criticisms
of the Falklands campaign where 5 Brigade, working
alongside 3 Commando Brigade, had to function under
the system of a mixture of attached logistic units.
The comparison emphasised effectiveness of the com¬
mandos integrated logistic regiment which fortunately
was the first to arrive in theatre and was able to
take charge of all land force logistics. A subsequent
analysis of logistics in the Falklands noted that
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"the campaign highlighted the inestimable value of
formations having their own dedicated logistic units
110
in peace and war", and recommended the introduction
of brigade support units in BAOR. But yet, in spite
of its advantages, the British Army policy remains
that such groupings are only necessary for Out of
Area Operations and are not applicable to the 1st
British Corps.
* * *
This Chapter has recorded a number of different
national logistic systems designed for use on the
battlefield. If one wished to develop a good logis¬
tic system to support offensive operations, then the
Russian methodology should be considered as concep-
tially it is basically sound. NATO Forces in the
Central Region however, have to cope with a conven¬
tional defence and react to an enemies offensive
initiative. In this respect, the Warsaw Pact Forces
112
are capable of creating spearheads which dictate
111
that a NATO defender operates a mobile area defence.
Mobility in defence requires correspondingly flexible
logistic support and the essentials of a system to
adequately sustain such operations are: First, suf¬
ficient mobile logistic supplies organic to each
practical command level to sustain the force for the
114
period of its normal mission. Second, mobility of
137
supplies and services at the supporting level.
Third, command and control of logistics at the
level of tactical/operational responsibility.
Fourth, the ability placed at the level of the
appropriate operational command to determine policy,
planning or execution of logistic support.
It is recorded in the first draft of a document
on Land Forces Logistic Doctrine: "the NATO system
should be characterized by mobility, initiative,
115
responsiveness and flexibility". Although all
NATO forces in the Central Region have their defi¬
ciencies in stocks and transport, they all endeavour
to make the best use of their resources when design¬
ing their logistic systems to meet the above criteria.
The ground forces of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
all take into account the four essentials noted in
the above paragraph. The United States forces are
structured towards a similar system following exten¬
sive trials. The United Kingdom's logistic system
is trying to cope with the problems, but some of its
policies have to be changed. An appropriate message
to close this Chapter are comments from the business
world by two distinguished Professors of Management:
...the right organization structure is
not performance itself, but rather a
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prerequisite of performance. The wrong




Change is not to be advocated for its own
sake. But the organization that can adapt
to changing situations and requirements is
the organization that survives. The assump¬
tion that a given organizational form which
works today will still be right in five




NOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. See Lieutenant General Eberhard Eimler, "The
Role of Air Power in Defence of the Central
Region", NATO's Sixteen Nations, (February/
March 1987), p.57-
2. See General Dr Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin,
"Defence of Central Europe: The Challenges of the
1980's", NATO's Fifteen Nations, (Special Issue
2/1981), p.16.
3- See General John R. Galvin, "Trans-Atlantic
Partnership for Security: Canada in NATO",
Canadian Defence Quarterly (Summer 1988), p.13-
4. Forward Defence Strategy - see UK Statement on
the Defence Estimates 1988 (London, 1988), Vol¬
ume 1, p . 15 •
5- See General Ulrich de Maiziere, "Rational
Deployment of Forces on the Central Front",
Western European Union Document 663 (2 April
1975), p.10.
6. UK Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986 (London,
1986), Volume 1, p.33•
7- Colonel C.G. Shaw, Supply in Modern War (London,
1938), p.228.
8. See NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1984), p.187;
also Chapter 1 note 71-




The rear part of the theatre of opera¬
tions (behind but contiguous to the
combat zone) which contains the Lines
of Communications (LOC), establishments
for supply and the evacuation and other
agencies required for the immediate
support and maintenance of the field
forces.
(NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6).
140
12. Defined as:
That area required by combat forces
for the conduct of operations and
that territory forward of the Army
Group rear boundary. This zone is
divided into the FCZ and RCZ.
(NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6).
13• Defined as:
Usually that portion of the CZ com¬
prising the territory between the
corps rear boundary and the army group
rear boundary.
(NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9 (First
Draft: September 1989), Annex A, p.A-2).
14. Defined as:
That portion of the CZ forward of
the corps rear boundaries.
(NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9 (First
Draft: September 1989), Appendix A, p.A-1).
15- See NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9
(First Draft: September 1989), P-7-
16. Major General E.M. Graham, Jr., "The Dynamism
of Army Combat Logistics", Military Review
(April 1976), p.65.
17- The nations are: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
United Kingdom and United States.
18. NATO document MC 36/2 (Revised) of 18 May i960
and Council Resolution of 23 February 1952.
19. It has recently been recorded that:
...significant differences, particu¬
larly in organizations and equipment,
exist among the NATO land forces.
(NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9 (First
Draft: September 1989), p-7)-
20. See R.A. Beaumont, "Beyond Teeth and Tail: The
Need for New Logistical Analogies", Military
Review (March 19 8 5 ) , pp-3_ll-
141
21. See Chapter 1 note 53- A similar 'shop window
mentality' is recognized by Brigadier F.A.L.
Alstead in his study The Reinforcement of Cen¬
tral Europe in Crisis and War (NATO Brussels,
1989) , p.246.
22. Operational Readiness Tests of army units are
carried out under NATO staff direction; but it
is usual for the staff officers conducting
the tests to belong to the same nation of the
units being tested.
23. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe has referred
to: "my mission of deterrence" and noted that
"the main thing that we should be concerned
with is preventing war, not fighting war".
(General John R. Galvin's Address to the Royal
United Services Institute, London, on 10 February
1988 - author's notes).
24. There are five nations fielding Corps level
formations - Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands,
United Kingdom and United States; with Canada
providing a Brigade Group.
25- The author makes no apologies for this nautical
reference based upon his earlier sail - training
experience as 'Worcester' cadet.
26. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6.
27. For two pragmatic comments concerning 'limited
resources' in NATO's Central Region see General
Sir Martin Farndale, "Follow-on Forces Attack",
NATO's Sixteen Nations (April/May 1988), p.45
and Brigadier F.A.L. Alstead, The Reinforcement
of Central Europe in Crisis and War (NATO Brussels,
1989), p.254.
28. Exemplified by UK's Assistant Chief of the Defence
Staff (Logistics): "...after 40 years of the Alli¬
ance, progress on interoperability has been mini¬
mal". (From a paper by Major General I.S. Baxter,
"Sustainability - a concept which may come of
age", presented to the King's College, London/
MOD Conference "Britain and the Central Region
- 18/19 July 1989" ) •
29. For example; the Federal German Ministry of Defence
has 176,000 civilians earmarked for wartime support
tasks; see Neil Munro, "The West German Territorial
Army", Armed Forces (April 1987), p.167-
142
R.A. Beaumont, "Beyond Teeth and Tail: The Need
for New Logistical Analogies", Military Review
(March 1985), p.11.
The Emblem of the 1st British Corps:
The NATO definition of a brigade is:
A basic 'fighting' formation com¬
bining combat, certain combat
support and some other operational
support capabilities required for
sustained combat, larger than a
battalion and smaller than a
division.
(NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6).
NATO defines a division as:
A major administrative and tact¬
ical unit/formation which combines
in itself the necessary arms and
services required for sustained
combat, larger than a regiment/
brigade and smaller than a corps.
(NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6).
See Brigadier G.B. Fawcus, Chief of Staff 1st
British Corps in a letter published in British
Army Review (August 1985), p.78.
Simon O'Dwyer - Russell, "NORTHAG concept
'aims to win'", Jane's Defence Weekly (26 July
1986) , p.116.
NATO Glossary of Terms and Defintiions AAP-6.
See Brigadier G.B. Fawcus, Chief of Staff 1st
British Corps in a letter published in British
Army Review (August 1985), p.78.
The number of transport squadrons within each
143
divisional transport regiment is, alas, sometimes
reduced to just two.
39- The Royal Corps of Transport (RCT) and the Royal
Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC).




43. One of the few NATO organizations with its head¬
quarters remaining located in France. The Cen¬
tral Europe Operating Agency is in Versailles.
44. Because some CEPS depots are established within
a national Army Corps area, there is a tendency
for its troops to regard the facility as their
own. This is not so as the depot is NATO owned
and funded and other nations could draw upon its
supplies.
45. D.C. Isby, "Battlefield Equipment Recovery and
Repair", NATO's Sixteen Nations (Special Issue
1/1985), p.108.
46. Ibid, pp.103-113.
47. Brigadier G.B. Fawcus, Chief of Staff 1st British
Corps in a letter published in British Army Review
(August 1985), p.78.
48. RAMC Training Pamphlet 1986, Chapter 2, Annex C.
49. Ibid.
50. UK Army Field Manual, The Armoured Division in
Battle, Volume 1, Part 2 (Code 71344), p.12-6.
51. See James Meacham, "NATO's Central Front", The
Economist (30 August 1986), Survey, p.15-
52. For US Power-Projection, see Frank C. Carlucci
Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1990 on
the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-
1994 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C., 19 8 9) ,
p. 28.
53- Four outstanding examples are; Duncan Ballantine,
Hawthorne Daniel, Henry Eccles and James Huston.
54. Often abridged to FASCO.
144
55- M. Mooradin, "DISCOM in a 'Come as you are' War",
Military Review (June 1976), p.41.
56. US Field Manual 63-20 outlines the role of the
Forward Support Battalion and US Field Manual
63-21 describes the role of the Main Support
Battalion. Both documents published by Head¬
quarters Department of the Army Washington,
D.C., 18 February 1986.
57- Ibid.
58. Klaus Wittmann, "NATO's Front Line", Defence
(April 1988), p.256.
59. Ibid, p.259-
60. The divisions currently comprise - 6 armoured,
4 mechanised infantry, 1 mountain and 1 airborne.
61. Host Nation Support (HNS) is defined in NATO
Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6.
62. See Niel Munro, "The West German Territorial
Army", Armed Forces (April 1987), p.170.
63- An area within the Federal Republic of Germany
between the various Corps rear boundaries and
the borders of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem¬
bourg and France.
64. Lieutenant General Eberhard Burandt, "Indispen¬
sable Partner", NATO's Fifteen Nations (Special
2/1981), p.54.
65. Organic to the formation.
66. Major General I.S. Baxter in his presentation
to the King's College London/MOD Conference -
18/19 July 1989 emphasized that "...the opera¬
tional level is that of the brigade".
67. Within NATO's command region of Central Europe
only France is outside the integrated military
structure.
68. See David Fairhall, "The military steps to a
political initiative", The Guardian (8/April
1988), p.23.
69- For logistics 'push' and 'pull' see E. de Fabribeckers,
"The Long Tail: Supply and Transport in the Modern
Army", NATO's Sixteen Nations (Special I/I983),
p.100. """
14 5
70. The Canadians name their FCZ to the rear of
their divisional boundary the Corps Admini¬
strative Area. This in turn is sub-divided
into a Corps Rear Administrative Area and
a Corps Forward Administrative Area.
71. Major General I.S. Baxter, see note 66 above.
72. This appointment is essentially Second-in-Com-
mand of the Rear Services of the Soviet Armed
Forces.
73- Colonel General I. Golushko, "Logistics Support
in Battle", Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye
(No. 5, 1984), p.18.
74. V.G. Reznichenko et al., Taktika (Moscow Military
Publishing House, 1984).
75- See V. Bogdanov and G. Lokshin, "Reasonable Means
Sufficient", X X Vek i Mir (No. 12, December
1987), pp.2-9; also Manki Ponomarev, "Criteria
of Sufficiency: Two Approaches", Krasnaya zvezda
(26 February 19 8 8 ) , p.3-
76. See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Rear Service
Support Concepts and Structures", Military
Review (December 1988 ) , pp.78-79 and footnote
No. 14.
77- See Lieutenant General Sir Martin Farndale,
Follow-on Forces Attack", NATO's Sixteen Nations
(April/May 1988), pp.42-48 and 50.
78. Professor J. Erickson, "The Soviet 'Conventional
Option': Constraints in Time and Space", Univer¬
sity of Edinburgh Defence Studies Precis, 1984,
p.11.
79- Colonel General I. Golushko, "Logistic Support
in Battle", Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye
(No. 5, 1984), p.18.
80. Tyl meaning 'rear' has been described as embodying
two very wide-embracing concepts:
Firstly, it denotes the homeland
with all its industrial production
capacity, its human and material
resources from which the State draws
its military strength. Secondly, it
refers to the entire rear services
organization of the Armed Forces and
its various branches, including logis¬
tics and supply, technical maintenance,
146
medical support, maintenance of
Loc etc..
(C.N. Donnelly, "Rear Support for the Soviet
Ground Forces", International Defense Review
(April 1979), p.3^4). See also: C.N Donnelly
and M.J. Orr, "Soviet Logistics Flexibility",
International Defense Review (7/1986), p.949-
81. Mark L. Urban, Soviet Land Forces (London, 1985),
p. 62 .
82. It is emphasized that the depots, even when loca¬
ted forward, are army level assets and remain
firmly under army level control.
83- Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Soviet Logistics
Support Concepts Change", Army Logistician
(March - April 1987 ) , p.2.
84. Ibid.
85. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Rear Service Support
Concepts and Structures", Military Review
December 1988), p.74.
86. See C.N. Donnelly, "Rear Support for the Soviet
Ground Forces", International Defense Review
(April 1987), pp.344-350; also Oberstleutnant
Gunter Lippert, "Die Logistik der sowjetischen
Landstreitkrafte", Soldat und Technik (5 May
1981), translated and disseminated in US Intel¬
ligence Information Report 2 218 6640 81 dated
20 November 1981.
87. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Soviet Logistics
Support Concepts Change", Army Logistician
(March - April 1987), p.7-
88. See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Rear Service
Support Concepts and Structures", Military
Review (December 1988), p.78.
89. Colonel General I. Golushko, "Logistics Support
in Battle", Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye
(No. 5, 1984), p.18.
90. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Sustaining Theater
Strategic Operations" The Journal of Soviet
Military Studies (April 1988), p.99-
91. Graham N. Thompson and James Kinnear, "The Bear's
Tail", Armed Forces (August 1988), p.368.
92. This criteria excludes France.
147
93- See Brigadier Richard E. Simpkin, Mechanised
Infantry (Oxford, 1980).
94. The following comment by a Professor of History
of Texas A & M University who is also co-author
of Defence Analysis is relevant:
When someone expresses the view that
the 'tail-to-teeth' ratio is too
lopsided, there is no firm basis on
which to say what the optimum ratio
should be.
(Professor R.A. Beaumont, "Beyond Teeth and
Tail: The Need for New Logistical Analogies",
Military Review (March 1985) , p.10).
95- See Robert Fox, "Spending to fall next year in
real terms", The Daily Telegraph (16 November
1989), p.12; see also NATO's Defence Planning
Committee Progress Report on Shared Roles, Risks
and Responsibilities in the Alliance (Brussels,
November 1989), p.6.
96. See Major General Ken Perkins, Weapons and War-
fare (London, 1987), p.270.
97- R.N. Anthony and R.E. Herzlinger, Management
Control in Non Profit Organizations (Homewood,
Illinois, 1985), p.46.
98. Professor J. Child, Organization - A Guide to
Problems and Practice (London, 1970), p.196.
99- Most objective assessments would advocate a struc¬
ture change within the logistic corps. The cur¬
rent Army structure which provides "nineteen
separate, totally autonomous support corps" was
criticised by the UK Governmenfs independent
financial watchdog, see Adela Gooch, "Army
regimental system attacked by Audit Office"
The Daily Telegraph (10 May 1989), p.2; and the
report by the National Audit Office, Ministry
of Defence: Control and Use of Manpower, Ordered
by the House of Commons to be printed 27 April
1989.
100. See M.A. Gilbertson, "Development of Logistics
in the British Army" in J.J.G. Mackenzie and
B.H. Reid, eds., The British Army and the Opera¬
tional level of war (London, 1989) , p.78.
101. K.A.P. Stevenson, "Praise the Lord and pass the
ammunition", Royal Artillery Journal (September
1984), p.95- The M109 gun fires a 155 mm shell.
148
102. For a comprehensive background see J.R. Robinson,
"MLRS: a new dimension in artillery fire support",
in G. Blakey, ed. Defence Systems International
(London, 1989), pp.143, 144, 146 and 149.
103. Brigadier G.B. Fawcus, Chief of Staff 1st British
Corps in a letter published in British Army
Review (August 19 8 5 ) , P-78.
104. See Susan B. Chodakewitz , Michael J. Deane and
Stephen G. Weatherly, "Soviet Strategic C3: The
Threat and Counterthreat", Signal (December 1985),
pp•33-36.
105- 1st British Corps logistic training is suffering
further erosion. This comment by the Commander
Transport concerning Ex Iron Hammer which took
place in Autumn 1988 is relevant:
In order to ensure that combat units
gained the maximum value from the
training, logistic play was sacrificed
with not a single pallet of ammunition
unloaded at gun lines, nor any simulated
loads issued through brigade distribu¬
tion points.
(Digest of a presentation by Brigadier J.D.
MacDonald et. al. in "Training-The Changing
Perspective in BAOR", Royal Corps of Transport
Review (June 1989), p.21.)
106. Multilift Limited, "DROPS-the logistic system
of the future", in G. Blakey ed., Defence
Systems International (London, 1989), p-335-
107. Ibid, p.338.
108. Brigadier G.B. Fawcus, Chief of Staff 1st British
Corps in a letter published in British Army Review
(August 1985), p.78.
109. Over three-quarters of the personnel are provided
by the Royal Marines, the remainder are from
the RCT, RAOC, REME, RAMC and others.
110. I.M. Vaughan-Arbuckle, "Logistics in the Falklands",
British Army Review (April 19 8 5 ) , P-49-
111. This was most strongly emphasised by Brigadier
G.B. Fawcus in his official letter to the
British Army Review (August 19 8 5 ) , P-78.
112. It has been suggested that as much as 8:1 super¬
iority could be achieved at a main point of
149
effort, see General Sir Martin Farndale, "The
Use of Helicopters on the European Battlefield",
Vertiflite (May/June 1989), p.16.
113- NORTHAG's 'new' concept of operations places
emphasis upon "tactical flexibility and mobility",
see UK Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986
(London, 1986), Volume 1, p.33-
114. A unit's basic load of bulk supplies normally
amounts to "a maximum" of 5 Days of Supply
(DOS) with an additional 9 DOS "stopped by
corps in corps depots"; see E. de Fabribeckers,
"The Long Tail: Supply and Transport in the
Modern Army", NATO's Sixteen Nations (Special
1/1983), p.101.
115- NATO Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-9 (First
Draft: September 1989), p.2-2.
116. P.F. Drucker, "New Templates for today's organ¬
ization", Harvard Business Review (January/
February 1974), p.13.
117- Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations
(London, 1976), p.366.
CHAPTER 4 - LOGISTIC STOCKS AND BURDEN-SHARING
The NATO definition of sustainability is: "the ability
of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat
power for the duration required to meet its objec¬
tives"."'" The true objective of NATO's Allied Com¬
mand Europe (ACE) is to defend allied territory by
conventional force for as long as possible before
having to invoke the second leg of NATO's triad of
deterrence - the use of nuclear weapons. The sustain¬
ability of conventional force is therefore a means of
raising the nuclear threshold through the maintenance
of fighting power.'" Because the NATO definition of
sustainability is broad, emphasis is placed upon many
elements depending upon the perspective of the beholder;
but essentially sustainability is about holding a
sufficiency of war stocks and being able "to get them
to the fighting troops at the right time. Even
trained personnel who have high morale, sound equip¬
ment and well organized systems are of little value
in a war situation without an adequate supply of fuel
and ammunition, which one outstanding field commander
noted as being "the first essential condition for an
3
army to stand the strain of battle".
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Time and again excellent pieces of academic work
compare force numbers, analyse training standards,
assess psychological motivation and run computer
4
models of Central Region threat perceptions. There
are intellectual races to compare NATO and Warsaw
pact weapons, equipment and killing potential; but
nearly all these studies ignore the vital importance
of war stocks. A degree of recognition is occasion-
5
ally paid to the NATO sustainability dimension;
but it tends to be a soft focus view with sharpness
centred upon equipment and numbers, hiding the hard
fact that logistic stock levels are simply inadequate.
General Rogers as SACEUR repeatedly went as far as
possible, without undermining the deterrence value
of NATO forces, in stressing the importance of logis¬
tic stocks:
Because of our lack of sustainability...
primarily ammunition, materials to
replace losses on the battlefield, tanks,
howitzers, trained manpower... I have to
request the release of nuclear weapons
fairly quickly after a conventional attack.
And I'm talking about in terms of days,
not in terms of weeks or months.6
Given the General's concern, it is of interest to
consider why Allied nations permit this unacceptable
situation to exist. A scan of NATO's Defence Plan-
. 7
ning communiques shows that the words "Ministers
Affirm" are inevitably used in respect of sustain¬
ability .
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Bold words are however, no substitute for promised
action as the non-performance of Allied nations in
meeting their agreed goal of 31° annual increase in
g
defence expenditure has shown. The reason for Allied
reluctance is not a total lack of will, as indeed
Ministers regularly reaffirm their commitment to NATO's
agreed stock level targets. It is simply that even
normal 'non-smart' conventional ammunition is very
expensive. 'Smart' is the term applied to precision
guided munitions (PGM's) or terminally guided sub-
munitions (TGSM's) and one type of 'smart' 155 mm
artillery shell named Copperhead homes onto a target
9
illuminated by a laser designator. Taking a hypo¬
thetical example of 150 rounds of the normal 'non-
smart' rounds for a 155 mm gun, which would be mod¬
erate consumption for one day, the expenditure would
1 n
be about £17^,000.
If the above figure was multiplied by the number
of 155 mm guns in a nation's inventory and the stag¬
gering result would represent only one day's expend¬
iture at a firing rate some experts would consider
11
to be low. Because stockpile costs are easily
identifiable, it provides governments with a commod¬
ity which can be used to save funds at short notice.
Expenditure can be reactivated at the end of a finan¬
cial year if there is an underspend; but for many
Allied nations with budgetary problems, ammunition
153
has often fallen the wrong side of the accountant's
margin. The present situation has not suddenly
12
occurred, but has steadily developed over time.
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on
1 °)4 April 1949, the Allied nations forces in exis¬
tence at the time were mostly equipped with US or
UK equipment as a result of the Second World War.
Similarly, there were significant quantities of war¬
time ammunition stocks still available to meet imme-
14
diate requirements. Paradoxically this situation
provided a high degree of standardization and flexi¬
bility, although these benefits were not readily
appreciated at a time when NATO planners priorities
centred upon the military structure and the feasi-
1 *")
bility of integrated forces.
Because NATO was founded as an international and
not supranational organization, no centralized logis-
16
tic support system was introduced. It left the
maintaining and equipping of national contingents
to the individual countries involved,assuming that
17
'logistics is a national responsibility'. ' This
principle in time led to an erosion of the immediate
post-war standardization advantages as nations moder¬
nized equipment and upgraded war stocks by purchasing
from a variety of arms manufacturers. Logistics was
not however, fully excluded from NATO decision making
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as the North Atlantic Council resolution of 23 February
1952 noted:
The responsibility for logistic support to
national component forces will, in general,
remain with the responsible authorities of
the nations concerned. The responsibility
for coordination will, however, rest with
the Supreme Commander, and with his major
subordinate commanders at the appropriate
levels.1^
19
The key word 'coordination' however, can be
interpreted differently depending whether the level
of command is responsible for execution, planning
or policy. Its effect upon NATO logistics policy
is that requirements are recommended by NATO com¬
manders , agreed by nations, coordinated by NATO
commanders and then hopefully implemented by the
20
nations.
One of the most important roles of logistic coor¬
dination in NATO concerns the issue of stockpile
planning guidance. The aim is to ask nations to
hold sufficient war stocks to meet operational
requirements, and this was originally based upon the
logistic experience of the Second World War and plan¬
ning for war. At first the assessment was that there
should be sufficient war stocks available to meet the
operational plan until war time manufacturing capa¬
bilities could be reactivated. The planning assump-
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tion at that time was that 90 days (3 months) opera¬
tional stocks would be sufficient to surge manufac-
21
turing production and commence resupply. This was
a fair estimate given the requirements and complex¬
ity of ammunition in the early 1950s and the presence,
certainly within the UK, of a strong post-war heavy
industry production base well capable of responding
22
to emergency requirements.
Nations did not meet the original 90 day target
primarily due to cost; but also because there was
little incentive when greater emphasis was placed
from 1953 onwards upon massive nuclear retaliation
when the US began deploying tactical nuclear weapons
to Europe.^3 The formal adoption by NATO in 1956 of
24
the nuclear response strategy, portrayed conven¬
tional defence merely as a trip-wire designed to
provide a short pause before a massive nuclear
response had to be unleashed. This strategy was later
called 'trip-wire'. At this time the sword and shield
emblem of Allied Command Europe was taken to represent
a conventional shield, with nuclear weapons providing
25
the cutting sword. The implication was that the
conventional shield could only rebuff an attacker
for a brief period.
In 1967 NATO's strategy changed from 'trip-wire'
with its implications of mutually assured destruction
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26
to one of 'flexible response'. This change required
the Allies to be able to respond to any act of aggres-
27
sion "with an appropriate response". The implica¬
tions being that the Alliance must possess a spectrum
of forces at conventional, tactical nuclear and stra¬
tegic nuclear level. This strategy, which is discussed
in Chapter 1, places a greater emphasis upon conven¬
tional force as a key leg of NATO's Triad of deter¬
rence and to quote a former SACEUR "the conventional
leg of the Triad has become more important to our
efforts in maintaining the credibility of our deter-
2 8
rent". However, escalating costs of ammunition made
the 90 day stockpile target even more difficult for
nations to achieve, therefore an interim measure was
agreed for nations to hold at least 30 days desig-
29
nated stocks. This interim measure assumed the
ability of Allied nations to 'surge' industrial pro¬
duction of war stocks, should it be necessary to pro¬
vide a sustaining system. In both these supply areas,
the level of war stocks and industrial surge capa¬
bilities, the NATO Alliance judged as a whole has
30
proved to be woefully inadequate.
Supply is an integral element of logistics and
over time nations developed different systems for
classifying stocks and equipment often under the
generic term of supplies. The UK tends to group
supplies under named headings; engineer stores,
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combat supplies, medical stores etc; whereas the US
have ten designated classes. To prevent confusion
and to aid logistic planning, particularly in areas
of stockpile planning guidance and logistic report¬
ing, NATO has adopted a simple method of categoriz¬
ing supplies into five class groups for land forces
published in STANAG 2961^ and shown in figure 1.0.
Within the 'logistics is a national responsibility'
agreement, some nations still adhere to their national
names for supplies. However, logistic reports and
directives within NATO commands all use the five
class system for land force supplies.
The most important classes of supply in terms of
volume and ability to maintain battlefield fighting
power are Class I, III, V eg; rations, fuel and ammu¬
nition; for "without these a modern battle soon comes
22
to a stand-still". NATO stockpile planning guidance
places greater emphasis upon fuel and ammunition due
to its sheer size and cost. The document titled
22
SHAPE Guidance for Stockpile Planning in ACE out¬
lines the methods for calculating supplies required
to meet anticipated war-time demands. The second
section deals specifically with stockpile planning
data for land forces. For Class III (fuel) the
Guidance details the basic measure known as the Fuel
Consumption Unit; and for Class V (ammunition) it
includes the formula for the calculation of basic
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CLASSES OF SUPPLY OF NATO LAND FORCES
Class I
Items which are consumed by personnel or
animals at an approximately uniform rate,
irrespective of local changes in combat
or terrain conditions, eg; food and forage.
Class II
Supplies for which allowances are estab¬
lished by tables of organization and
equipment, eg; clothing, weapons, tools,
spare parts, vehicles, etc.
Class III
Fuel and lubricants for all purposes,
except for operating aircraft or for
use in weapons such as flame throwers,
eg; gasoline, fuel oil, greases, coal
and coke, etc. For Air Force IIIA:
aviation fuels and lubricants.
Class IV
Supplies for which initial issue allow¬
ances are not prescribed by approved
issue tables. Normally includes forti¬
fication and construction materials, as
well as additional quantities of items
identical to those authorized for initial
issue (Class II), such as additional
vehicles.
Class V
Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents
of all types.
(Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 2961)
Figure 4.0
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stocks for various weapon types. Basic stocks are
defined as "those stocks required by MNC's to support
the execution of approved operational plans for an
initial pre-determined period."-^
For fuel planning, the use of a Fuel Consump¬
tion Unit (FCU) has been agreed by a NATO
Standardization Agreement which essentially provides
a measure by determining the fuel consumed by vehicles
motoring 100 kms on flat European roads. The number
of vehicles in a formation (Brigade, Division, Corps)
are added up to provide a total to which factors are
applied. These factors include geographic considera¬
tions eg; terrain ana temperature, ana also an inten-
3 5
sity factor to cover battlefield activity levels.J
This FCU methodology has the advantage of being
simple, and provides a reliable planning base-line
applicable to major sized formations at NATO opera¬
tional level. US moves to computer model the varia¬
bles to produce an accurate FCU assessment in appear¬
ance may well unnecessarily complicate current NATO
planning and encourage countries to determine their
own requirements level. The danger is that the more
complex the imput data the more room for error or
amendment. This is particularly relevant in a high
expenditure area prone to political/economic national
interest where data could be massaged to suit a purse
Simple methodology provides simple NATO checks.
The view expressed by UK's Chief of Defence Staff
1 60
to the House of Commons Defence Committee represents
one perspective:
Fuel Stocks is something which at this
moment you could possibly take some
risks with, because there is a great
deal of fuel in the world and every¬
body has masses of stocks and you could
afford to run these down without undue
risk, but you will have to run them up
again at some stage so you will have
to meet the cost of that then.36
The method of calculating the quantitiSve require¬
ments of ammunition to meet anticipated ..battlefield
consumption and attrition is even more complex.
There were originally two separate stockpile plan¬
ning calculations for the two main types of weapon
systems; indirect fire and direct fire. However, an
additional two planning methods have been added in
recent years as munitions became more complex. The
four types of ammunition calculations currently used
by NATO are termed:
Level-of effort Munitions. In stockpile
planning, munitions stocked on the basis
of expected daily expenditure rate, the
number of combat days and the attrition
rate assumed, to counter targets the
number of which is unknown. This method
applies to indirect fire weapons.
Lifetime-Oriented Munitions. In stockpile
planning, munitions stock for all direct
fire and force weapons which each have
finite life in combat, defined as an
average number of engagements, the require¬
ments being the sum of munitions expended
or lost during all the engagements the
weapon is in until it is destroyed.
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Threat-Oriented Munitions. In stockpile
planning, munitions intended to neutra¬
lise a finite assessed threat and for
which the total requirement is determined
by an agreed mathematical model. SHORAD
munitions are an example.
Target-Oriented Munitions. In stockpile
planning, munitions intended to neutra¬
lise a finite assessed amount of targets
and for which the total requirement is 77
determined by an agreed mathematical model.
For stockpile planning the largest requirement in
the terms of volume and quantity is level-of effort
munitions which applies to indirect fire weapons
eg; field artillery. The method of computation
includes assessing the number of rounds a howitzer
could fire for a mission, determining the number of
missions feasible within one day, projecting this
quantity for a given number of combat days and apply¬
ing the resultant to the number of guns, taking into
account attrition considerations. It has been
suggested by some UK observers that the final result,
the standard NATO rate, is low and does not reflect
recent historical experience:
Even a campaign as limited as the Falklands
quickly exhausted some categories of muni¬
tions . The Armed Forces themselves concede
that some of their holdings are below agreed
levels, which are themselves below realistic
requirements.38
The implications of the last eight words of this
statement were strongly re-buffed by NATO's former
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Director of Logistics. However, the main result of
the present stock level methodology, irrespective of
stance, is that Allied nations are at least working
to the same definitive guidance.
The factors which influence the stockpile guidance
of lifetime-orientated munitions is even more complex.
Determining the combat life of direct fire weapons,
which includes main battle tanks , is a scientific
study area of its own. Important considerations are
speed of target acquisition, first round kill prob¬
ability and battle field survivability. Twenty five
years ago a tank gunner would have been judged a
marksman had he regularly achieved a second round
hit when 3 shots was the average. Today anything
less than a 90% first round hit rate is considered
40
poor. Enhanced accuracy is a significant factor




The SHAPE Guidance for Stockpile Planning provides
the formula and methods of calculating anticipated
fuel and ammunition expenditure which, with the
exception of lifetime-oriented munitions, applies
the timescale of a combat day. The determination of
the actual number of days stocks Allied nations should
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hold to meet the operational plan is a political
decision, and these requirements are laid down by
NATO Headquarters in other publications. An impor¬
tant document MC55/2, Military Planning Factors
sets out the policy on theatre operational stocks
and the various categories of readiness of forces.
See Figure 4.1.
The first concern of NATO's logistic planners is
for nations to hold sufficient supplies of operational
stocks for the initial predetermined period of com¬
bat ie; basic stocks; and then to have enough addi-
42
tional stocks available until resupply can commence
from increased procurement or enhanced industrial
production. It is the current inability of the Alli¬
ance to meet even the comparatively low first interim
goal of 30 days ammunition stocks which has raised
4 3
severe 'sustainability' concerns. As defined by
the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, sustain¬
ability represents the ability to fight off an attack
with conventional forces long enough to permit any
NATO decision to escalate to theatre nuclear weapons
to be made "deliberately" and "not because we are
44
running out of munitions in the battlefield".
The NATO agreed stock level requirements for fuel
remains classified; but the number of designated com¬
bat days is significantly higher than the current
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THEATRE OPERATIONAL STOCKS
Operational Stocks as the expendable and
non-expendable supplies over and above
national peacetime levels which are
required by MNCs to support forces allo¬
cated to NATO for the execution of approved
operational plans and are further sub-divi¬
ded into:
Basic Stocks. Those stocks
required by MNCs to support
the execution of approved
operational plans for an ini¬
tial predetermined period.
Sustaining Stocks. Those stocks
required by MNCs to support the
execution of approved operational
plans beyond the initial pre¬
determined period until resupply
is available for support of con¬
tinued operations within each
area.
Resupply as covering the nations' respons¬
ibilities for the continuous support of
their forces giving consideration to all
foreseeable war-time contingencies.
Resupply arrangements could comprise a
wide variety of measures, ranging from
additional stockpiling to standby procure¬
ment or production.





ammunition stockpile goal. There is a perception
that because industrialized Europe has enormous fuel
reserves that war-time supplies for NATO forces
would pose few problems. Indeed a European Commis¬
sion 1972 directive specifies that:
Western European Countries must main¬
tain a mandatory stock level equiva¬
lent to 90 days domestic consumption
in the previous calendar years.^6
The military requirement is that its war reserves
of fuel should, where possible, be stored in dis¬
persed, protected or hardened facilities. This is
achieved by using the NATO common-funded Central
Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) which is a distribu¬
tion and storage facility. It comprises over 6,000
km of buried high pressure pipelines, 100 main pump
stations and approximately 60 storage depots connec¬
ted to ports, airfields, truck, train and barge
facilities spanning 5 countries (BE, FR, GE, LU and
NL) , and serving the eight nations deployed in
Central Europe. See Figure 4.2. It has been noted
that "it would take over 13,000 rail cars to carry
4 7
the fuel that is in the pipes alone", but the funda¬
mental advantage of the CEPs is not the quantity of
fuel it can move and store; but a system built
specifically for a military task:
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Source-NATO'sCEOA1981
They are designed, constructed and
operated in accordance with criteria
established by NATO military authori¬
ties to meet clearly defined, but
dynamic storage and delivery require¬
ments. The facilities offer a measure
of protection, operate independently
from commercial power sources, and
provide flexibility in both receiving
and delivering fuels, thereby contrast¬
ing with their commercial counterparts. °
For logistic stock level planning, the only dis¬
advantage with the excellent CEPS is that throughput
and storage capabilities would be insufficient in
war-time to cope with projected demands. Enhanced
battlefield mobility and new aircraft deployments
(AWACS is an example) have increased forecast require¬
ments to a level where the system could not cope.
It has been estimated that both the throughput capa¬
city and the storage capacity needs to be doubled
q q
to meet current NATO war-time plans. Logistic
planners in NATO have been seeking ways and means
to limit this deficiency area. A common-funded
enhancement of pipeline diameter, pumps and storage
takes time and the expenditure must be matched
against many priorities. At the time of writing,
two ideas were under development which might ease
the present problem.
The first is to improve fuel storage and delivery
flexibility within the CEPS and on the battlefield
by standardizing fuel. A 'Single Fuel Concept'
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adopted by the NATO Pipeline Committee in May 1987
proposed to move from a three fuel system (Jet,
Diesel and Gasoline) to a single product. This
important initiative is outlined in NATO's Single
Fuel Concept document at Appendix A to this Chapter.
The single fuel goal which has far-reaching, but
positive logistic stock level implications is worded
as follows:
To achieve equipment interoperability
through a single fuel for use on the
battlefield and for land based air
operations, ensuring that the specifi¬
cation of that fuel is standardized with
its commercial equivalent in common use
in NATO Europe, and that its physical
and chemical characteristics are such
that it can be introduced, stored, trans¬
ported and distributed by the NATO Pipe¬
line System (NPS).50
The second innovation concerns a NATO trial of
recent technology to enhance pipeline throughput
by introducing a flow improver. The addition of
diluted high-molecular polymer solutions on the out¬
put side of a pipeline pump has been found to
decrease energy loss due to turbulence, and increase
product throughput at constant pressure. A Pipeline
Drag Reducer (PDR) was introduced into a section of
the CEPS in Germany in November 1988. The initial
results showed a flow increase in excess of 45%
when 50 parts per million PDR was introduced in
diesel fuel.51 The manufacturers of PDR advise that
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laboratory engine tests show no detrimental effect
52
upon the life or performance of engines. It has
also been suggested that dilute polymer solutions
53
could reduce mist ignition properties in fuel, an
additional safety factor particularly applicable to
aircraft. Further tests are taking place within
NATO, however these two initiatives could signifi¬
cantly influence fuel support in the Central Region
by enhancing flexibility and distribution in through¬
put .
While NATO logistic planners' concern with fuel
centres upon the problems of distribution and
hardened storage for what is in general an adequacy
51\
of Class III supplies, the Class V planner is
faced with difficulties of a different kind. These
are primarily coping with nations inability or unwil¬
lingness to meet the Allied agreed interim stockpile
target to hold a minimum of 30 days ammunition stocks.55
This relates directly to the length of time NATO could
wage conventional operations. General Rogers as
SACEUR repeatedly drew attention to sustainability
problems:
We will defend. I think in an admirable
way as long as we can defend. I think it
is in that first X number of days - before
we run out of ammunition... we will fight
very well... But lack of adequate sustain-
ability is our major deficiency.56
170
General Rogjer's-' successor as SACEUR, General Galvin
has made a similar appreciation about the length of
time the Alliance could conduct an effective defence
and underlined the necessity to improve ammunition
stockpiles: "NATO has enough of these critical sup-
57
plies to last only a relatively few days". To com¬
pound NATO logistic planners' problems, the interim
aiming point of stockpiling 30 days Class V supplies
represents basic stocks only - and ignores the addi¬
tional need for nations to provide sustaining stocks
until a resupply can commence from industrial produc¬
tion and procurement. Although modern technology
places emphasis upon manufacturing efficiency with
the benefits of CAD/CAM, switching automated manufac¬
turing to ammunition production in times of crisis
is no mean task.
The UK and most other European countries were more
capable of swiftly increasing their ammunition manu¬
facturer, known as 'surge' production, in the 19^0s
58
than they are today. This is due to two main reasons;
firstly, the earlier heavy industrial technology pro¬
vided a more simple framework for expansion; secondly,
the indications are that today a market forces policy
has encouraged the European nations of NATO to rely
upon East European suppliers for explosive fillers
at the expense of their own declining ammunition pro-
59
duction base. In summary, the required sustaining
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stocks time-frame is extending as NATO's industrial
ammunition production base is declining when, in
American terms, the Alliance is not even touching
first base by meeting the basic stock goals which
themselves are perceived to be a low interim target.^
Although NATO has provided a fulsome definition
ofsustainability discussed in Chapter 2, the word
'sustain' entered the English language in the 13th
Century via old French from Latin sustinere meaning
to hold up; sus plus tenere (to hold).^ In its
truest sense ammunition stocks are needed to hold up
conventional operations until resupply from industry
can commence thus easing the reliance presently placed
on the second leg of the NATO Triad. Allied nations
do not object to this principle and they regularly
affirm their commitment to meeting the agreed stock-
(3 2
pile goals. " It is simply that in the real world of
costs and budgets, stockpiling Class V supplies repre¬
sents a very heavy financial burden. According to
one report, consumption by a US six gun 155 mm howitzer
battery of a mix of modern munitions would expend
$4 m in one week of war in Europe, and that was com¬
puted at 1983 prices.^
The actual level of stocks each nation holds
towards meeting the Class V requirement of 30 days
is declared by each country in NATO's integrated
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military structure in response to NATO's annual
64
Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). The consoli¬
dated figures provide an assessment of NATO's logis¬
tics posture which is brought to the attention of
ministers through the North Atlantic Council and
65
features m the yearly NATO Defence Planning Review.
Studies covering the capability of the Alliance for
industrial ammunition production are undertaken by
a separate committee, the Industrial Planning Commit-
66
tee.
The ammunition stock-level situation creates a
ground-swell of concern within NATO military and
civilian circles, which has been reflected in some
speeches of senior NATO personnel emphasizing that
Class V stocks are inadequate and the European ammuni¬
tion production base is declining. In addition the
application of a market forces philosophy in Western
Europe has seen some NATO nations placing significant
reliance upon ammunition fillers obtained from Warsaw
Pact countries. These developments occuring at a
time when NATO's tactical nuclear weapon strength
has been reduced or remains unmodernized has a cer-
/' ry
tain poignancy of its own.
The present situation is that, in a short or medium
warning scenario, the Allies in Central Europe would
have to make a conventional defence with what ammuni-
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tion stocks they hold now. A re-supply cannot be
guaranteed. The only methods available for NATO
to enhance logistic sustainability in the immediate
future is for nations to either increase their current
ammunition stock-levels or to manage existing resources
in a more efficient manner by enhancing cooperation,
control and mobility of vital stocks. It is the
latter - control and mobility, which provesto be the
core of the matter.
* * *
While it has been noted that the English language
recognizes 'to sustain', and the NATO Alliance has
a general definition for the military concept 'sus¬
tainability' ,^ it is reported that the Soviet Union
lacks an authoritative translation in Russian. A
b h
study by 20 experts concluded that the nearest com¬
parison centred upon 'viability' defined in the
Soviet Military Encyclopaedia as:
Zhivuchest '(mil)'. The capability of
troops (forces), weapons, military
equipment, rear installations or com¬
mand and control systems to preserve
or quickly restore their combat capa¬
city (the capability to fulfill their
appropriate military task).70
A phrase contained in the Soviet Union book of mili-
71
tary tactics has also been noted as relevant to
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the sustinability concept; "Podderzhanie i svoyevremennoye
vosstanovleniye boyesposobnosti voystk", meaning the
maintenance and timely restoration of the combat cap¬
ability of forces".^
Whatever term or name the Russians give to the pro¬
vision of logistic support for ground forces, today's
available stockpile of conventional ammunition and
71
fuel for its numerically larger forces, certainly
in the Western Theatre of Military Operations (TVD)
opposite NATO, is greater than the Allies resources
by a factor of about 4:1. In addition the Warsaw
Pact nations have a philosophy and control of state
industrial production which should enable factories
to be swiftly harnessed to meet military requirements
in times of war or tension. The Warsaw Pact level
of war stocks is based, in the same way as NATO's
early assessment, upon the logistic experience of
the Second World War and the time needed to surge
manufacturing production to commence re-supply:
It is stipulated that strategic and state
reserves must be adequate to supply the
Armed Forces until industry is able to
expand its production and meet war-time
supply demands. In World War II this 7i.
period was approximately 90 days of supply.
It is significant that Soviet Union planners 3 month
figure is similar to NATO's original assessment which
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was made at a time when the West European heavy
industry base was stronger and more readily respon-
75
sive to emergency requirements. Although NATO
amended its initial stockpile aim to an interim tar¬
get of at least 30 days of supply for Class V, all
the evidence suggests that the Warsaw Pact has
retained its goal based upon historical experience,
to hold "at least a 90 day supply of ammunition,
76
fuel, technical supplies etc".
The US Department of Defense has noted that since
1980 there has been an upsurge in Soviet ground forces
ammunition stocks which are designed to reflect a
military doctrine requiring the pre-stocking of
7760 to 90 days of conventional ammunition. The
figure of between 60 and 90 days ammunition stocks
held in the Western TVD i.e.; over 3 million metric
V P)
tons, appears in a number of US and UK publications.
The UK government tends to play down the Soviet
Unions' military logistics capabilities. However,
it has drawn attention to logistic stocks in the 1989
Statement on the Defence Estimates. This noted that
Warsaw Pact ammunition stocks in Central Europe had
doubled between 1970 and 1984 and that forward-based
stocks "should be enough to support a major offen-
7 9
sive for at least 2 weeks". This statement is not
incorrect, but could be regarded in the same vein
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that the writer or reader is at least 3 ft (1 m for
Europeans) tall. The document also notes that "the
present infrastructure could meet the demands of high
80
intensity war for about 2 months". Decoded, this
adds up to a declaration that there are enough for¬
ward-based ammunition supply dumps in the Western
TVD, which if stocked, could support 60 to 90 days of
war; but because the UK is not sure that the bunkers
are full a political 'best case' is propounded in
preference to a military 'worst case'. This slightly
slanted view could perhaps be explained against the
political background where the same Defence Estimates
shows forecast production expenditure on ammunition,
mines and explosives to be lower in 1988 — 89 by 29-7%
than the average expenditure over the last 7 years
and it is scheduled to be 33-3% less in 1989/90
81
when compared with the same period. Similarly the
actual defence expenditure on petroleum products in
1987-88 was 42.2% less than the average of the pre-
82
vious 7 years. ^ These reduced national allocations
for vital logistic stocks does not sit easily with
a true recognition as noted by the Commons Defence
Committee in discussions with senior officials and
the Secretary of State for Defence, that Soviet sus-
tainability in Central Europe has increased "to between
O 9
60 and 90 days war-fighting capability". ^
Paradoxically, the unilateral cuts in the Soviet
177
Forces announced by Mr Gorbachev in his December
1988 United Nations speech have increased the stay¬
ing power or sustainability of the remaining troops.
The adoption of a doctrine of 'reasonable sufficiency',
together with overall cuts by 1991 of 500,000 person¬
nel, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces and 800
aircraft which includes 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks
from East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia has "done
nothing to alter the aggressive deployment, material
84
and logistics of their forces in Central Europe".
A similar comment to the effect that there is no
evidence to show cut-backs in Soviet Forces military
stockpiles appears in UK's 1989 Statement on the
Defence Estimates:
We have no evidence of any cutbacks
in military stockpiles, despite
public emphasis on "reasonable
sufficiency". The logistic cap¬
ability of the Warsaw Pact, which
far surpasses that of NATO, is
crucial to its continuing ability
to wage a sustained and large-scale
offensive with the minimum of
warning. 85
This concern has also been raised by General John
Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who has
argued that the Warsaw Pacts forward-based ammuni¬
tion and supply dumps are quite unnecessary for
86
defence. The fact is that vast logistic stock¬
piles can now support the still sizeable theatre
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troops for a longer period or, as is more likely,
provide support for reinforcements swiftly re-deployed
from the Soviet Union. Indeed it can be argued that
Soviet logistic sufficiency is more than reasonable
for conventional defence.
While the size of Soviet war stocks is based upon
an operational plan and the time determined for the
State to activate war-time industrial production
(assessed as 90 days), the shape of ammunition stocks
in terms of number of rounds needed to meet the agreed
timescale is based on a system of scientific study
and theory linked to historical experience. The
Russian approach to stockpile planning is founded
upon a declared Marxist-Leninist philosophy which
includes scientific analyses of all the identifiable
variables in order to provide a valid forecast of
requirements. The use of Soviet 'materialistic dia¬
lectics' in scientific forecasting requires signifi¬
cant operational research effort and mathematical
O
modelling. The net result is the production of
mathematical equations to provide a guide-line of
requirements for various weapon systems when employed
in differing roles and circumstances. The aim being
to use logic, which is defined as "the science of
8 8
valid inference", to make reasonably competent
deductions in preference to broader subjective judge¬
ments or "intuitive guess-work" favoured by the West.
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Although an earlier proposed NATO definition of
'sustainability' included reference to a Commander's
90
subjective assessment, the military planners at
SHAPE responsible for stockpile guidance would not
agree that guess-work, intuitive or otherwise, is
91
involved in making reasonably competent deductions.
The Allied decision to amend the time-scale for the
number of days stocks to be held was a political one.
Those politicians responsible can point out that the
present target is an interim measure which, by defi¬
nition implies a temporary or provisional arrangement.
In an event it could be argued that 'logistics is a
, Q2
national responsibility and that there is no value
in setting higher targets, albeit based on logic, when
nations are having difficulty in meeting an interim
goal which is itself a third less than the original
'objective judgement' decreed. It has been noted
that when the 90 days assessment was made, the West
European heavy industry base was greater and thus
production was more capable of being surged than it
91
is today. J This situation implies that the time
currently needed to maintain conventional forces in
94
action before 'resupply can commence would be
somewhat greater than 3 months. This places General
Rogers military concern about requesting nuclear
release in "terms of days, not in terms of weeks or
95
months into greater perspective.
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A political decision determines the size of NATO
stockpiles in terms of number of days required; mili¬
tary judgements influence the shape of ammunition
stocks in rounds per weapon system and these require¬
ments are promulgated to the Allied forces in NATO's
Central Region through the document SHAPE Guidance
9 6
for Stockpile Planning in ACE. As discussed some
munitions are stocked on the basis of an assessed
lifetime of the weapons system ie; a Main Battle Tank,
and others are either threat orientated, target-orien¬
tated or level-of effort munitions. The latter applies
to indirect fire weapons such as artillery, and is
related to a daily expenditure rate. It is in this
area that a significant number of mainly British
reservations have been expressed, implying the SHAPE
Guidance figure for daily artillery consumption is
low in the light of recent historical experience and
forecast intensity levels for modern warfare in Cen¬
tral Europe.
In the early 1980s there were rumblings that the
NATO consumption figures were inadequate "given the
97
rates experienced in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict".
Two British studies commissioned by the Director of
Military Operations and completed in 1981 examined
the probable ammunition and equipment expenditure at
high intensity in BAOR. The projects which included
an estimation of attrition losses were named the
181
Battle Attrition Study (BAS) and the related Review
of Ammunition Rates Scales (RARS). The studies gen¬
erally known as 'BAS and RARS' recommended:
Very large increases in artillery daily
ammunition expenditure rates (DAERs).
In "the case of M109 eg; the rates were
trembled. The quantity now recommended
to [pe held on wheels with the battery has
increased to about 3 times what can cur¬
rently be carried.98
The implied three-fold increase above the NATO levels,
certainly for 155 rnm munitions, caused some British
military logisticians to doubt that the BAS/RARS
results would be passed-on to NATO planning staff.
The political/economic considerations were signifi¬
cant. However, the Rt Hon George Younger, TD, MP,
as Secretary of State for Defence, in evidence to
the House of Commmons Defence Committee confirmed
that the UK's experience of the Falklands which
implies BAS/RARS considerations had been made avail-
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able to NATO, but war stocks had not been altered.
The telling remark made at the time by Dr John Gilbert,
a member of the Defence Committee was: "I consider
myself that NATO normal rates are fiction, it is
the real thing which matters, which is the intensive
. „ 100rates .
A similar theme is taken by Anthony Cordesman in
his 1988 book NATO's Central Region Forces where he
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notes that the Netherlands Army "hopes to reach
NATO ammunition standards of 30 days (about 13 days
of actual combat)".'^"'" He is even more fortright
concerning UK levels of 155 mm munitions, however
the comment confirms the disparity between the SHAPE
Guidance and British National BAS/RARS rates:
It also has severe ammunition shortages,
and its planned daily consumption rates
owei more to the influence of its budget
offjicers than its artillery experts.
Inspite of claims to higher stock-levels,
the UK only has about 8-12 days worth of
ammunition for intensive conventional
combat at the levels likely to be con¬
sumed in the Central Region.102
It is interesting to note that despite the mainly
British criticism of the accuracy of the SHAPE Gui¬
dance for level-of effort munitions, NATO has not
seen jf it to amend the planning goal. Perhaps a
change of target by a factor of two or three when
the majority of Allied nations have not achieved
the basic level may be counter-productive. Certainly
the political will seems to be influenced by the
economic realities as noted by Mr Younger" ...NATO's
desirable level of stocks is an expensive thing
which eats up a great deal of money which one wishes
to spend on equipment"."'"0^
As a costing guideline taking a US Army approved
scenario for a M109 in Europe firing 300 rounds per
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gun per day, a British 3 gun section would expend at
UK prices in excess of £1 million on munitions for
104
just that one day. Defence is expensive, but
the Allies slow advance towards meeting its agreed
'low' goal of achieving the minimum of 30 days stocks
is surprising given the conventional sustainability
of the Warsaw Pact forces. National responses to
the 1988 DPQ concerning battle decisive munitions
indicate that out of all the countries in the NATO
Alliance "only the United States plans to achieve
stock-level targets by 1993"- ^
In the final analysis it is not the methodology
used by NATO to determine the military requirements
which is important. Cooperation and political will
make things happen and, in the words of Belgium's
former Chief of Defence Staff, General Willy Gontier,
(on logistics) "it also depends on the budget funds
the nation is willing to give its Armed Forces".
The level of the nations' economic commitment to the
Alliance has recently received greater prominence,
for a variety of reasons, under the term 'burden-
sharing' - a term used by those carrying a heavy load
to get someone else to help.
* * *
The burden-sharing debate is political in its back-
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ground and this section begins with a comment from
the former US Ambassador to NATO, the Hon Alton Keel:
Since the beginning of this Alliance
nearly 40 years ago, member countries
have readily agreed that all must share
in the risks, roles and responsibilities
associated with the defence of the NATO
region. Despite widespread support for
this basic principle, differences have
periodically risen over whether every
nation is carrying its fair share of
the collective burden.107
Although sentiments of Burden Sharing may be influ¬
enced by economic considerations, the present re-emer-
108
gence of the debate is sheer politics. Burden-
sharing within the Alliance has been described by
one defence analyst as "arguments to convince others
109
to do more, thus to do less themselves". Certainly
the urge to do less must surely be present when the
acknowledged leaders of the NATO Alliance are facing
huge budget deficits described in one 1987 economic
assessment to "have pushed the United States in just
3 years from being the world's largest creditor to
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being the world's biggest debtor". This upset
occurring during the run-up to and during the US
Presidential election provided a political focus of
significant dimensions. Senator Reid, who was inter¬
viewed by a North Atlantic Assembly Sub-Committee in
November 1987, predicted that burden-sharing would
111
become an issue during the US election campaign,
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and was proved correct. Senator Dole reportedly-
brought a listless crowd to life in Charlotte,
North Carolina, by criticising the NATO Allies, "We
112
can't pick up the tab for everyone", and the Deputy
Secretary of Defence in the Reagan administration
noted, on burden-sharing, that it would be a "mis¬
take to think that this will not be a major issue in
111
political discussion next year - it will be". This
prediction has also proved correct.
It was the result of growing political pressure
in US Congress and not the economic factors which
prompted the Reagan Administration to create a special
commission in the Department of Defence headed by
Deputy Secretary William H Taft IV. The commission
visited Allied capitals and NATO Headquarters in
May 1988 in order to underline the need to make a
convincing response to Congress that the Europeans
were indeed making fair contributions to their own
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defence. NATO's response was the establishment of
an Executive Working Group of the Defence Planning
Committee which was tasked to explore the issue and
make recommendations. This resulted in the report
made to NATO Defence Ministers meeting in December
1988 on which the official communique included the
following statement:
Central to our discussions has been the
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need for all Alliance members to share
equitably the roles, risks and responsi¬
bilities, as well as the benefits, of our
collective defence. This fundamental
principle was the basis for the preparation
of a wide-ranging and major report on enhanc¬
ing NATO's collective security. This report,
which we have agreed and which has been pub¬
lished, addressed the perceptions and reali¬
ties involved in the fair sharing of the
burdens and benefits of Alliance membership.
It concludes that, as the Alliance approaches
its 40th Anniversary, its strength and cohe¬
sion remain as firm as ever with major con¬
tributions being made by both the European
and North American pillars of the Alliance.
Nevertheless, the report has also shown that
there are significant variations among coun¬
tries in the scale and nature of their con¬
tributions, and has identified a number of
areas where further improvements could be
made to strengthen the Alliance's defence
capability.
The report emphasises the need to provide
adequate resources for defence and to use
them as efficiently as possible.H5
The NATO report entitled 'Enhancing Alliance Collec¬
tive Security. Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibili-
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ties in the Alliance' represents the European and
NATO reaction to the US Administrations' political
request to counter pressure in Congress to reduce US
military spending in Europe. From the time of the
Taft commissions first visit to NATO in May 1988
(there were two visits) and the publication of the
report 'Enhancing Alliance Collective Security', the
US Administration faced increased political congres¬
sional pressure when the Defence Burden-Sharing Panel
of the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by
Representative Patricia Schroeder, issued its interim
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report in August 1988.^7 report gives a clear
view on the US Congressional position by stating:
Our Allies are not sufficiently aware
of the strong political pressure in this
country to reduce our defence commitments
to our Allies unless they are willing to
shoulder more of the burden. This view
is shared by the Congress. 118
The Allies were, infact, well aware of strong Congres¬
sional pressure upon the US Administration as they
had responded to the Taft commission request to
try an find a formula to appease Congress. The care¬
fully crafted result in the form of 'Enhancing Alli¬
ance Collective Security' changes the emphasis from
spending to performance and has been praised by a
senior US official, who said "the report's 'Candor
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will impress even critics' in Congress". However,
it is emphasised that the Burden-Sharing debate is
essentially a political initiative.
Although the burden-sharing topic has surfaced
from time to time, almost since the formation of the
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Alliance; it is significant that the US Government,
as opposed to Congress, has only infrequently criti¬
cised its Allies efforts. The report of the Secre¬
tary of Defence to Congress on the 1986 Budget, 1987
Authorization Request and 1986-90 Defence Programs
recorded that:
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we believe the record shows that our
European Allies are doing more for the
common defence, broadly defined than
they are often given credit for.121
In a later report to the US Congress on Allied Con¬
tributions to the Common Defence in discussing the
Allied effort, the Secretary of Defense noted "the
comparisons also reveal that the non-US NATO Allies
as a group are shouldering roughly their fair share
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of the NATO and Japan defence burden". These views
reflect a pragmatism and recognition of the European
Allies defence outputs as opposed to defence inputs.
It is the latter which tends to dominate economic
assessments using the measurement of defence spending
as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (D/GDP).
The Schroeder report in particular uses this indica¬
tor to criticise the Allies' contributions and super¬
ficially the figures do lead to the conclusion that
America leads, see figure 4.3.
It is not the intention to compare the economic/
accountancy aspects of the debate as these elements
have received structured analysis in a number of
12 3
works. However, when a D/GDP comparison is made
the following factors should be borne in mind. First,
the US is a global superpower and uses its 'defence'
assets to project its power world wide. The percen¬
tage of the defence budget spent on its commitment
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Defence Expenditures as " of GDP
(based on current prices)




Belgium 3.34 3.34 3.35 3.52 3.40 3.32 3.15 3.05 3.03 2.99 2.87 3.25 3.11
Canada 1.94 1.33 1.38 1.91 2.10 2.19 2.21 2.17 2.17 2.13 2.08 2.05 2.17
Denmark 2.41 2.32 2.44 2.53 2.51 2.45 2.31 2.15 2.00 2.11 2.17 2.32 2.20
Germany 3.35 3.26 3.28 3.39 3.39 3.37 3.26 3.20 3.10 3.05 2.98 3.26 3.20
Greece 6.70 6.28 5.67 5.97 6.35 6.28 7.15 6.97 6.11 6.15 6.59 6.50 6.52
Italy 2.07 2.08 2.10 2.11 2.26 2.28 2.28 2.31 2.24 2.44 2.39 2.21 2.31
luxemoourg 1.03 1.02 1.15 1.21 1.19 1.20 1.15 1.09 1.08 1.21 1.27 1.13 1.15
Netherlands 3.08 3.20 3.11 3.20 3.23 3.19 3.19 3.10 3.05 3.05 2.99 3.14 3.11
Norway 3.22 3.08 2.39 2.89 3.02 3.08 2.30 3.08 3.11 3.36 3.28 3.05 3.oe
Portuga1 3.47 3.46 3.46 3.46 3.45 3.34 3.28 3.16 3.20 3.11 3.13 3.34 3.22
Soain 2.03 2.13 2.30 2.36 2.38 2.43 2.37 2.42 2.24 2.40 2.20 2.31 2.37
Turkey 5.43 4.55 4.5B 5.11 5.13 4.32 4.37 4.44 4.77 4.44 4.37 4.75 4.56
United Kingdom 4.61 4.35 5.02 5.14 5.39 5.28 5.49 5.23 4.99 4.73 4 .48 5.07 5.14
United States 4.30 4.80 5.14 5.40 6.09 6.37 5.22 5.52 5.72 6.50 6.07 5.81 6.46
Defence Expenditure; a; of GDP
(based on constant prices)




Belgium 3.43 3.43 0.35 3.43 3.37 3.36 .24 3.20 3.27 3.24 2.10 2.33 2.26
Canada 1.90 1.82 1.88 1.91 2.10 2.19 .21 2.17 2 17 2.13 2.08 2.04 2.17
Denmark 2.49 2.41 2.44 2.47 2.40 2.36 in 2.16 2.08 2.15 2.22 2.32 2.20
Germany 3.35 3.26 3.28 3.39 3.39 3.37 3.20 3.10 3.05 2.98 3.26 3.20
Greece 6.70 6.28 5.67 6.97 6.85 6.28 .15 5.37 6.11 6.15 6.59 6.50 6.52
Italy 2.13 2.08 2.10 2.07 2.13 2.17 .15 2.16 2.12 2.18 2.10 2.13 2.16
Luxemoourg 1.00 1.00 1.15 1.21 1.24 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.11 1.23 1.29 1.15 1.18
Netherlands 3.15 3.21 3.11 3.26 3.38 3.35 .35 3.28 3.33 2.30 2.26 3.27 2.32
Norway 3.05 2.96 2.89 2.95 3.05 3.04 .74 2.99 2.82 3.11 2.06 2.96 2.93
Portugal 3.44 3.42 3.46 3.46 3.45 3.34 .28 3.16 3.20 3.11 3.13 2.33 3.22
Soa in 2.03 2.13 2.30 2.36 2.38 2.43 .37 2.42 2.24 2.40 2.20 2.31 2.37
Turkey 4.41 4.57 4.58 4.48 4.48 4.14 .86 2.99 4.17 3.83 3.87 4.24 4.00
United Kingdom 4.73 4.78 5.02 5.15 5.40 5.24 .33 5.14 4.83 4.54 4.26 5.01 5.01
United States 4.87 4.93 5.14 5.19 5.69 5.90 . 77 6.00 5.21 6.05 5.59 5.55 5.98
Source - A Report by NATO's Defence
Planning Committee, December 1988
Figure 4.3
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to NATO varies between 50% and 60% depending upon
124
which source is used. However, a withdrawal from
Europe would not realistically see a 50% to 60% saving
given America's global aspirations. A figure between
30% to 35% would be more appropriate; and this in
truth represents the real burden the US is sharing
with its Allies. If the Federal Republic of Germany
chose to leave NATO it would not save a dollar and
the same argument applies to Spain and Turkey. Holland
would save about 50% of its defence budget with cuts
in offensive aircraft but not in air defence. Second,
the D/GDP for the US includes a significant slice
for nuclear assets, many of which are outside European
territory. The US policy does not encourage each
European Ally to have its own nuclear capability and
indeed it has never asked for a common Alliance respons¬
ibility outside the European territory.
The comparison of inputs verses outputs in defence
125
is a well worn track, where attention is drawn to
the European use of conscripts to save costs; and
the loss of rents and environmental considerations
with low flying and exercise damage in the Federal
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Republic of Germany. All these variables assist in
making Ambassador Keel's statements true:
There are no universal criteria for
assessing national contributions. A
variety of quantitive and qualitive
191
measures have been proffered as
reasonable measures, but none command
universal support... In any event,
there is presently no definitive means
of determining whether the burdens of
the Alliance are equitably distributed.1^7
It is scientifically difficult to draw conclusions
from political discussions, especially when the debate
itself is basically confused. The political burden-
sharing debate is confused by:
- One, the US global power projection of
which NATO is only an element.
- Two, the unwillingness of NATO nations
to be drawn into world wide responsibili¬
ties which they have not agreed.
- Three, US nuclear policy which has not
asked for a NATO responsibility outside
the European area.
Examining these three specific areas in turn. Firstly,
it is not fully appreciated that US defence strategy
has a world wide perspective, of which NATO is only
a part. Indeed the prestigious US Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy co-chaired by Under
Secretary of Defence Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter
recorded in their January 1988 report Discriminate
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Deterrence that: "Defense planning in the United
States has centred for many years on a grand strategy
1 ? Pi
of extraordinary global sweep". This global power
indeed global superpower projection is linked to a
US assessment of national interest which has been
identified by one expert to cover seven main geo¬
graphic areas; North America, Western Europe, Soviet
Union, East Asia and Pacific, South America, Middle
129
East and Southern Africa. The application of US
'intensity of interest criteria' to these areas, span¬
ning four separate categories for each; defence of the
homeland, economic well-being, favourable world order
and promotion of American values, places Western
Europe high in US strategic importance after North
America. ^30
The analysis by a Professor of International Affairs
at the US Federal Executive Institute serves to empha¬
sise that NATO Europe is only one of many world wide
commitments of US strategic and thus political interest.
This global perspective is not fully recognized by
many Europeans in NATO or indeed by the US public
themselves. The US National Security Council's former
Director of West European Affairs noted in May 1988
that:
...few Americans appreciate that much
of US military activity does not contri¬
bute to the defence of Europe, thus dis-
193
torting comparisons of military effort.
Nor do many in the United States take
into consideration how much political
influence is gained from US defence
spending and foreign involvements.131
Given that the Americans in general do not fully
appreciate, especially in the burden-sharing debate,
the depth and scope of their country's world wide
defence strategy - a political decision; it is under¬
standable that similar myopia exists in their Euro¬
pean Allies whose closeness to the Warsaw Pacts con¬
siderable forces naturally concentrate awareness upon
the nearest apparent danger. However, within the
burden-sharing debate, the US political global super¬
power projection and the general lack of understanding
of its world wide role by the American and West Euro¬
pean public alike represents an important factor.
Secondly, several NATO nations do not accept a
world wide responsibility in the NATO forum. If one
discusses a common burden, one demands a common responsi¬
bility. The fact that the European Allies are content
to "defer to a considerable extent to the American
112
lead" within NATO is primarily due to the recogni¬
tion that without the considerable commitment of the
US, the defence of Europe would lack credibility. How¬
ever, the European obligation within the strategic
deterrence and nuclear levels does not mean that all
the same Allied partners endorse the American view
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that US out-of-area involvement should be considered
a burden shared, given or received on behalf of NATO.
A striking example of this was the European Allies
reaction, except for the UK, in their reluctance to
support the American raid on Libya in 1986. Another
example was the Allies initial reaction to the US
request for their involvement in the Persian Gulf in
1987, although several European naval forces were
eventually committed, these were provided in a national
rather than a NATO capacity. However, as Stanley R.
Sloan in his book entitled 'NATO's Future': towards
a new transatlantic bargain has noted:
The Alliance has never had a Third World
mission, initially because the United States
preferred that NATO's commitments be defined
within narrow geographic perameters and, in
more recent years, because the European allies
were not willing to expand NATO's defense
commitments beyond their own resources or
their domestic political base for the Alliance.
The above comment does not mean that the US has
ceased trying to involve its NATO Allies in out-of-
area activities either through direct political,
economic or military support or through the tacit
recognition that the US, in its Third World dealings,
is advancing the interests of the Western Alliance.
The drawback with the US global perspective is that
many of the NATO nations including Iceland, Denmark.
The Netherlands and even the UK in some instances,
just do not connect US dealings in, say, Nicaragua,
195
as having direct relevance to NATO interests.
Indeed this significant comment by the two Williams
brothers sums up the situation:
...the American mining of Nicaraguan
ports with the subsequent French offer
to remove the mines exemplifies the
growing dissension in the alliance
over Third World issues.135
Because the European Allies generally acquiesce to
US leadership in the NATO forum, the American percep¬
tion would appear to be that the Allies should also
be willing to be drawn into wider security concerns
for the sake of the common good as identified by its
superpower leader. However, it is suggested that
the true situation is understated by Martin Edmonds
in his book "NATO in the 1980s; Challenges and
Responses":
The United States is in competition with
the Soviet Union and has global interests,
many of which, such as energy, it has in
common with the European states. Nonethe¬
less , the European governments appear
reluctant to widen the scope of NATO and
risk being drawn into conflicts that are
potentially of greater interest to the
United States than to themselves.136
The European reluctance to become involved in out-
of-area activities and to extend Allied Alliance geo¬
graphic commitments, has been identified by the high
level US Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy.
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The Commission, which included a number of experienced
senior political figures, including ex Secretaries of
State, submitted a report to the US President in 1988
entitled Discriminate Deterrence. The report referred
to a "problem of cohesion" in NATO dealings with coun-
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tries like Libya or Nicaragua. This term implies
that the Allies should be sticking with or to its
US leader; but the Europeans would argue that there
should be common agreement on common responsibilities
-]Og
before these burdens are commonly shared.
The third area concerning the confused burden-shar¬
ing debate involves nuclear weapons. The US policy
on nuclear defence has never asked for a common respon¬
sibility outside the European area. This policy has
evolved over time. When the NATO Alliance originally
came into being with the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty on the 4th April 1949, the US held a complete
nuclear monopoly. While the Soviet Union exploded its
own first atomic device in August 1949, it then lacked
the sophisticated delivery systems capable of reaching
139
the American homeland. The massive nuclear response
strategy adopted by NATO's Military Committee in
December 1954 under the aegis of MC 48 saw the deploy¬
ment of a number of tactical nuclear weapons into
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Europe augmented by the US Strategic Air Forces
targeting the Soviet Union. But as noted in 1957 by
Henry Kissinger in his now classic book on nuclear
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weapons and foreign policy:
...Our Strategic Air Command has never
been a part of the NATO structure.
Since the alliance has no control over
the instrument around which its whole
strategy is built, there has inevitably
been an air of unreality about NATO
planning.141
Any air of unreality soon became dissipated with
the realization in the late 1950s that the Soviet
Union had made such rapid technological advances,
highlighted by the launch of the Sputnik satellite
in 1957, that the North American continent could no
longer remain immune from the threat of a Russian
nuclear attack. By the time of the May 1962 meeting
of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic
Council in Athens, which assembled to "review the cir¬
cumstances in which the Alliance might be compelled
14 2
to have recourse to nuclear weapons (Athens Guidelines)",
the US had deployed a significant number of short and
intermediate range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
The Athens Guidelines were concerned with the European
Theatre of Nuclear Forces and articulated that decision¬
making should remain firmly in the hands of the nuclear
power, but agreed that there would be Allied consulta-
141
tion before use. The wishes of some European Allies
to have a greater say in the nuclear planning process
coupled with the US interest in reinforcing the cred¬
ibility of its extended nuclear deterrence led, in
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December 1966, to the creation of NATO's Nuclear
1 44
Planning Group (NPG).
A shift took place in 1967 from the strategy of
massive retaliation to one of flexible response known
by its NATO Military Committee designation of MC 14/3.
This strategy, which is still current, focused greater
attention upon the European Theatre in nuclear terms
through the application of the NATO Triad which, for
two of its legs envisages the use of tactical nuclear
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weapons which by definition are based in Europe.
The NPG is now, in 1989, a well established consul¬
tative forum; however, consultation means neither con¬
trol nor responsibility and as recognized by Stanley
R. Sloan who acted as the Study Director and Consul¬
tant to the North Atlantic Assembly Committee 'NATO
in the 1990s':
The United States provided no iron clad
guarantee about how extensive consulta¬
tions might be in a crisis, but at least
the NPG provided ways and means for such
consultations.146
The foreign policy and worldwide strategy of the
United States, concerning the use of nuclear power,
does not call for a common responsibility outside the
European area. However, within the burden-sharing
debate, the total costs of maintaining strategic
nuclear forces represents to some US Congressional
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members a responsibility which should be commonly
shared.
These three essentailly political issues which do
confuse the burden-sharing debate:
- US global power projection of which NATO is
only an element.
- Unwillingness of NATO nations to be drawn
into worldwide responsibilities.
- US nuclear policy.
are not addressed in the December 1988 report by NATO's
Defence Planning Committee 'Enhancing Alliance Collec¬
tive Security. Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibili¬
ties in the Alliance'; but it is clear that the docu-
147
ment was carefully written with these areas in mind.
The question of 'shares and burdens' could be regarded
as 'spends' or what one is 'missing' in terms of hos¬
pitals, schools or social services, as a consequence
of the funds having been expended on defence. The
nature of less developed economies places greater
weight upon what it is 'missing' as opposed to 'expendi¬
ture'. However, this perspective is not only applic¬
able to the poorer nations. In May 1989 the French
President had to arbitrate in an argument between his
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Defence Minister and the Prime Minister who wished to
transfer about £7 bn of the defence budget to educa-
148
tion. In the context of 'spends and missings' or
'shares and burdens' by the countries of NATO, it is
emphasised that the true nature of the debate is cen¬
tred on political issues in a changing economic situa¬
tion. Nations 'spendings' on defence are integrated
political decisions and NATO members should aim to
ensure that this expenditure is tied to improved cooper¬
ation to make existing 'spends' more effective.
Burden-sharing is an area which tends to create
more problems rather than to providing solutions.
While the head of America's National Security Coun¬
cil has stated that a bigger Allied contribution,
offering economies to the US defence budget, would be
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his main priority, and US defence expenditure for
150
1990 has planned zero growth; it is again recog¬
nised that the true nature of the burden-sharing
debate is political. The December 1988 report by
NATO's Defence Planning Committee represents a care¬
fully worded political response to the US Government's
political initiative where one of the main conclusions
is that defence resources committed should be "used
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as efficiently as possible". While this statement
is obviously correct it seems that the whole burden-
sharing debate provides the means for postponing a
decision; however, political decisions cannot be made
201
without first identifying solutions.
* * *
Working from the premise that the Allies are try¬
ing, albeit very slowly, to work towards achieving
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agreed ammunition stock-level goals, it will be
conceded that when resources are scarce the efficient
management of them becomes far more critical as any
European housewife of the Second World War can testify.
The burden-sharing deliberations might well create the
base for a political consensus to make decisions
regarding logistic management cooperation within the
Alliance. In the past the issues have become mixed
and cloudy in a debate which fairly espouses "better
15 3
resource management", but fails to specify those
resources which are truly critical to the Allied
defence.
These resources deficiencies tend to be lumped
together under the overall labels of logistics or
sustainability; however, as noted at the beginning of
the Chapter 'sustainability' incorporates a mix of
elements including both 'consumer' and 'production'
logistics. A shortened definition is:
Consumer logistics: that part of
logistics concerning reception of
the initial product, storage,
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transport, maintenance (including
repair and serviceability), opera¬
tion and disposal of materiel.
Production Logistics: that part of
logistics concerning research,
design, development, manufacture
and acceptance of materiel.15^
The involvement of the latter which includes defence
procurement with its attendant costs and vested
interests introduces significant national political
and economic pressures which, in turn, inhibits the
making of true resource management improvements for
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consumer logistics. Combining the term 'logistic
resources' tends to create focus upon the most expen¬
sive elements, ie; the production end; while what is
required is better management of 'limited resources'
needed at the consumer end ie; the battlefield.
Based on Second World War experience it is clear
that the most important classes of consumer logistics ^
supply, in terms of volume and battlefield sustain-
ability are rations (Class I), fuel (Class III) and
ammunition (Class V). The provision by nations of
rations does not present a problem, and regarding
Class III, NATO's former Director of Logistics noted
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that "the problem with fuel is its distribution".
The overwhelming deficiency today centres upon a short¬
fall of Class V ammunition stocks and, in some Allied
forces a shortage of transport to provide essential
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mobility for these key resources. Senator Sam Nunn
has posed the question "...why should the Americans
arrive prepared to fight for 30 days only to see the
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ammo running out and the flanks caving in"; this
question paints a slightly better picture than
General Bernard Rogers' comment as SACEUR on having
to request nuclear release "in terms of days, not in
1S 8
terms of weeks or months" and a May 1989 report of
an interview with a staff officer of the British Army
of the Rhine:
If the Pact attacked us, we could hold
them for 72 hours or perhaps a week,
depending on how much ammunition we
had, ...ammunition is a real problem.
The disparity of views concerning the duration of
ammunition stocks is understandable. Firstly, there
is the mainly British perception that the intensity
of conflict will upset the SHAPE Stockpile Guidance
figures for indirect fire weapons by approximately
18 0
a factor of three. However, it may well be that
the British view of daily ammunition expenditure rates
would change if they were equipped with more guns.
Indeed the SHAPE Stockpile Guidance requiring a speci¬
fic number of 'rounds per tube' would eventually core-
late to the number of guns one can bring to bear on
target; but the number of guns is not specified.
Secondly, no nation is anxious to advertise it is
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dragging its feet in such a critical area. However,
in the words of NATO's former Director of Logistics,
"Individual nations stockpiles vary anywhere from 10
1 6 1
to 12 days to 30 days and beyond. It's not uniform".
While the Americans have reached an excess of 30 days
for some type of ammunition, it is an open secret that
at the present rate of progress, it will take its
European Allies well into the next century to meet
the 'interim' 30 day stockpile goal.
It is information such as this which adds fuel
within US Congress to the political burden-sharing
162
debate. Class V ammunition supplies, therefore
represent very limited resources and the management
of them must be optimised within the Alliance if the
duration of a conventional defence is to be extended.
This statement does not imply that the strong should
fully support the weak because this would reduce the
nations incentives to meet their agreed stockpile
obligations; what it does mean is that vital ammuni¬
tion resources should be subject to more innovative
management control in the interests of the Alliance
as a whole.
To introduce innovative management of essential
logistics may seem like proposing to turn base metal
into gold, but a possible solution to the Class V
ammunition problem is so relatively simple that once
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discussed, the perspective becomes quite obvious.
It involves shifting the sharing of burdens away
from the political/economic arena towards the con¬
sumer on the battlefield for, in the words of the
former Commanding General of the US Army Logistics
Center, "this is by far the most important place
in the logistic system - all other elements support
it".^3 jn nato's vital Central Region eight Corps
provided by five nations are ranged in what has been
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described as a "layer-cake" format defensively
facing the Warsaw Pact forces. The Allies are striv¬
ing, with varying degrees of success, to meet agreed
ammunition stockpile goals under the 'logistics is
a national responsibility' policy with requires each
nation to provide logistic resources for its NATO
assigned troops for a specified blanket period of
combat. The total combat days requirement varies by
class of supply with Class V ammunition set at 30
days, and Class III fuel somewhat greater. However,
these esoteric differences are, with the exception
of Class I rations, quite irrelevant to the soldier
in the field. What he requires, apart from daily
rations, is the ready provision of ammunition and
166
fuel when he is in contact with the enemy. ^ To
echo Senator Sam Nunn, it is no use trying to conduct
a holding operation to see the Corps on the flanks
giving way through a lack of Class V supplies; but
166
this could well represent the present situation.
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Taking a battlefield view, the Warsaw Pact could
not achieve offensive momentum by attacking all
eight Allied Corps simultaneously - which would be
a tactical nonsense. An attacker needs to attain
numerical superiority of at least 3 to 1 to have any
chance of success and this is achieved by massing
167
forces and attacking on a number of axes. In the
Central Region the 'worst case' planning figure of
attack axis would be four with the probability
168
resting upon three. When consumable resources are
expensive and scarce, it is not sound management
practice to aim for a balanced stockage distribution
for a 100% of outlets when the maximum pressure on
expenditure can only be placed upon 50% of the whole.
This is quite basic supply and transport practice as
any professional retail logistics manager would agree.
The analogy may seem strange but, in truth, ammuni¬
tion in combat does represent fast moving consumer
goods (FMCGs). The key to enhancing the Allied Corps
sustainability in terms of critical Class V supplies
must involve the sharing of 'base metal' ammunition
in order to achieve the 'gold' of a viable conven¬
tional defence.
Because there is no copyright on sound logistic
management principles, the idea of pooling NATO
supplies in one form or another has been considered
in the past. However, little action followed due to
a mixture of influences of which 'timing' is a funda¬
mental part. Some twenty years ago when NATO's flex¬
ible response strategy had just been adopted, a sig¬
nificant study by Geoffrey Ashcroft expressed the tru¬
ism that:
The sine qua non of an integrated ammuni¬
tion supply system is surely that ammuni¬
tion should be allocable to where it is
required, rather than in accordance with
ownership.170
He continued to recommend that NATO should hold a
small quantity of standard ammunition centrally which
"would be susceptible to re-distribution in the
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interests of flexibility". The recommendations
were alas, ahead of their time for three main rea¬
sons. Firstly, the realism of 'flexible response'
and the greater importance of conventional force had
not fully taken root with the European members of the
Alliance, who were used to relying upon the American
nuclear umbrella for deterrence. Secondly, nations
were more parochial about their 'national responsi¬
bility for logistics' which could be used to screen
their shortfalls of resources in the international
forum. Thirdly, the middle years between the end
of the Second World War and today, saw a greater
diversity of national weapons systems, which obviously
lacked the degree of standardization a NATO 'pool'
would require.
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Pooling of a different nature was proposed by
Steven Canby in the early 1970s. He felt that lar¬
ger US battlefield manpower reserves could be pro¬
duced by reducing the American divisional slice of
logistic support personnel and centralizing logistic
resources. His comment that "the criterion is not
the ability to support every unit all the time, but
172
to support the total force as required" showed a
ready appreciation that only part of a force in com¬
bat can be heavily engaged at any one time. His
solution involving the reduction of logistic person¬
nel in divisions was applicable to US Forces only as




Many minds have toyed with the idea of sharing
NATO logistic stocks in one form or another in the
174
interests of enhanced efficiency, but real change
has been hampered by a lack of political and military
will linked to time and circumstances. Conditions
change, and the dynamics of eased US/Soviet relations
coupled with the pressures of the Alliance burden-
sharing debate could well provide a catalyst for move¬
ment. The US Secretary of Defense Annual Report to
the Congress of Fiscal Year 1990, which was written
after the Publication of NATO's Defence Planning
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Committee burden-sharing report, included these
words:
The message to our allies was clear:
we must find the resources, through both
battle management and ultimately through
funding increases to sustain the common
defense and to strengthen our alliances
through a progressive evolution of the
common defense burden.176
Although the burden-sharing debate is essentially
political in its makeup; it has gained an impetus of
its own leading the European Allies to seek ways to
assuage US pressures for tangible "follow-up action
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on the recommendations agreed" in the NATO
Defence Planning Committee's burden-sharing report.
Faced with the choice of expending significant addi¬
tional defence funds or agreeing to enhance resource
management of vital logistic stocks at less cost pen¬
alty, the pragmatic elders of the Alliance would
probably feel constrained to choose the latter.
The concept of pooling or sharing ammunition is
not just a method of crisis-managing today's short¬
falls although the current levels adds an immediacy
to seeking a solution; but is based upon the logic
of making the most efficient and effective use of
expensive resources in both the short and the
longer term. The introduction of management control
procedures for Class V supplies would enhance Alliance
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cohesion in the Central Region by extending conven¬
tional combat duration and limiting the risk of the
1 *7 o
"Corps on the flanks caving in" through lack of
ammunition. It would provide better value for what
the nations' taxpayers are 'missing', and most impor¬
tantly, it would meet the needs of the soldier and
his Allied comrades in the field in having ammunition
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available when in combat.
The proposed solution involves the agreement by
nations that all national Corps should hold suffi¬
cient Class V supplies for their troops to cover
immediate requirements at high intensity with a bal¬
ance held under NATO's Allied Forces Central Europe
command with the control devolved to Army Group level.
The required quantities of ammunition involved can
be assessed by SHAPE and advised to nations; but as
a rule-of-thumb the key would be for national Corps
to hold about one-third of the total stockage, with
the remainder placed firmly under NATO control.
The suggestion that nations surrender the control
of a significant amount of valuable ammunition
resources to an Allied command cuts into the very
roots of the 'logistics is a national responsibility',
ethos. However, such a system would provide four
profound advantages:
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- First, the combining of a sizeable proportion
of Class V supplies under NATO control extends
the duration of conventional 'sustainability',
even given the same level of today's inade¬
quate stocks. This would be achieved by
ensuring that ammunition is allocated to where
it is really required - the Corps areas under
greatest pressure, and not just spread thinly
across the Central Region.
- Second, military control could start to be
exercised at the right level, permitting the
NATO commander to exert effective command of
conventional operations. In truth, the con¬
trol of logistics cannot be divorced from com¬
mand; but this situation, alas, exists within
NATO today (see Chapter 6).
- Third, the proposal offers a viable political
and practical commitment of cooperation and
commonly shared responsibilities within the
Alliance.
- Fourth, the idea represents the most cost
effective solution for the Allies who all
face increased national economic pressures
highlighted in the burden-sharing debate.
Any scheme to trim 'sustainability' costs by
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introducing effective logistics management
principles cannot be ignored.
The establishment of a NATO ammunition pool in the
Central Region, together with a mechanism for control
in war would be relatively simple to structure. The
Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) is a model of
successful coalition logistics and its operating
principles could be used as an outlined guide. The
former Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics HQ
AFCENT described the operational characteristics of
the system as follows:
The operating principles of the CEPS can
best be likened to an international bank
with many branches. The eight user nations
can feed in fuel to the pipeline from their
own refineries, tankers, or ports and then
drain the 'credit' thus established at any
other point in the system.180
The fuel obviously loses its national identity once
placed into the CEPS, but regular checks and balances
are undertaken and, in war, control of allocation is
coordinated by NATO military staff who ensure that
deliveries are made by priority of operational need.
The relationship between linking the control of
Class III and Class V supplies was also identified
in a study for the Western European Union undertaken
by a former Netherlands Military Representative to
NATO's Military Committee. Lieutenant General
Dijkstra, a one time Chief of Netherlands Army Logis¬
tics and Vice Chief of the Army Staff, drew attention
to the successful logistics management of fuel in
NATO's Central Region. He felt that:
Is should therefore be possible to
follow this principle of international
logistic control and international
funding to meet another national
responsibility for high-priority
supply, i.e., ammunition.181
The solution for Central Region Allies to delegate
a part of their national responsibility for Class
V supplies to a NATO organization for control under
a 'credit' system in a similar manner to the CEPS,
is realistic given the key of 'cooperation' . A
major advantage being that the total Central Region
stock requirement would be less than the overall
combined national goals because enemy pressure could
not be sustained against all eight Corps. Apart from
the utility of extending conventional 'sustainability',
the plan also has economic considerations, a factor
recognised by one commentator nearly twenty years
ago when ammunition costs were significantly less:
It could indeed be cheaper if
the greater flexibility afforded
by centrally held, standardized
stocks permitted some reduction
in overall stock-holding.182
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The NATO 'pooling' of supplies would also encourage,
or perhaps shame, nations into narrowing the gap
between promises and deeds. There is some discre¬
pancy in this area as demonstrated by the Allied
Defence Ministers regular affirmations to increase
annually their countries defence expenditure by 3%•
The annual submission of a national reply to NATO's
Defence Planning Questionnaire also provides scope
for adjustment should a country wish to present a
more positive but, maybe slightly inaccurate situa¬
tion report.
Several disadvantages in establishing a NATO con¬
trolled 'pool' of ammunition suggest themselves.
First, the Class V stocks would need to be standard-
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ized or be 'interchangeable'; at present there
are some limitations. Second, nations would lose
their annual budgetary balancing possibilities first
mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter. In addi¬
tion, a commitment to purchase and pool ammunition
stocks under NATO control would provide a verifiable
check, which replies to an annual questionnaire, does
not give. The following comment by one retired General
sets the scene:
However, if deterrence is the major
plank in a strategy it is better to
economise in the munitions which are
stored out of sight than in the equip¬
ment is visible on exercises or parades.
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There is also no doubt that given
the choice, admirals, generals and
air marshals will put priority on
visible element of their command
so that economies tend to all auto¬
matically upon weapons rather than
platforms.185
Third, nations would need greater logistic transport
support as stockpiles would tend to be more disloca¬
ted. However, the costs of transport in proportion
to accrued savings through the pooling of ammunition
would represent cents in comparison to dollars, or
■
^ A. * ^ 186indeed pennies compared to guineas.
The costs of transport in relation to Class V
supplies is an indication of ammunition expense rather
cheapness of trucks/personnel, but the role of trans¬
port which should remain a 'national responsibility',
is fundamental in the 'pooling' of Class V supplies
under NATO control. While savings can be made by
consolidating resources in many areas of logistic
support, especially in a peacetime environment, the
"centralizing of transport in a mobile war is losing
18 7
capability". Combat units in action in Central
Europe will have to be tactically flexible and mobile"^
in response to enemy initiatives, and their supplies
must also be mobile. A soldier, corporal or general
will not fight when he has severe doubts about the
logistic support he needs. Mobility and full control
'at the right level' are vital to provide the confi-
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dence and will to Allied troops in battle. Given
the present level of 'sustainability' in the Central
Region, in the final analysis, it is concluded that
mobility is more important than the level of stocks.
However, logistic mobility is linked to full control,
which requires Allied cooperation and leads to demands
for enhanced interoperability between nations for
logistic stocks and systems.
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WORKING GROUP NO. 4 CN FUELS (W3/4)
SINGLE FUEL CONCEPT (SFC)
Note by the Staff Officer
1. Following the discussions at meeting 32 of the WG/4 the original
document'^' and the comments submitted by the United States'"', a revised text
has been prepared and is at the Annex.
2. In order to move ahead, this version is now circulated to both the NPC
and W3/4. The latter is invited to agree this text under the silence procedure
ending 3rd April 1989. For the NPC this WP will appear an the agenda for its
April 1989 meeting and will cnly be discussed if the WG/4 silence has not been
broken.
3. Unless I hear to the contrary by 3rd April 1989, WG/4 will be deemed to
have agreed this text which will appear on the NPC Agenda.
(Signed) D.A. SIMPSON











THE SINGLE FUEL CONCEPT (SFC)
INTRODUCTION
1. The "Single Fuel Concept" is now the accepted description of the goal
proposed by the NATO Pipeline Committee's (NPC) Working Group No. 4 on Fuels and
agreed by the NPC at its May 1987 Meeting (^). That goal is worded as follows:
"Tb achieve equipment interoperability through a single fuel
for use on the battlefield and for land based air operations,
ensuring that the specification of that fuel is standardised
with its commercial equivalent in common use in NATO Europe,
and that its physical and chemical characteristics axe such
that it can be introduced, stored, transported and distributed
by the NATO Pipeline System (NPS)".
2. The concept concerns fuel for ground vehicles and equipments and land
based military aircraft. It does not include naval fuels but could cover
amphibious forces ashore. Similarly it does rot apply to the high density and
high stability fuels used for special applications.
3. Geographically, the concept applies to NATO Europe.
THE MAIN PRINCIPLES
4. For the concept to succeed in whole or part there are five main
principles, namely:
(a) that conversion F—40 to F-34 is complete:
(b) that only compression ignition or turbines are used to power
ground vehicles and equipments in the forward areas;
(c) that as a result of (b), the use of gasoline is eliminated in the
forward areas;
(d) that the same fuel without any operational constraints can be used
to power land based military aircraft and ground vehicles and
equipment using compression ignition or turbine engines;
(e) that the selected fuel is readily available, satisfies all military
storage and bulk distribution criteria and is basically the same








5. Fuel storage and distribution facilities and equipment must be designed
and maintained with the capability to receive, store, and issue alternate grades
of petroleum products when the primary grade cannot be obtained in sufficient
quantity to meet operational requirements.
SELECTED FUEL
6. There is only one fuel that could meet the requirements. It is the
kerosene based aviation turbine fuel, F-34. It differs from commercial JET A-i
(NATO Code F-35) only through the need for an additive package.
THE STAGES OF THE SPC
7. There are three stages:
(a) STAGE 1 The total elimination of F—40 and its replacement by F-34
for use by land based military aircraft in NATO Europe.
(b) STAGE 2 The adoption of F-34 (or F-35) as a replacement for diesel
fuel starting in the forward areas.
(c) STATE 3 The total elimination of the gasoline requirement.
IMPLEMENTATION
8. STAGE 1 can be implemented without any significant delay throughout
NATO Europe. The target date for completion is mia-1990, except for Turkey where
it depends upon the phasing-out of certain aircraft types.
9. STAGE 2 can be carried out independently by each nation in accordance
with their own programme fully co-ordinated with other user nations.
10. STAGE 3 will take much longer as it depends on nations' equipment
procurement policy and vehicle inventories, active and reserve.
EQUIPMENT ASPECTS
11. Hie future design of land based military aircraft, vehicles and ground
equipment will be primarily based on the use of F-34. Performance data re other
fuels (e.g. F-40, diesel etc) will be determined and recorded as appropriate to
the design requirements of the equipment concerned.
12. All nations should introduce a policy to procure only compression
igm tion/turbine powered military venicles ana ground equipments.
13. A programme of tests is being undertaken to clear F-34/F-35 for use in








14. For STAGE 1:
(a) continue monitoring the conversion F-40 to F-34 for the use of
land based military aircraft in NATO Europe;
(b) set target date for total conversion in NATO Europe of mid-1990,
except for Turkey;
(c) contribute to the PPC study into JET A-l availability in NATO
Europe;
(d) maintain close liaison with all bodies, the specification
authorities and the oil industry in order to avoid any deviations
between the specifications of JET A-i and NATO F-35, the base fuel
for F-34.
15. For STAGE 2:
(a) continue monitoring the conversion of military diesel fuels to
F-34/35;
(b) continue to progress the completion of all technical tests with
F-34/35 of ground vehicles and equipments;
(c) set target date for the completion of all testing;
(d) receive details of the procurement policy for each nation
relative to the type or power unit for future ground vehicles ana
equipments.
16. For STAGE 3:
(a) encourage the early phasing out of gasoline powered military
vehicles ana equipments, initially in the forward areas;
(b) encourage the early withdrawal of gasoline from the forward
extensions of the NPS and its substitution by F-34/35;








17. Arising from the implementation of the SFC there are related aspects
for action, namely:
(a) With regard to the specification of JET A-i(F-35):
(1) For aviation use, the closest co-ordination and co-operation
will nave to be continued between the military ana civil
sides to keep the respective specifications interchangeable.
(li) For the use of F-34/35 by around vehicles ana equipment,
every effort should be made to avoid the adding of new
specification requirements for JET A-l (F-3S).
(iii) STANAGs covering F-34 and F-35 should no longer have a
caveat anout not releasing their contents to industry,
except, maybe for STANAG 1110.
(lv) Special attention should be paid to the possible
proliferation of standardization authorities as a result of
the EEC goal for a single market in 1992, particularly in
resp>ect to the future role of the comite eurcpeen ae
normalisation (CEN).
(b) Related to Pipeline Drag Reducer additives include in the clearance
process for their use in aviation turbine fuels, tests covering
around vehicles ana equipments.
(c) For procurement, standardize terminology avoiding the use of
contusing descriptions.
(d) With regard to high density ana hiah stability fuels discourage any
moves to increase their use for otner than special applications.
SUMMARY AND WAY' AHEAD
18. The aoai to use a sinale fuel on the battlefield is known as the Single
Fuel Concept. It is applicable to NATO Europie ana consists of three stages.
The fuel is commercial JET A-l with an additive package. The use of gasoline is
to be gradually reduced and eventually eliminated from forward areas as nations
cease the procurement of spark ignition vehicles ana equipment. As an interim
step nations should periodically evaluate their gasoline requirements with the
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19. While there is a mid-1990 target date to complete Stage 1 - conversion
F-40 to F-34(2), the implementation of the other two stages depends upon many
factors. Therefore, each nation should set its own pace but in full consultation
with all interested parties. The execution of all stages and the related
aspects requires careful monitoring. Tins is the task of the NATO Pipeline
Committee ana in particular its Working Group No 4 on Fuels.




CHAPTER 5 - INTEROPERABILITY
Interoperability is defined within NATO as:
The ability of systems, units or
forces to provide services to and
accept services from other systems,
units or forces and to use the
services so exchanged to enable them
to operate effectively together.!
Its importance increases in proportion to the decreas
in military resources, for if provided within a suffi
ciency of equipment and stocks, it is doubtful that
military authorities would wish to become involved
in an area of greater civil/economic common interest.
It could be argued that, in certain circumstances, a
variety of weapons systems could enhance rather than
degrade the deterrence posture of the Alliance. How-
•5
ever, the "logistic shortfalls' of the Alliance has
led to the following comments by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe:
The effectiveness of NATO defenses is
also degraded by the lack of interoper¬
ability of equipments from its various
nations. While the Warsaw Pact equip¬
ment has a great deal of commonality,
NATO has, for example, eight difference
main battle tanks firing four different
kinds of ammunition. Although national
desires to maintain independence in the
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area of weapons development and produc¬
tion are understandable, in an era of
increasingly scarce resources we can no
longer afford such inefficiencies.^
Interoperability is however inextricably linked
to NATO Standardization which, while having the aim
formulated in 1982 to increase the effectiveness of
the military forces of the Alliance is limited to
5
the principle that standardization is voluntary.
6
The North Atlantic Council paper outlining the
principles of NATO standardization emphasizes the
need for political will and identifies two inter¬
acting military and economic aims. It also gives
a general perspective of technical, operational and
managerial requirements in the area of interoperabil¬
ity, without stating priorities. A copy of this
unique document is at Appendix A to this Chapter.
Although a Military Agency for Standardization
(MAS) was established in 1951 "to foster military
standardization with the aim of enabling NATO forces
7
to operate together in the most effective manner",
it work of coordinating staffing and promulgating NATO
Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) is hampered to
a degree by the 'voluntary principle', which means
g
that standardization cannot be imposed. Standardiza¬
tion proposals mainly originate from national staffs;
but the process of agreement, ratification and imple-
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mentation of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
is alas a slow process due to international systems
9
and 'national interest' screenings. However, accord¬
ing to Mr Jan Van Houwelingen, the Secretary of
Defence for the Netherlands, "Standardization is the
ideal, interoperability is indispensable"."'"0
The perception that interoperability is 'indispen¬
sable' is understandable given the present economic
climate within NATO countries coupled with the ever
rising costs of defence equipment which has led to
the coining of the phrase: "Structural Disarmament"
by Thomas Callaghan meaning:
...the disarmament phenomenon of more
and more money producing fewer and
fewer weapons, less"readiness" , and
even less combat sustainability.11
12
The economic advantages of interoperability when
associated with armaments cooperation have the great¬
est significance for high technology items which
involve high research costs, or the low technology
11
high numbers purchases. The acquisition of inter¬
operable armaments in between these two areas offers
few financial savings. Lower costs are important but
effective management is of greater significance.
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The essential rationale for interoperability within
NATO's integrated military structure concerns:
- Firstly, everything to do with command
14
and control and this involves not
only communications equipment compat¬
ibility, but also procedures.
- Secondly, the high consumption and very
15
expensive supplies, m other words
ammunition and its mobility."^
It is suggested that these two areas are the most
vital aspects of resource management in the Alliance
today, and it is these two battlefield considerations
which must be the starting point for any real 'resources
17
strategy'. With regard to the status of interoperabil¬
ity within command and control systems:
The British Ptarmigan tactical radio
system is one of seven different systems
operated by NATO nations which are unable
to communicate with one another without
the use of expensive and vulnerable inter¬
face devices and gateways.18
This damning criticism for an Alliance celebrating
forty years of cooperation is echoed for command and
control of the air where NATO's air defence posture
has been described by the Vice Chairman of the NATO
Air Defence Committee, as inadequate now and for the
19
foreseeable future. The lack of a NATO identifica¬
tion system (NIS) and an adequate identification
system friend or foe (IFF) for the air battle is an
indictment of the 'voluntary' principle of standard¬
ization so carefully detailed by the North Atlantic
Council (at Appendix A). In the words of the Vice
Chairman of NATO's Air Defence Committee:
For almost two decades some nations have
just refused to procure the available
systems which could, at least, have pro¬
vided standardization. All attempts to
agree on a more effective NATO Identifi¬
cation System (NIS), which cannot be
easily jammed or decoded by the Warsaw
Pact were frustrated, as one or the other
nation just "left the conference table".20
Low level airspace management also presents serious
command and control interoperability problems. With
the planned increase use of helicopters for low level
operations in NATO's Rear Combat Zone (RCZ), there
will be a "large number of helicopter movements by
21
the 4,000 helicopters in the Central Region", it
may concern Army and Air Force personnel to realize
that at present there is "no known standardized pro¬
cedure within NATO for managing corps controlled air-
22 21
space". Given the current speed of action with
'voluntary' standardization agreements, perhaps a sim¬
ilar timescale involved in the selection of a NIS may
apply.
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Moving from interoperability of command and control
to interoperability of logistics presents a more posi¬
tive picture. Out of the three essentail combat sup¬
plies required to enable troops to fight - Class I,
III and V; Class III fuel, is standardized within NATO
and is subject to NATO control at the right level.
The fact that ammunition is also high consumption and
expensive makes it an essential logistic resource which
should also be interoperable and subject to NATO con¬
trols in the same way as with fuel; however, while
2 4
the 'principles of NATO standardization' stress that
the military aim is to increase combined operational
25
effectiveness of Allied forces, true progress is slow.
* * *
Because of the complexity of ammunition the term
'interchangeability' is used in preference to inter¬
operability' for Class V Supplies as a means to more
closely define the requirements. The narrowing down
of a seemingly adequate term may appear semantic; but
terminology used within an organization comprising
2 ^
16 nations and employing two official languages^
requires that all definitions are as precise as poss¬
ible. The NATO definition of interchangeability is
given as:
A condition which exists when two or
more items possess such functional
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and physical characteristics as to
be equivalent in performance or
durability and are capable of being
exchanged one for the other without
alteration of the items themselves
or of adjoining items, except for
adjustment, and without selection
for fit and performance.27
It is with the above terminology in mind that the
Army Board of NATO's Military Agency for Standardiza¬
tion established a Land Forces Ammunition Interchange-
ability Working Party and keeping to the 'voluntary'
spirit of standardization, the Working Party com¬
prises only delegates of those NATO nations, commands
and agencies that agree to participate. Its main
role is to undertake studies into the interchangeability
of ammunition for war and includes specific tasks to:
Identify all NATO ammunition of the same
calibre used by two or more of the NATO
land forces, giving priority to artillery,
tank and mortar ammunition, and develop a
catalogue of ammunition and weapons commonly
used by NATO land forces which will show
what ammunition can be interchanged and
effectively fired by each national weapon
system, distinguishing between interchange-
ability for wartime emergency use and
training in peacetime.2o
Its work has resulted in the publication of a Land
Forces Ammunition Interchangeability Catalogue; which
stresses that "ammunition listed in this document is
interchangeable only in war except where otherwise
specified".^ -phe development and publication of NATO
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Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) has already been
described as a slow process; however, with the excep¬
tion of small arms (infantry) ammunition there is a
paucity of STANAGs for munitions. For example, there
are no STANAGs covering primers, propelling charges,
projectiles or fuzes for the following calibres of
artillery: 105 mm, 155 mm, 175 mm and 203 mm. 'Inter-
changeability' has become a watch-word in the realms
of NATO ammunition standardization where perhaps empha-
30
sis should be placed upon the word 'watch'.
* * *
To illustrate the practicalities of 'interoperabil¬
ity' on the dynamic European battlefield of today,
let us take a scenario that one of the Allied Corps
in the Central Region, defending against a strong
enemy thrust, was running short of 155 mm ammunition.
Then let it be assumed that the national US command
either due to good husbandry or lack of pressure on
its own Corps sectors, was able to offer assistance
with an emergency loan of compatible 155 mm ammunition.
There would be difficulty concerning cross-Corps
exchange as procedures have yet to be developed cover¬
ing the transfer of Class V supplies across the bound-
31
aries of two national corps. Nevertheless, assuming
that all went well, the receiving Corps in combat would
be unable to shift the pallets of 155 mm ammunition
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from the American truck without breaking bulk because
its fork-lift truck is incompatible with the US pallet
size which is not NATO standard. The European nations
forks would not fit the narrow gap at the base of the
US pallet; furthermore, if the receiving Corps happened
to be British, it would be unable to set the fuzes of
the shells as it uses electronic fuze setters which
only now are just being introduced into US service.
The above example is not designed as a criticism
of the US for using non-NATO standard pallets for they
have sound national logistic reasons to retain their
slim-line pallets. It is stressed there is a need for
communication within the Alliance today so that diff¬
erences are known and understood. With forethought
and planning European nations could purchase mechan¬
ical handling equipment fork extenders, which are rela¬
tively inexpensive, to assist interoperability with
US forces in times of crisis when speed and efficiency
really counts.
The Allied forces in NATO's Central Region are well
aware that there are likely to be severe procedural
and practical problems in transferring Class V ammu¬
nition supplies across the boundaries of two separate
32
national Corps. However, recognition of the problem
provides no guarantee that efforts will be made to
solve it. In 1986 at the 12th Meeting of NATO's Mili-
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tary Agency for Standardization Land Forces Logistics
33
Working Party, the US representative gave a:
...briefing on the essentiality of common
knowledge of ammunition procedures among
the member nations. The briefing covered
the need to select compatible ammunition
types from the stocks of all nations;
ammunition packaging and handling develop¬
ments in the US; and the need for common
training in ammunition ordering, packaging
and shipping procedures.3^
As a result of this briefing a group of Working Party
members drafted a 'statement of the problem'. The
indications at that stage seemed that the aim was
to solve the problem; however, the study was cancel-
3 5
led at the subsequent Working Party meeting in 1987,
thus the problem still remains. The types of fuzes
in use within NATO represents another example where
communications and forethought would benefit the Alli¬
ance as a whole; but as already noted, this data has
yet to be agreed and notified within NATO STANAGs.
3 6
A logistics study which is making headway in NATO
received a mention by the Chief of Staff of the US
Army, General Carl Vuono who, while noting that log¬
istics is a national responsibility, felt that the
development of a logistics doctrinal publication
37
should "build on allied logistic interoperability".
It is hoped that he is proved correct and real pro¬
gress continues; however, experience shows that full
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Q O
development takes time. An appropriate quote from
the ratification draft of the proposed NATO document
named Land Forces Logistics Doctrine summarizes the
position within the context of interoperability:
Logistics cannot be viewed from a purely
national perspective, but requires coopera¬
tion among NATO nations to achieve effective¬
ness, both in peace and in war. Logistic
interdependence requires a commitment of
other nations logistic requirements equivalent
to one's own. 39
* * *
In the general area of NATO standardization and
interoperability, a greater emphasis is often placed
upon the acquisition of the more visible weapon sys¬
tems and military equipment. It attracts domestic
political and economic attention within the procure¬
ment process, which may carry more weight than the
interests of NATO cooperation and standardization.
It is natural that expenditures of vast sums of money
for equipment purchases attract more attention than
other factors within a military Alliance; however,
sound interoperability of command and control and
operational procedures could create more realistic
40
'fighting power' than the much lauded procurement
of war machinery.
The most important contribution to interoperability
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within NATO concerns the provision of effective com¬
mand and control systems and the development of cooper¬
ative procedures. These two interrealted areas out¬
strip the advantages of the myriad types of battle¬
field hardware; for without proper command and con¬
trol and commonality of procedures within NATO, the
fighting machine lacks proper direction and timing.
This observation is quite clear and basic. While the
provision of command and control systems represents,
albeit essential expenditure, there are many proce¬
dures which would enhance Allied effectiveness and
would cost little except clarity of thought and deed.
NATO's Military Agency for Standardization (MAS)
4 1
is tied to the 'principles of NATO standardization'
of voluntary effort and therefore can only deal with
national proposals, or NATO command proposals which in
turn must be agreed by nations. Against this 'volun¬
tary' background it is not surprising that important
working parties meet at NATO Headquarters at best
42
annually.
There is sufficient scope within this complex sub¬
ject for a separate paper to identify areas within
NATO's Central Region where interoperable procedures
would provide significnt benefits. However, the aim
of this Chapter has been to provide a general feel for
the problem and to highlight some key areas. To start
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with, in a multi-nation military Alliance the responsi¬
bilities of each level of command should be the same.
Procedures and staff organizations within the military
headquarters should also be common. Cross-Corps log¬
istic procedures should be the same as should field
logistic systems. At present the focus of interoper¬
ability tends to fall upon the equipment procurement
end; whereas it is suggested that standardization
starting at the consumer on the battlefield would pro¬
vide greater benefits at less costs. In the words of
one German ally:
The most important element of an integrated
defence is the interoperability of forces
and equipment. Its prerequisite is the tech¬
nical compability of the weapon systems and
the equipment, and the application of common
command and control doctrines and operational
procedures.^ 3
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APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER 5
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SUBMISSION OF "PRINCIPLES OF NATO STANDARDIZATION"
Kots bv the Secrets:— General
The Working Group on Rationalization, Standardization
Interoperability: Improvement of NATO Standardization Agreement
and the ROle of the Military Agency 'for Standardization (MAS)
(AC/303) was established in April 3.979 following the decision
by the Council to arrange for a combined CHAD/Military Committee
reviev/ to be conducted as defined in PO/79/12(Reviaed).
2. The Group progresses slowly and the final report to
Council is noz yet ready. Houever, "Principles of NATO
Standardization" have been developed and were agreed by
the Group for submission to the Council.
3. Therefore, I recommend that the Council:
(a) endorses the "Principles of NATO Standardization"
_contained in the report at Annen;
(b) requests the Working Group to use these principles
aa the basis for its final report;
(c) invites the appropriate NATO organizations to use
these principles in their work and to implement
then as required.
A. Unless I am advised to the contrary by close of business
on 30th April 1962, I will assume that the Council accepts these
recommendations.
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PRINCIPLES OF NATO STANDARDIZATION
P.eport bv the Working Group
NATO Standardization is the process of femulating,
agreeing, implementing and updating standards for use within
NATO. NATO standardization is one means by which Alliance
nations may develop their collective capability to resist arced
attack as required by Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
It carries additional political value as an outward demonstration
of co-operation and solidarity. NATO standardization is voluntary
and is not an end in itself.
AIMS
1. The overall aim of NATO standardization is to increase
the effectiveness of the military forces of the Alliance. This
overall aim has interacting military and economic (including
industrial) components, and its attainment depends on political
will :
(a) The military aim of NATO standardization is to
increase the combined operational effectiveness
of the military forces of the Alliance.
(b) The economic aim of NATO standardization is to
increase overall efficiency in the use of available
Alliance defence resources. This includes, among
other things, increasing co-operation and eliminating
unnecessary duplication among Alliance nations in
research, development, production, procurement and
support of defence systems and equipment.
SCOPE
2. NATO standardization is a broad process which may be
applied to any NATO activity. NATO standards are normally
classified into one of three main groups as follows, although
some standards may apply to more than one group:
(a) "Operational standards" are those standards which
affect future and/or current military practice,
procedure or format(l). They may apply among other
things, to such .matters as concepts, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, logistics, training, organizations
reports, forms, maps and charts.
(1) "Operational" m zms context is usea in its widest sense to
connote all non-material aspects involved in preparing
for or conducting operations, or to ensure the interoperability
of systems, units or forces. Previously, these standards were
classified as "non-materiel", but more positive and descriptive
terms were needed.
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(b) "Materiel standards" are those standards which
affect the characteristics of future and/or
current materiel. They may cover production codes
of practice as -well as materiel -specifications.
Materiel Includes complete systems (including
weapons systems and supporting command, control
and communications systems), sub-systems, ACSi1(l)
and consumables (including ammunition, fuel,
supplies, stores and consumable spares).
(c) "Administrative" standards primarily concern terminology -
which apply to both the "operational" and the "materiel"
fields - but this category also includes standards which
facilitate Alliance administration in fields without
direcz military application (e.g. reporting of economic
statistics).
general considerations
3- NATO standardization is inherently a multi-national
activity, requiring the harmonization of national points of
view in order to achieve agreement and a national commitment
to implement.
A. Established NATO bodies have an inherent responsibility
to propose, formulate, progress and keep up-to-date those standards
which apply within the fields covered by their Terms of Reference.
5. NATO nations are responsible for equipping and supporting
their own military forces, and therefore only they can make
ultimate decisions on the development, production and acquisition
of materiel. These decisions are affeczed by complex nazional
ana international military, economic, technical and political
factors.
6. The Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) have the unique
responsibility within the Alliance to plan for and, when necessary,
to conduct combined military operations employing multi-national
forces. The MNCs therefore have an inherent responsibility to
establish standardization objectives and to recommend priorities
which enhance the combined operational effectiveness of the
Alliance's military forces.
7. Efforzs to harmonize technical specifications proposed
by nations, and to further overall co-operation with a view to
reducing duplication in research, development and production of
armaments, are normally progress under the aegis of the Conference
of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).
8. The NATO Military. Authorities (NHAs) participate in this
process as appropriate by providing NATO military requirements and
views to the CNAD and similar NATO bodies in accordance with
established policy(2). The NHAs do not normally propose technical
specifications for materiel.
1.1J Assemoiies , Componenxs, bpare Parts ana Materials







9- "Operational" and "materiel" standardization are
interdependent. Standardization in key operational areas,
such as concepts, doctrine, procedures and mission needs,
will greatly enhance prospects for standardization of aeteriel.
In turn, new technology will often require the reformulation
of doctrine and will almost always result in changes to
operational procedures. The full benefits of increased
materiel standardization nay net be achieved unless there
is extensive harmonization of operation aspects. The need
for improvement of interoperability of C3 systems as an
integral entity is recognized.
10. The NATO standardization process encompasses a wide
range of objectives, depending on the particular activity
involved and the purpose of specific standards within that
activity. Objectives for "operational standards" strive for
the use of identical or compatible concepts, doctrines,
procedures, practices or formats to enhance interoperability
of Alliance forces. In the event special regional standards
may be required, overall interoperability/compatibility with
other regional forces should be maintained. Objectives for
"materiel standards" strive for the procurement of compatible,
inmeroDerable, interchangeable or identical materiel systems
for Alliance forces.
THE NATO STANDARDIZATION PROCESS
11. There are three primary actions which constitute the
NATO standardization process:
(a) formulation (or updating) of NATO standards;
(b) agreement on NATO standards by nations individually;
(c) implementation of agreed NATO standards as a matter
of national policy.
12. The formulation of NATO standards is inherently
international in character and hence must be co-ordinated
internationally. In view of the wide range of Alliance
activities for which standards are desirable, the formulation
of proposed NATO standards will normally be decentralised.
Formulation of standards can best be accomplished by multi¬
national bodies of national experts.
13. Normally, proposed "operational" standards will be
formulated by groups of experts under the aegis of the NATO
Military Authorities and proposed "materiel" standards will
be formulated by groups of experts under the aegis of the
Conference of National Armaments Direczor3. In carrying out
these responsibilities, it is recognised that it may be
appropriate for one group of experts to formulate both kinds
of standards applying in a specific field. In this event, the
work will have to be carried out solely in a 15-country context.
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Id. The North Atlantic Council any designate selected
standardization objectives as "high priority0.
15. Specific proposed standards nay not be relevant to all
Alliance nations. A proposed standard nay be designated a
"NATO Standard" if several (not necessarily all) Alliance
nations agree that it is acceptable as a goal for implementation.
Ratification of a NATO standard by a nation represents the
appropriaxe ccnnitmenx to national implementation of the standard
within a reasonable tine and as soon as the conditions for
inplenenxation are known.
16. Implementation of agreed NATO standards is a national
responsibility". NATO strongly encourages implementation, in
part administratively by observing, monitoring and reporting
results on a naxicn-by-nation and case-by-case basis.
17. The effectiveness of the standardization process is
greatly dependent upon the information available to support it.
The need for a cenxral source of information, including the
status of all NATO standardization activities, NATO Standardization
Agreements (STANAGs), Allied Publications and other forms of
agreemenx to standardize, and an Information interface with
international standardization organizations is generally
recognised. The information must be readily available to all
users.
OPERATIONAL STANDARDISATION
18. The maximum practicable "operational" standardization
should be achieved as an essential prerequisite for inter¬
operability, which will ensure the effective combined employment
of NATO forces. Priority of effort will be directed to achieve
comprehensive NATO doctrine, tactics and procedures for Alliance
forces in support of agreed concepts. If necessary this can be
done on a regional basis. High priority will be given to the
harmcni zatior. of those concepts, doctrines and mission needs which
are considered essential to the effectiveness of future military
missions. This applies especially when new technology provides
emerging new operational capabilities which can be foreseen
15 to 20 years a'nead(l).
MATERIEL STANDARDIZATION
19- Materiel standardization encompasses complete systems
as well as sub-systems, and ACSM and consumables. ' Materiel
standards may cover production cedes of practice as well as all
aspects of materiel specifications. Appropriate objectives for
specific materiel standards therefore vary widely, depending on
the class of materiel under.consideration, and on whether a
particular objective is primarily military, economic or technical
in nature. When considering future complete materiel systems,
(a J Operational sxanaardizaxion of C3 sysxems includes primarily
the development of operational and procedural interoperability
standards.
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the military aspect may often be adequately met if systems
procured by various Alliance nations are compatible or
possess a specific degree of interoperability or inter--
changeability of components. Procurement of identical
systems may have definite advantages for military or
economic reasons. Such procurement will, however, often
require a political decision(l).
20. In formulating and progressing proposals for
increased materiel standardisation, priority will be given to
the development of valid estimates of the increased military
effectiveness.and/or economic savings associated with the
proposal.
21. Industrial standards agreed by recognised international
standardisation bodies should he adopted for use within NATO
without modification unless there are compelling reasons not
to do so.
ADMI?\TI S TP-ATIVZ STANDAPJOIZ ATI ON
22. Clear, precise and consistent nse of terminology is
essential for achieving intercommunication and understanding
in a multi-lingual Alliance. The standardisation of terminology
is a necessary prerequisite for progressing both operational and
materiel standardisation. The use of terminology within NATO
will be in accordance with the NATO Terminology Programme which
designates French and English dictionaries as the basic source
for definitions. If definitions of terms in the designated
dictionaries are inadequate for general NATO use, these terms
should be defined and submitted for possible inclusion in the
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6, and used in
accordance with the definitions therein. In these cases, first
consideration will be given to the acceptance of definitions
established by international bodies such as the United Rations,
International Standardisation Organisation or International
Slectrotechnical Commission. In certain fields 'of standardization
activity, it may he appropriate for experts to develop specialist
lists of terms ana definitions unique to their field. In these
cases, terms already in general use within NATO will not be
redefined to conform to specialist usage, ana experts in one
field should not expect that experts in other fields will necessarilly
accept special terminology.
23- Standardization in other administrative fields is
encouraged whenever it facilitates co-operation or efficiency
in the administration of Alliance activities. Administrative
standards agreed by recognised international standardization
bodies should be adopted for use within NATO without modification
unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.
(l) Materiel standardization of C3 systems primarily includes the
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REGIONAL STANDARDIZATION CONSIDERATIONS
2U. NATO-wide standardization, and standardization within
smaller groups of NATO countries on a regional, econonic or
other basis, are complementary. Standardization by groups
of NATO countries is better than no standardization at all.
Hence regional standardization is encouraged when
Alliance-wide standardization is neither necessary"nor
achievable. In some cases, military objectives for materiel
standardization will apply only within regional groupings of
nations, although wider standardization may be desirable for
economic or political reasons.
IMPLEMENTATION •
25- General responsibilities and arrangements necessary to
give effect to this document, will be published in a complementary
North Atlantic Council document.
26. Specific internal implementing procedures and details
should be published separately by the appropriate NATO bodies.
(Signed) V. GARSER
Chairman
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CHAPTER 6 - NATO COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTICS
It is generally sound to say that any
commander should have the same control
over the logistic Forces and resources
allocated to his use as he has over the
combat Forces allocated.
Henry E. Eccles"'"
Following an examination oF logistic stocks at Chap¬
ter 4, it was concluded that in NATO's Central Region
today, mobility is more important than the level oF
2
stocks. It was emphasized that logistic mobility
is linked to Full control and enhanced interoperabil¬
ity between nations For Class V supplies and systems.
The latter important aspects are discussed in the
previous chapter; however, even under 'best case'
conditions oF logistic interoperability, the military
requirements to exert eFFective command and control
over battleField resources remains paramount. This
Chapter aims to examine NATO command responsibilities
For logistics against the unsettling NATO dictum that
q
'logistics is a national responsibility'; but Firstly
it is necessary to brieFly restate the military com¬
mand chain For NATO's Central Europe land Forces.
For the uniFormed members oF the Alliance the
Military Committee, which meets at NATO Headquarters
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Brussels, is the highest military authority in NATO.
Its composition in peacetime is the Chief of Staffs
of all the member countries in the integrated mili-
4
tary structure of the Alliance, except Iceland.
The Chiefs of Staff meet at least twice yearly, or
more frequently when "it is deemed necessary". In
order to provide effective continuity,its daily policy
is undertaken by the nations permanent Military Rep¬
resentatives (MILREP's), who represent their coun¬
try's Chiefs of Staff. It is to this Committee that
the Major NATO Commanders are responsible, see the
diagram only recently prepared by NATO Headquarters,
at Figure 6.0.
The appointment of Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR) is traditionally allocated to an
American four star general, of which eight have
followed in the footsteps of its first famous com-
6
mander General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He initially
established the headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters
7
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris on 2 April 1951;
but it moved to its present site in Mons, Belgium
in March 1967 following the French decision to with-
g
draw from the Allied integrated command structure.
The Mons location is now well established and is vir¬
tually a mini-city which, including all employees
g
and dependants, comprises over 12,000 people. An
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<©
©©
CANADA—UJ REGIONAL PIANNING GROUP
Source
-NATOInformationSe vice,BrusselsNove ber1989
international staff appointments is: US - 31%, UK -
21%, GE - 16%, BE - 11%, IT and NL - 5%, other nations
2% or less .
The current SACEUR is General John R. Galvin, and
he commands a number of subordinate commands, see
Figure 6.1. SACEUR effectively delegates operational
command to his subordinate commanders as realistic¬
ally SHAPE can only monitor conventional operations
in wartime."'""'" The two main tasks of SACEUR in crisis
and war are: firstly, to initiate the request for
full US reinforcement of Europe via NATO's Defence
Planning Committee to the US President; secondly, to
request nuclear release in time of war when necessary,
12
by using the same chain of communications. This
latter action would only take place following a dire
request from a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC), of
which Commander Allied Forces Central Europe is one.
Allied Forces Central Europe has its headquarters
in Brunssum, The Netherlands, within a former national
coal mine complex. It is staffed by personnel of six
13
nations and is commanded by a German four star
general known as Commander-in-Chief Central Europe
(CINCENT). CINCENT has five Principle Subordinate
Commands (PSC's) all in the Federal Republic of Germany:
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general at Munchengladbach; Central Army Group (CENTAG),
commanded by a US general at Heidelberg; Allied Air
Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) commanded by a US
general at Ramstein; and the Second and Fourth Allied
Tactical Air Forces (ATAF's) that provide air support
to NORTHAG and CENTAG respectively.1^
The word command has been used several times in
this Chapter; however, within the international NATO
environment, the word implies different responsibility
and authority meanings compared with a normal national
15
perspective. There are four terms currently used
in NATO to describe command and control in the Alliance.
They are:
Full Command is the military authority
and responsibility of a superior officer
to issue orders to subordinates and
covers every aspect of military opera¬
tions and administration. It exists
only within national services.
The term "command" as used internation¬
ally implies a lesser degree of authority
than when it is used in a purely national
sense. It follows that no NATO commander
has full command over the forces that are
assigned to him. This is because nations,
in assigning forces to NATO, assign only
operational command or operational control.
Operational Command is the authority
granted to a commander to assign missions
or tasks to subordinate commanders , to
deploy units, to reassign forces and to
retain or delegate operational and/or
tactical control as may be deemed necessary.
It does not of itself include respons¬
ibility for administration or logistics.
(It may also be used to denote the forces
assigned to a commander).
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Operational Control is the authority dele¬
gated to a commander to direct forces
assigned so that the commander may accom¬
plish specific missions or taks which are
usually limited by function, time or
location; to deploy units concerned and to
retain or assign tactical control of those
units. It does not include authority to
assign separate employment of components
of the units concerned. Neither does it,
of itself, include administration or logis¬
tic control.
Tactical Control is the detailed and,
usually, local direction and control of
movements or manoeuvres necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
The military concept of full command which applies
to national forces where the commander effectively
17
exerts military authority over all subordinates,
is diluted within the international environment to
the allocation of 'operational command' only. This
designation meets the agreed requirement for indivi¬
dual nations to retain 'national responsibility' for
the logistics of their NATO assigned forces. This
principle is outlined in the North Atlantic Council
Resolution of 23 February 1952, which states:
The responsibility for logistic support
to national component forces will, in
general, remain with the responsible
authorities of the nations concerned.
The responsibility for coordination will,
however, rest with the Supreme Commander
and with his major subordinate commanders
at the appropriate levels.18
It is this Council Resolution that causes the imbal-
286
ance between responsibility (mission) of a NATO com¬
mander by limiting 'full command' to the less authori¬
tative concept of 'operational command' as defined.
It is suggested that the 1952 Council Resolution
to keep 'logistics a national responsibility' was
probably due to three main influences. Firstly, the
decision was made only seven years after the end of
the Second World War when some Allied countries were
frankly reluctant to surrender their national forces
19
to full NATO command; Secondly, the NATO management
37 years ago might not have been able to cope with
the additional logistics responsibility; thirdly,
the Allied force deployments were different from
20
today's 'layer cake mix, which sees five nations
forces deployed in one comparatively small Army Group
21
area.
The North Atlantic Council of 1952 made good pro¬
gress at a time when: one, Europe was only just begin¬
ning to recover from the effects of war, two, the
Korean War was in progress the other side of the
world; and three, the size of conventional Soviet
Forces placed great emphasis upon the Allies nuclear
22
deterrent. However, in the intervening years NATO
has expanded to include the Federal Republic of
Germany, France has opted out of the Allied inte¬
grated military command, a strategy of flexible
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response has been adopted, and greater emphasis is
now placed upon mechanization and battlefield mobil¬
ity. The military motivation to keep 'logistics
purely national' is weakening, exemplified by this
view:
It is a fundamental tenet of warfare that
the provision of adequate logistic support
is essential for success. It is equally
fundamental that control and exercise of
the logistic function cannot be divorced
from operational command.23
The above comment by Air Chief Marshal Sir Ruthven
Wade effectively damns the NATO definition of opera¬
tional command, which "does not in itself include
24
responsibility for administration or logistics";
and he is correct. For all the weight of NATO
responsibility and office, a commander cannot com¬
mand unless he also commands and controls logistic
resources; without this ability a commander can only
monitor and endeavour to coordinate.
* * *
| \ 24
The North Atlantic Councils^ I 1952 Resolution
provides NATO's Supreme Commander and his major sub¬
ordinate commanders the responsibility for 'coordin¬
ation' of logistic support. The word coordinate is
defined in Webster's Dictionary: "to regulate or
25
combine in harmonious action", and this description
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would seem to fit the intention of the Councils^
\J
Resolution. However, NATO has an official defini¬
tion of 'coordinating authority' which is a compre¬
hensive combination of words, but it does not give
an international commander the ability to compel
agreement. NATO's coordinating authority is defined
as :
The authority granted to a commander or
individual assigned authority for coor¬
dinating specific functions or activities
involving forces of two or more countries,
of two or more services or two or more
forces of the same service. He has the
authority to require consultation between
agencies involved or their representatives,
but does not have the authority to compel
agreements. In case of disagreement
between the agencies involved, he should
attempt to obtain essential agreement by
discussion. In the event he is unable to
obtain essential agreement, he shall refer
the matter to the appointing authority.
Within the above definition and guided by his terms
27
of reference, SACEUR has authority to establish
requirements for nations logistic resources; but
only in consultation with the national authorities.
Similarly, he can 'determine' the geographic distri¬
bution of resources and can make recommendations
concerning the quantity and quality of logistics to
be held. The difficulty with all the words used to
define a NATO commander's responsibility for logis¬
tics is that they do not offer true authority. The
word coordination within the NATO forum has come to
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mean consultation; however, as one distinguished
American logistician noted over thirty years ago:
"Responsibility for coordination must include authority
2 8
to make decisions".
At Supreme Allied Command Europe level the need
to have a real coordinating authority is probably
unnecessary. SACEUR's major war role can only involve
monitoring the situation and, as already mentioned,
being ready to recommend the use of and command
nuclear weapons should they be employed. However,
his major subordinate commanders do need the ability
to make decisions concerning logistics which eludes
them within the current NATO understanding of 'coor¬
dination'. The present sequence for Allied logistic
policies and requirements are therefore that proposals
are recommended by NATO commanders, agreed by national
consensus within appropriate NATO committees, and are
then coordinated by NATO commanders and finally imple-
29
mented by nations. This appropriate comment by
Anthony Cordesman in his 1988 book about NATO's Cen¬
tral Region forces serves to emphasize the problem:
This decoupling of strategy and resources
is probably the most consistent and most




While the foregoing section has made it clear
that in effect a NATO commander has no real authori¬
tative control over logistic resources, which remain
firmly a national responsibility, it is foreseen that
there may be times in a crisis of war that the situa¬
tion makes it essential to transfer logistic resources
from one nation to another in the interests of the
cohesion of the Alliance. This transfer is termed
'reallocation of resources' and is defined in NATO:
The provision of logistic resources by
the military forces of one nation from
those deemed "made available" under the
terms incorporated in appropriate NATO
documents, to the military forces of
another nation or nations as directed
by the appropriate military authority.31
In order to assist the coordination and consultation
of logistic requirements in crisis or war, each NATO
command headquarters has established a logistics
coordination centre or cell. These are made up of
national military representatives and one of the
missions of the Allied Command Europe Logistics Coor¬
dination Centre (ACE LCC) is to provide a link between
Allied nations and SACEUR "so that his operational
decisions can be consistent with logistic capabili¬
ties".^ There is a similar logistic cell at AFCENT
named the Multi-National Coordination Centre (MNCC)
and each of its Army Groups have some form of logis-
33
tic coordination centre for crisis and war. An
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important role of the ACE LCC is to maintain a list
of national logistic surpluses or deficiencies - the
former is sometimes ammunition 'made available' which
is perhaps obsolescent, but may be of value to a nation
still using the weapon. However, reallocation of
resources is subject to national voluntary agreements
and is not the prerogative of the NATO commander.
Because there may be a need to transfer logistic
resources in a war emergency, which would be espec¬
ially applicable to the Central Region due to the
international mix of corps, NATO has officially
defined the term 'reallocation authority' as:
The authority given to NATO commanders
and normally negotiated in peacetime,
to reallocate in "an emergency in war"
national logistic resources controlled
by the combat forces under their command,
and made available by nations , in order
to influence the battle logistically.35
The ability to reallocate national logistic resources
'controlled by the forces under their command' ties
NATO commanders to those resources 'made available
by nations' and is linked to an emergency in war.
This situation is limited in its duration (applicable
for only a short period) and an emergency in war is
defined as:
An operational contingency in a limited
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area caused by a critical aggravation
of combat operations and requiring special
and immediate action by National and
Allied Commanders. The existence of such
an emergency shall be determined by the
Allied Commander responsible for the
limited area involved, in consultation
with the National Commander concerned.36
A careful examination of the NATO definitions used
in connection with the reallocation of national logis¬
tic resources shows that the whip hand remains, at
all times, with the national commander and owner of
the stocks, A NATO commander has no real authority
or responsibility to direct a national commander to




...good combat leaders cannot ignore
the resupply and administrative func¬
tions. And to really get these func¬
tions to operate well, you can do it
only from the front.
o Q
General Hermann Balck
The General who, commanding the 48th Panzer Corps
in the Second World War which was responsible for
3 9"the virtual destruction of 3 Russian armies",
would doubtless be perplexed with today's NATO com¬
manders inability to exert full control over the
logistic resources of assigned troops. A fellow
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countryman General Hans Speidel is quoted by James
A. Huston in his book One for All, as saying "logis¬
tics as a national responsibility does not make any
40
military sense'; and this view is becoming more wide-
41
spread in NATO international military circles.
The logistic constraints which .affect NATO comman¬
ders are most certainly not applicable to commanders
in the Warsaw Pact forces who, on the basis of their
countries 'historical experience, ensure that full
command (within NATO definition) is applicable to
their field commanders. An objective analysis by
the American Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., who special¬
izes in Soviet Forces Logistics has noted that:
It was a basic conclusion from that
Second World War that each level of
command must possess its own rear
service resources. That is, rear
service reserves must be established
at every level to permit, as one
Soviet author put it, "the appropriate
command to influence the course of
events in time, and maintain the via¬
bility of the system of rear support
to the army in the field".^2
The aim of NATO should be to ensure that its com¬
manders have full control and responsibility of log¬
istics 'at the right level' so that they too can
influence the course of the battle and not just mon¬
itor events, for without control of logistics there
can be no real command responsibility.
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POSTSCRIPT
Noting that while member governments, in assigning
national forces to NATO Command, have entrusted the
lives of their soldiers to allied commanders, they
have not transferred sufficient control over mater¬




NOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philo¬
sophy (Rahway, New Jersey, 1965), p.100.
2. See Chapter 4, Note 189-
3. Unsettling because it conflicts with the old
military maxim that 'administration cannot be
divorced from command'.
4. Iceland, having no military forces, may be rep¬
resented by a civilian - NATO Logistics Hand¬
book (Brussels, 1989), p.4.
5. NATO Handbook (Brussels, 1986), p.35-
6. The Generals who followed Eisenhower were:
Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad, Lemnitzer,
Goodpaster, Haig, Jr., Rogers, and Galvin.
7. Temporarily in the former Hotel Astoria, on
the South side of the Avenue des Champs Elysees;
but shortly afterwards SHAPE moved to more per¬
manent accommodation at Rocquencourt.
8. President de Gaulle announced France's inten¬
tion to withdraw from the integrated military
structure on 10 March 1966, see NATO Facts and
Figures (Brussels, 1984), p.3^3-
9. SHAPE Public Information Office, 1989-
10. Ibid.
11. This represents the authorb fair, but experienced
j udgement.
12. See David M. Abshire, Preventing World War III:
A Realistic Ground Strategy (New York, 1988),
p.27 and in particular, Note 4.
13- BE, CA, GE, NL, UK and US.
14. NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1984), pp.106-
108.
15. Command: "to have authority over or control of".
Concise Oxford Dictionary.
16. NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels, 1989), pp.7-8.
17. In the British Army military discipline is upheld
by Act of Parliament.
296
18. North Atlantic Council Resolution of 23 February
1952, see NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels,
1989), pp.25-26.
19. A far greater suspicion of foreign armies existed
in those early days of the Alliance. (Author's
Notes ) .
20. Layer-cake mix:
(Source: David Greenwood, "Towards Role special¬
ization in NATO), NATO's Sixteen Nations (July
1986), p.46).
21. The Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).
22. It was in 1953 that the US began deploying tac¬
tical nuclear weapons to Europe. See Karsten
Voigt, Rapporteur Sub-Committee on Conventional
Defence in Europe, North Atlantic Assembly Paper
Conventional Defence in Europe (Brussels, 1985) ,
p.4.
23. Sir Ruthven Wade, "Defence Logistics: Evolution
or Revolution?", Brassey's Defence Yearbook
(London, 1978/9), p.142.
24. See NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels, 1989),
pp.25-26.
25. Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National
297
Defense (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1959), p.252.
26. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6.
27. NATO Document MC53/1 (Final) 1979 - SACEUR's
Terms of Reference.
28. Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National
Defense (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1959), p.252.
29. See NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels, 19 8 9 ) ,
p. 26 .
30. Anthony H. Cordesman, NATO's Central Region
Forces: Capabilities, Challenges, Concepts
(London, 1988), p.xxii.
31. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6.





37- This area was discussed with NATO's Director
of Logistics, Major General Homer D. Smith at
NATO Headquarters Brussels on 21 January 1987
who identified this as a serious problem -
author's notes.
38. General Hermann Balck, translation of taped
conversation 12 January 1979 by Battelle
Columbus Laboratories, Tactical Technology
Center (Columbus, Ohio, 1979), MIPR No. FY
7615-78-05106, p.49.
39. Ibid, Biographical Sketch, pp.3-4.
40. James A. Huston, One for All (Newark, Delaware,
1984), p.289. Author's observations following
informal visits to military headquarters in
Belgium, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic
of Germany.
41. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Sustaining Theater
Strategic Operations", The Journal of Soviet
Military Studies (April 1988), p.83.
42. From a draft recommendation by the WEU Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments, "State of
298
European Security: Logistics in Allied Forces
Central Europe", Western European Union





...it must constantly be borne in mind
that neither logistics, nor strategy,
nor tactics operates alone.
1
Hawthorne Daniel
At the beginning of this study, attention was drawn
to the inter-relationship between strategy, tactics
and logistics, not only within academic defence
studies, but also on the battlefield. For logistics
is a practical subject which involves management of
resources which could have a direct influence upon
life or death of one's own troops in war. Because
of its supreme importance to fighting troops, logis¬
tics as a subject can be as exacting as it is vital.
It involves the application of sound management in
its truest sense and it offers the rewards of contri¬
buting to team work which characterizes the military
culture in both peace and war. Past successes or
failures on the battlefield are mainly attributed to
a military commander's strategic or tactical plan
and often neglects logistic considerations. But
analysis of engagements frequently shows that it
was the presence or lack of essential logistic supplies
which really swayed the outcome. Examples abound,
but in keeping with the international nature of this
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study, it could be argued that the country leading
today's Western Alliance only came into being as a
nation due to the inadequacy of a transport system
carrying vital combat supplies to troops. It is
widely recognized that Burgoyne's surrender of his
5,763 men at Saratoga in 1777 stiffened the French
alliance and marked the turning point of the American
Revolution. The British defeat resulted primarily
from inadequate transport to cover a particularly
difficult 16 miles overland stretch between Lake
2
George and the Hudson River; thus it is advanced
that US Independence was swayed in no small measure
by the influence of logistics on the battlefield.
* * *
It is the influence of logistics upon a European
battlefield and the sustainability of today's fighting
troops, which resulted in the choice of 'NATO Logis¬
tics Policy (Central Region)' as an area for academic
study. In Chapter 1 it is explained that the original
Western European Union agreement that 'logistics is
a national responsibility' permitted Allied nations
a degree of latitude and resulted in:
- Different national battlefield logistic
management systems.
- Different national stock-levels.
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- Differences in logistics interoperability.
- The lack of authority for a NATO commander
to control logistic assets.
It is emphasised that this stance has impacted upon
the duration a conventional defence could be main¬
tained, and it has effectively kept the nuclear
threshold low. Furthermore, it is suggested that
immediate improvements are not likely due to four
main factors: first, a public perception of an easing
of the Soviet threat; second, the continuing growth
of West European peace movements; third, an impres¬
sion gained by many Western publics that NATO forces
could defeat a conventional attack; and fourth, a
genuine desire to see finite national funds spent
on peactime projects such as health, education and
conservation. However, the reality is that today
(1989) there is insufficient logistic support provid¬
ing inadequate sustainability for the troops assigned
to NATO command in war.
Chapter 1 notes that the geographic area for the
study - NATO's Central Region was chosen essentially
for three main reasons. Firstly, Britain has commit¬
ted substantial land and air forces to the region on
the basis that the forward defence of Europe repre-
sents the forward defence of UK itself; also, for
British taxpayers (thus stakeholders) it is signifi-
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cant that over 40% of the country's total defence
budget supports this deployment. Secondly, the
unique international mix of Allied nations forces
stationed side by side, in a comparatively limited
area and, as mentioned above with each operating
different national battlefield logistic systems,
offers a complex and challenging study topic.
Thirdly, the region is arguably the most important
part of NATO's defensive posture; providing mili¬
tary, industrial and economic resources as part
of the Western Alliance and as part of the European
Economic Community. To re-emphasise the criteria
of the study, the subject area 'military logistics'
narrows down the focus to land force logistics
and the geographic bounds of the thesis lie within
Central Europe where the United Kingdom, together
with the United States, provides its major support.
Two parameters or limitations outlined in Chapter 1
concerns the special relationship of France being
part of NATO, but not part of the integrated mili¬
tary structure, and the influence of European versus
American industry. Both these areas have been con¬
sidered but excluded to save clouding the basic
problem.
Chapter 2 touches upon the changing political
scene in Europe which has been described by the
4
US President as being "in a state of flux". A
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chronology of recent events draws attention to the
INF Treaty which led to increased emphasis being
placed upon the conventional leg of NATO's triad
of deterrence. It is noted that this area of conven¬
tional weakness resulted in a Conventional Defence
Improvement initiative launched by NATO some two
years before the INF agreement. The problems of
the expense of conventional improvements, at\a time
of declining defence budgets, does not auger/well
f Jfor substantial investments by NATO nations./ An
Allied approach to arms control and disarmament in
the CFE negotiations may result in future conven¬
tional force reductions, and ease the twin problems
of: (a), a preponderance of Warsaw Pact military
might; and (b), the cost penalties of enhancing
NATO's conventional deterrent.
In Chapter 3 the varying systems of battlefield
logistic management are assessed. It is noted that
while there is a general similarity between the
various methods used; the UK is out of step with
its immediate Allies. "The British Army is alone
amongst the NATO forces in AFCENT and the Warsaw
5
Pact in not providing brigades with logistic support".
This situation has developed over time and British
Battlegroups now do not have sufficient transport
"to carry their first line support or to effect their
own re-supply".^ The lessons of Saratoga are, alas,
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long forgotten. The planned introduction of logis¬
tic handling equipment (DROPS) should reduce battle¬
field transport turnaround times and help to redress
the transport lift shortfalls; however, one senior
7
officer has warned that "DROPS is not a panacea".
In the wider context of NATO's logistic management
systems, a former Commander Northern Army Group has
recommended more integration of defence resources
with these words:
We could create a single NATO logistic
system. At the moment we have seven
national Lines of Communication weaving
their way cross Europe and duplicating
each other. Army Group Commanders have
very little control over their rear areas
or logistics which is a serious weakness.8
The sensitive subject of NATO logistic stock-
levels and burden-sharing pressures is outlined in
Chapter 4. The lack of sustainability mentioned
by several NATO military leaders, including the
former SACEUR could easily be transposed to read
'lack of ammunition stocks', for it is here that
the situation is most serious. A shortfall of
sufficient conventional ammunition could well force
NATO to implement the second leg of its triad of
deterrence - theatre nuclear weapons - much sooner
than prudence would dictate; but this situation is
not new. A policy was made in the earlier days of
the Alliance that nations should stock sufficient
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ammunition for their forces to conduct defensive
operations until such time that re-supply could
commence from 'surged' industrial ammunition produc¬
tion - a logical plan. At the time NATO planners
assessed this would require 90 days and surprisingly,
the Russians made a similar appreciation and deter¬
mined the same figure (in fact 3 months). Due to a
number of factors discussed in Chapter 4, NATO
amended the 90 days to an 'interim' target of not
less than 30 days, with an implicit proviso that
nations should be ready to gear-up industrial pro¬
duction to surge rates certainly much faster than
the original 90 days plan. It is quite clear that,
with the exception of the US, nations are nowhere
near meeting the agreed 'interim' goal. In addition,
the Western ammunition production base is rapidly
declining to the extent that it could not now even
meet the initial 90 day demands to surge production.
A final complication is that the planning guidance
produced by SHAPE concerning daily ammunition expendi¬
ture rates per weapon system is considered, by some,
to be low for various categories of ammunition. The
stocks of conventional munitions held by the European
members of the Alliance, varies between only hours
in double figures and days in single figures to the
low teens depending upon the intensity criteria used;
but in any event, the figures all fall short of the
basic interim measures agreed by nations. In contrast,
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the Soviet Union has retained its 3 month figure and
all the indications are that the State has met these
requirements with 90-100 day stocks positioned forward
in their Western Theatre of Military Operations which
faces NATO's Central Region. It is the quantity and
location of these stocks which have generated unease
publicly expressed by General John R. Galvin, the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
It is against this background where the INF agree¬
ment has placed greater reliance upon conventional
forces that America is pressing its Allies to do more
within the burden-sharing debate. Conventional ammu¬
nition and fuel is expensive and nations are frankly
reluctant to set aside the necessary funds. In
Chapter 4 it is emphasised that the major impetus for
Allies to take more share of the collective burden
stems from US political initiatives rather than true
objective judgement. Nevertheless, given the state
of Allied sustainability on the battlefield, the
American concern is understandable. Difficulties of
a different nature are covered in Chapter 5, where
NATO interoperability is discussed in detail. The
problem is that standardization and interoperability
is voluntary within NATO and in consequence, progress
is far too slow. Key committees at best meet annually
and its work is hampered by the 'voluntary principle'.
There are severe difficulties, not only concerning
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the interoperability of different national weapons
and equipments; but also in procedures. The latter
aspect is serious as efficiency could be enhanced
by standardizing methodology at virtually no cost
to the nations, but it is disappointing to record
so little progress for an Alliance 40 years old at
the time of writing. A graver concern is reserved
for a NATO commander who, as outlined in Chapter 6 ,
has no effective control over the logistic resources
of the troops placed under his command.
It was mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter
that logistics is a practical subject which involves
the management of resources which could have a direct
influence upon the life or death of one's own troops
in war. The most serious shortfall in NATO logis¬
tics policy in the Central Region concerns a shortage
of ammunition stocks against the sure knowledge that
some Allied Corps sectors would face a greater enemy
pressure than others. The level of defence is not
even, as it must resp to the pressure points
created by the aggres initiative. Yet, when
resources are so limited, it is a nonsense to spread
finite stocks across the region under the cloak of
'national responsibility'. As the aim is to main¬
tain an effective conventional defence as long as
*
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possible - then some innovative management of resources
is essential. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 4,
where a feasible solution involves centralizing the
greater proportion of national logistic stocks under
a NATO commander's control; but decentralizing trans¬
port resources to provide mobility. The importance
of mobility is stressed as being a key; but the cen¬
tralization of ammunition requires a degree of stan¬
dardization or interoperability (as defined in Chapter
5), linked to effective control. There is a precedent
for this type of resource management as the allocation
of fuel to Central Region NATO Corps and air bases
is coordinated at joint Army Group/Allied Tactical
Air Force level under the overall command of AFCENT.
These resources are firmly managed to ensure that
priority is given on the basis of the NATO commander's
plan and the developing tactical situation. The tem¬
plate is available for this management methodology
to also embrace ammunition. If adopted, it would
allow the Central Region Army Groups to extend the
duration of their conventional operations. At the
battlefield level, the scheme requires mobility and
control of logistics 'at the right levels'; but this
is achievejable at less cost than stockpiling to the
agreed scale, even if national funds were available.
In other words, thirty days of ammunition held by
all Central Region Allied nations would provide thirty
plus days sustainability if the resources were managed
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at NATO level.
The fundamental logistic weaknesses which have
been discussed can be traced to the 1952 decision
that 'logistics is a national responsibility'. This
has been enhanced by national interests to keep
logistics national for both political and economic
considerations. This latter point is assisted by
national annual defence and budget cycles which per¬
mit logistic stock purchasing to be used to balance
accounts. It is easier to cut a fuel or ammunition
purchase when under economic pressure than to can¬
cel a longstanding equipment project with its many
political-military implications. Such logistic cuts
can remain 'under the counter' for significant periods
and a move to centralize the coordination of national
ammunition on a NATO basis may not find immediate
favour with all nations; but times are swiftly chang¬
ing.
The INF agreement of 1987 has placed a greater
emphasis upon the conventional leg of NATO's triad
of deterrence; but possible future cuts of conven¬
tional forces in Central Europe through the CFE talks,
see Chapter 2 Appendix B, will have a further impact
upon NATO forces. In a post-reduction environment,
the cuts in conventional force strengths paradoxi¬
cally increases the sustainability of the remaining
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Soviet forces creating an even greater logistic
imbalance that exists at present. It is a concern
which should spur the NATO alliance to enhance its
own force sustainability as a matter of urgency.
The timing may now be right for national implica¬
tions of battlefield logistics to be set aside in
the interests of adopting effective methods of
resource management.
* * *
In many things the best solutions to problems
are very often the simplest. This thesis therefore
ends with five specific points or pointers which it
is concluded would improve NATO's logistic posture
in the Central Region of Europe today:
- First, the adoption by nations of similar
battlefield logistic management systems
to enhance flexibility and operational
cross-corps support in times of war.
- Second, a national agreement for a specific
quantity of Class V supplies to be held
under AFCENT command with control of allo¬
cation devolved to Army Groups to increase
Allied 'sustainability'. This can be
achieved by ensuring that ammunition is
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available where it is most required and
not spread thinly across the Central Region.
- Third, an agreement by nations to introduce
a three year budget cycle for the funding
of defence materiel, and to provide accurate
reports of logistic stock-levels at each
level of NATO command.
- Fourth, NATO should re-define the 'logistics
is a national responsibility' agreement at
its highest decision-making level to ensure
that a NATO commander is mandated to control
consumer logistic resources of all the forces
placed under his command.
- Fifth, NATO should amend the 'voluntary'
principle of standardization where it applies
to interoperability of:
- Command and control systems and pro¬
cedures .
- Ammunition for common weapons systems.
The above quite simple measures comprise three conclu¬
sions for nations and two conclusions for NATO. The
aim is to improve the logistic sustainability of
Allied conventional forces as a means of raising the
nuclear threshold through the maintenance of fighting
power. This can be achieved by implementing the five
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conclusions of this study; where it is emphasized
that, in defensive operations today, mobility and
control of logistics at the right level is essential
for battlefield success.
This paper represents a substantial contribution
to the subject knowledge of NATO military logistics
policy and systems and is based upon many years of
logistic experience reinforced by international
level research. Strategy, tactics, management systems
and economics are all important in the NATO environ¬
ment. However, in the final analysis it is man, not
functions who make things happen and really matter.
The Allies1 best resources are its soldiers. They must
be supported wisely and well.
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AAFCE Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AAP Allied Administrative Publication
ACE Allied Command Europe, the area commanded
by SACEUR
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH Allied Forces - Northern Europe
AFSOUTH Allied Forces - Southern Europe
ATAF Allied Tactical Air Force
BAOR British Army of the Rhine
BAS Battle Attrition Study
CDI Conventional Defence Improvements
CENTAG Central Army Group
CEOA Central Europe Operating Agency
CEPS Central Europe Pipeline System




COS Chief of Staff
C. Sups Combat Supplies
CZ Combat Zone
DAER Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rate
DCOS Deputy Chief of Staff
DOS Days of Supply
DPC Defence Planning Committee
DPQ Defence Planning Questionnaire; a series
of questions put to nations by NATO
Headquarters to assess their military
capabilities and planning
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DROPS Demountable Rack Offloading and Pickup
Systems
EUROGROUP Group of European NATO Members
EUROLOG EUROGROUP Logistic Sub-Group
EWG Executive Working Group
FCU Fuel Consumption Unit
FCZ Forward Combat Zone
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FLOT Forward Line Own Troops
FOUR ATAF 4 ATAF/Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force.
GDP General Defence Plan/Gross Domestic
Product
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile
GNP Gross National Product
GTNC German Territorial Northern Command
GTSC German Territorial Southern Command
HNS Host Nation Support
IGB Inner German Border
IMS International Military Staff; the staff
at NATO Headquarters which supports the
Military Committee
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IPC Industrial Planning Committee
IS International Staff; the staff at NATO
Headquarters which supports the North
Atlantic Council
JOC Joint Operations Centre
LCC Logistic Co-ordination Centre
LOC Lines of Communications; a general term
covering the land and sea routes to be


























Military Agency for Standardization
Military Committee
Military Representative to the Military
Committee
Multiple Launch Rocket System
Major NATO Commander; i.e., SACEUR,
SACLANT, DINCHAN (see also MSCs and
PSCs )
Multi-National Co-ordination Centre (at
AFCENT)
Main Operating Base; a major military
airfield
Ministry of Defence
Memorandum of Understanding; an agreement,
covering such matters as Host Nation
Support, often made between Ministries





NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency/Organi-
zation





Nato Wartime Oil Organization
(National) Permanent Representatives to
the North Atlantic Council
Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
Principal Subordinate Commander
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QMG Quarter-Master-General (of the Army)
RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps
RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps
RARS Review of Ammunition and Related Scales
RCT Royal Corps of Transport
RCZ Rear Combat Zone
REME Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SCEPC Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHORAD Short Range Air Defence weapons/missle
systems etc
SNLC Senior NATO Logisticians' Conference;
the senior NATO advisory body on con¬
sumer logistics, consisting of both civil
and military members
STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
STC SHAPE Technical Centre
TWO ATAF 2 ATAF/Second Allied Tactical Air Force
UKMF United Kingdom Mobile Force
USAFE United States Air Force (in) Europe
USAREUR United States Army (in) Europe
WEU Western European Union
WG Working Group




The bibliography aims to provide a specific and
singular contribution to the subject knowledge of
this particular discipline and is arranged in five
sections to assist identification of the sources
and methods used. It is noted on page 1 of the
main text that there are 'few books on logistics'
in comparison to those on strategy and tactics and
research has proved this view to be correct. How¬
ever, the three elements: strategy, tactics and
logistics are totally interdependent and this rela¬
tionship is reflected within the bibliography; but
the main emphasis is properly placed upon the broad
spectrum of military logistic studies and management.
Section I comprises essential 'foundation' research
material of a unique and particular nature. It is
divided into three sub-sections: (a) specific docu¬
mentation including original NATO policy references
for which, in general terms, there is "no direct access"
due either to a security classification or to confidentia¬
lity? (b) material with a limited availability which
had to be unearthed through a degree of investigative
perseverance; and (c) a record of the unique
interviews/discussions conducted with key personnel,
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spanning several countries, during the tenure of
the study. The resulting materials from these impor¬
tant discussions, which included attendance as an
observer at a Senior NATO Logisticians Conference
are held under cover of personal and in some instances
NATO confidentiality; but each provided valuable sign¬
posts and support for this academic defence logistics
research. It is considered that the information
listed in Section I and in particular, in sub-sections
(a) and (c), corresponds to primary source material.
Section II records reports, studies and research
papers relevant to the study, including the committee
reports of the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels
who provided direct assistance. The Special Report
NATO in the 1990s is of particular significance.
Section III contains a list of contemporary articles
which also represent a vital area of research for a
topic where the emphasis is very much placed upon the
present - the European battlefield of today - a truly
dynamic situation.
Section IV lists a number of important yearbooks,
handbooks and annual reports which includes UK's
Statement on the Defence Estimates, annual threat
assessment publications and, in view of Western
Europe's steady advance to the single market of
1992, some data from the European Communities. The
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final Section V does indeed list some of the valuable
'few books on logistics', but is augmented by mono¬
graphs, not only from the strategy/tactics arena,
but also from the field of management science.
This latter aspect is important, for logistic support
on the battlefield of the 1990s will require signifi¬
cant resource management where the focus must be
placed upon management.
The bibliography is structured as follows:
SECTION I - Primary Source Material:
(a) Guideline Material - No Direct
Access .
(b) Material - Limited Availability
(c) Interviews/Discussions.
SECTION II -- Reports, Studies and Research Papers
SECTION III -- Articles.
SECTION IV -- Yearbooks, Handbooks and Annual
Reports.
SECTION V - Select Monographs.
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